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In my opinion, the strongest point of the publication is that it is so 
comprehensive, showing the main elements of energy transition against 
the background of their practical applications in ten selected countries. 
I would recommend the book to anyone who wants to understand the 
comprehensive approach to the analysis of energy transition as well as 
the practical forms of its implementation.
Władysław Mielczarski, Full Professor 
Lodz University of Technology
It is a book for all those who are interested in an active participation in 
the process of energy sector transition at any level of political, economic, 
or technological structures. It provides, first of all, the “food” for matter-
of-fact discussion and debate on the trends connected with energy 
policy transitions, the reasons for them, and the ways of implementing 
different models of energy transition in different countries. The authors 
of the volume have put considerable effort into preparing a list of 
valuable references, which should be helpful in further studies of the 
discussed issues.
Piotr D. Moncarz, NAE, Adjunct Professor
Stanford University
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Michał KURTYKA1
The concept of “transition” is already deeply rooted in the vocab-
ulary of energy management, and the aim of this book is to present 
it in all its many facets. The book is not an attempt to assess or com-
pare the ways chosen by the world’s largest economies to achieve their 
visions of energy transition. Without passing unnecessary judgments, 
this volume covers the different roles energy sources play in the pro-
cess, showing the diversity and multiplicity of various “transitions”. 
It describes what is happening in countries such as Germany or Den-
mark, which have made energy transition a priority, but we also look 
at the likes of Great Britain, France and Italy who are combining tra-
ditional and renewable energy production methods, while also making 
reference to Central European countries such as Austria, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic.
I think as you explore the abundance of data and detailed descrip-
tions contained in this volume, you will find yourselves pondering 
questions about the nature of the process that we have decided to call 
“energy transition”. Is it a mere result of “dispassionate” technical pro-
gress? Is it more the effect or the cause of the changing ways of thinking 
about energy? We are used to approaching national energy strategies 
as determined mostly by technical (i.e., apparently objective) condi-
tions. And for obvious reasons they may not ignore objective laws of 
1 Michał Kurtyka, PhD, Deputy Minister of Energy, Ministry of Energy, Plac Trzech 
Krzyży 3/5, 00-507 Warsaw sekretariatmkurtyka@me.gov.pl
Opinions expressed in the book by Michał Kurtyka, PhD are his personal views and 
not the official stance of the Ministry of Energy.
The author would like to thank Professor Leszek Jesień, Professor Konrad Świrski, 
and Ms Monika Morawiecka for comments to the text.
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physics. However, they are also a powerful tool for communicating 
values which have great importance to our communities. Energy sys-
tems are also dependent on the political and cultural environments in 
which they are embedded. Moreover, they are inspired by industrial 
strategies and they develop platforms for these strategies: friendly for 
some, deadly for others. Assuming a broader perspective, while reading 
this book it is worth asking ourselves whether we are “merely” expe-
riencing the erosion of the previous energy paradigm, embodied in 
energy transition, or whether we should also question the traditional 
framework of reference through which we analyse energy strategies. 
Actually, there is more and more evidence to suggest that the classic 
energy trio (competitiveness, security of supply and environmental 
protection) is not enough to understand all that is going on in the world 
of energy. A new trio is emerging: social expectations, technological 
changes and industrial policy. This new set in some ways enhances 
the old, but in others it might actually be coming to replace it. 
The sources of energy transition involve a breakthrough in each 
element of the “new trio”. Firstly, it is a question of the ultimate goal 
of economic development, asked by the citizens of developed econo-
mies, providing the background for much debate. There is growing 
public disapproval of the influence civilization has on our surround-
ings, our natural environment and our climate. Developed societies 
are becoming more and more sensitive to environmental matters. 
Secondly, we are witnessing the emergence of new technologies which 
involve sourcing energy from water, wind or sunlight. They no longer 
require fossil fuels, using natural forces instead. Thirdly, being less 
visible to external observers yet equally fundamental are countries’ 
industrial strategies surfing on the wave of these new technologies 
and trends. With the help of pioneers in technological breakthroughs, 
modern countries are creating markets for their solutions using the 
regulatory instruments of the state, hoping that the increased scale 
and accumulation of competencies on a national level will help them 
secure a globally competitive advantage. 
Mass individualization and robotisation are about to became the 
driving forces of the post-industrial era. In wealthy economies, human 
work and labor-intensive “tailoring” are being displaced by uniform 
products using common basic features, where production is becoming 
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more and more automated. Individualization can and is becoming the 
object of industrialization. Fads come and go; modifying and fixing 
products is unprofitable, so they are becoming increasingly dispos-
able, matching instead consumers’ rapidly changing tastes. The life 
cycle of most products is becoming increasingly shorter. 
When applied to the energy industry, a new dynamic is emerging 
in which all elements of the new trio work to reinforce each other. 
The compact character of renewable home installations means that 
dispersed energy corresponds perfectly well to the idea of energy 
democratization. Up till now, the technologically advanced, conven-
tional methods of energy production required the knowledge and 
competence of many people. And then economies of scale ensured 
the supply of relatively cheap energy. More capital-intensive renewa-
ble technologies provide opportunities for research and development. 
This is occuring today at the expense of a rise in the per-unit cost of 
energy production, financed by subsidies. But wealthy communities 
are agreeing to incur these higher costs in return for a move away from 
fossil fuels, believing that future energy production methods will have 
less impact on our climate than the two previous centuries of industrial 
development. In the future, robotization, the drive towards standard-
ization and shorter life cycles of industrial products may reduce the 
cost of producing and then installing standardized renewable energy 
technologies in millions of homes. Are they going to become the object 
of mass consumption? Who knows, perhaps now that the age of great 
industrial undertakings and associated wide-scale energy production 
facilities is coming to an end, the future might involve a new form of 
“disposable energy production installations”? If so, then the triple cycle 
will conclude. After lengthy investment efforts, wealthy communities 
may become even wealthier, feeling they have done well for the planet, 
and energy production technologies may become more standardized 
(and maybe ultimately also cheaper). In any way, the energy indus-
try will become thoroughly renewable and renewed at the same time.
As a result of the three above-mentioned factors, the most com-
mon understanding of energy transition (supported by communities’ 
expectations) is the political will to move away from centralized use 
of fossil fuels towards diversified energy generation using renewable 
resources. This process is accompanied by the growth of new branches 
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within the industry.2 The community-technology-industry trio thereby 
aims to became a self-propelled spiral of growth. Nowadays, it is ris-
ing at the expense of an increase in the unit price of energy, so in 
order to limit the inevitable rise of costs of energy consumption in the 
economy, energy transition thus is accompanied by policies aimed at 
increasing energy efficiency.3 Modernity, dating back to the Renais-
sance, should no longer be tantamount to incessant growth (growth in 
terms of the wealth, consumption, production, life expectancy etc.) but 
also encompass self-limitation. We would now like our future growth 
to be compatible with a reduction in energy usage. 
The European Union has set itself one of the most ambitious goals 
in terms of energy transition. The objective is to ensure its position 
as world leader in renewable energy production and to fight global 
warming by reducing greenhouse gas emission by between 80% and 
95%.4 The project is widely supported, both by the governments of EU 
member states and (predominantly) by Western European societies 
and industries.5 At a time when Europe no longer claims a position of 
global dominance, energy transition is becoming one way to maintain 
European leadership, not in political or military, but in moral terms. 
The EU is the most active advocate of the setting of planetary goals 
and ambitions through climate protection, believing this to be the best 
way to find new sources of economic and industrial growth. France’s 
newly elected president Emmanuel Macron responded to Donald 
Trump’s decision to pull the USA out of the Paris Agreement with the 
words “Make our planet great again”, thereby not only paraphrasing 
the American President’s electoral slogan, but also echoing what many 
Europeans believe is a shared responsibility to protect the future of our 
2 Relationships between energy strategy and industrial strategy are illustrated by 
the example of the situation in Austria and the United States. 
3 The concept of energy transition is defined in detail in another chapter. Its descrip-
tion presented above is supplemented with the component of social expectations and 
the resultant political will of departure from fossil fuels towards renewable ones. 
4 See e.g., 2050 Energy Strategy, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strat-
egy-and-energy-union/2050-energy-strategy (accessed: 20.08.2017). 
5 I. Jakuszko-Dudka, Energiewende - konsensus społeczny, a nie fanaberie [Ener-
giewende: a social consensus, not a whim], http://cse.ibngr.pl/wp-content/uploads/
cse-iwona_jakuszko-dudka-energiewende-konsensus_spoleczny_a_nie_fanaberia.
pdf (accessed: 19.08.2017).
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world. Energy transition serving climate ambition has given Europe 
a new direction, not only in terms of a local but also global narrative. 
Its central motif is the move aware from fossil fuels: the symbol of 
caring for the environment, the expression of responsibility wealthy 
communities have to care for those with fewer resources, especially 
where climatic and economic, or even existential, challenges collide. 
This is the case in places such as the Pacific Islands, whose gradual 
erosion due to rising sea levels is the most common example of cli-
mate warming and its dire results. 
As already mentioned, climate concern involves the belief, popular 
with European consumers, that economic growth of the industrial age 
was not always in line with due care for the environment and contem-
porary capitalism, being focused solely on satisfying consumer needs, 
disregards the natural resources that it exploits. The common goal of 
energy transition originates from generations of experience, making 
common activity meaningful, and serving as a factor which strength-
ens communities both politically and morally. This global ambition 
has been symbolically reflected in the language of our western neigh-
bours. Energiewende, the German term for energy transition, is based 
around the word “Wende” which literally means a dramatic 180 degree 
turn, and was used with reference to the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
and the comprehensive evolution of Germany following its reunifi-
cation. This linking of energy transition with German reunification 
carries a profound historical and civic message. 
However, despite the relatively broad historical and philosophical 
ambitions communicated in this way, for many European countries 
the fight against climate change – both at civil and governmental level 
– is at heart about replacing fossil fuel based energy production with 
new technologies which use wind, sunlight, waste, biomass and water. 
Coal, which for many symbolises a bygone age of industrialisation, is 
publicly condemned in narratives connected with energy transition in 
Europe. Hence, decarbonization has become the central pillar of the 
Energy Union (the equivalent of a European energy strategy). Coal is 
the only one of all the fossil fuels to have become labelled as “dirty”, 
thus becoming the symbol of “bad” industrialization in the eyes of the 
public. Even the seemingly positive search for “clean coal” technology 
implies a problem: the cleaner the coal of the future, the dirtier the 
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coal of today. The gas industry has succeeded (although we might ask 
whether this success is only down to them, and what role has been 
played by national interests) in making us believe that gas, whose 
combustion emits half as much carbon dioxide as coal, deserves the 
popular label of “clean”: after all, gas is colloquially referred to as “blue 
fuel”. As a result, the ambition of energy transition has narrowed to 
attempts at eliminating coal, and any discussion about gas has been 
quietly disregarded, attributing this form of fuel a “transitional” char-
acter. Crude oil, responsible for the third remainder of carbon dioxide 
emissions due to its use by the transport sector, has been practically 
ignored, even though combustion engines have ten times the power 
of that installed in the production of electric energy.6
Challenges to European energy transition 
The European concept of energy transition understood and devel-
oped in this way still leaves questions to be asked. The new “trio” 
comes up against barriers which originate in the preceding trio. Social 
expectations, renewable technologies and new industrial strategies 
must try hard to maintain competitiveness, ensure security of supply 
and a global environmental balance. 
First of all, given the knowledge we have now, unifying the system of 
energy provision in all European countries using renewable resources 
is an unprecedented challenge in terms of expenses and materials. 
Effective delivery of such a transition is a very complex undertaking. 
It involves a number of factors, such as the country’s unique features, 
its geographical location, size and potential for the development of 
renewable energy sources, its previous way of developing its energy 
mix, its willingness to incur extra costs, and so on. Not all countries 
can develop hydropower like Sweden, Norway or Austria, because not 
all have the necessary environmental conditions. Few are lucky enough 
to have an abundance of sunlight, like Spain or Portugal. The size of 
the country is not unimportant if its ability to produce energy from 
renewable energy sources (such as wind or sunlight) per 1 m2 of surface 
area (so-called power density) is several orders of magnitude lower 
6 In the EU, crude oil has already been eliminated as a fuel from which electricity is 
produced (see chapter on the role of fossil fuels in energy transition). 
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than that of conventional sources. This means that in order to ensure 
sufficient energy for more and more urbanized mankind, centralized 
wind and photovoltaic farms require huge areas for their develop-
ment.7 In other countries, such as Poland, the historical energy path 
has been dominated by a single fuel. Poland has not witnessed even 
a symbolic development of nuclear energy, such as in neighbouring 
countries with a similar history (e.g., the Czech Republic, Slovakia or 
Ukraine). The Polish mix is dominated by that much-maligned fuel – 
coal. From the point of view of the above-mentioned European energy 
ambition, this is a huge challenge, especially as its historical experi-
ence means Poland attaches great importance to issues of energy and 
geopolitical security connected with autonomous energy supplies, not 
only in terms of resources but also of technology. As a result, it is one 
of the most energy-independent states in the EU.8 
If Energiewende has allowed Germany to install more than 50 GW 
wind power and 40 GW photovoltaic power, it has come at an extremely 
high price. A German consumer adds as much money to production 
from renewable sources as an American pays for their whole energy 
bill. Calculated using averaged wholesale prices, the aggregate annual 
value of the German market of electricity production is less than €20 
billion, while subsidies for renewable sources are €25 billion. German 
decision makers are concerned about how much it costs to run a sys-
tem fully based on renewable sources9, in spite of its many positive 
aspects. In the case of Germany, we should remember that despite 
very robust economic growth, the demand for electricity is not going to 
increase as spectacularly. There are considerable surpluses of produc-
tion capacities, while 80% of Germans are willing to continue paying 
extra money for energy transition. They also approve of the idea of 
cross-subsidizing industries: an average German worker pays twice 
as much for their electricity at home as the company they work for. In 
7 R. Wilson, The Future of Energy: Why Power Density Matters, http://www.theen-
ergycollective.com/robertwilson190/257481/why-power-density-matters (accessed: 
20.08.2017).
8 Polish power sector getting the facts straight, http://www.pkee.pl/upload/files/
Unpopular_facts_about_polish_power_sector[10].pdf (accessed: 20.08.2017).
9 Renewables versus fossil fuels - comparing the costs of electricity systems, https://
www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/Stromwelten_2050/Agora_
Gesamtkosten-Stromwelten-EN_WEB.pdf (accessed: 20.08.2017). 
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comparison, Poland’s demand for energy is quickly growing (especially 
at peak summer levels), while energy production facilities built in the 
60s, 70s and 80s are slowly coming to the end of their lives, and it is 
necessary to either create new installations of energy production or 
thoroughly modernize the old. Besides, costs for the industry, espe-
cially energy-intensive branches, are already quite high, and in the 
case of households, the share of energy costs in family budgets is one 
of the highest in Europe. 
Thus, while shaping European energy policy, we should not assume 
that the technical conditions of its implementation will be the same 
everywhere, nor that all the communities are ready to shoulder simi-
lar costs in energy transition. For some, the share of energy expenses 
in family budgets has reached its limit. Poland, with its 10% share, is 
currently in a much more difficult situation than Germany with 5%, 
so there is serious objection to transferring the costs of energy tran-
sition to the end customer here. 
Secondly, the way in which renewable installations are working 
means that in the foreseeable future they will not be able to function 
independently. Even though the sun stops shining each day, and the 
winds don’t always continue blowing, the energy needs consumers 
have are there to be matched, and the need to balance demand and 
supply makes it necessary to maintain a parallel system, in which 
conventional energy sources and storage facilities serve a back-up 
role. The German system of energy production delivers one third of 
its total energy demand from renewable sources at the expense of not 
only double, but 250% of its generating capacity. Despite this dual and 
expensive system, it is impossible to achieve a share of production 
higher than that. There are periods when wind do not blow in large 
areas, and the nights remain long.
In this context, a further increase in how much energy is meant 
to be produced using renewable sources may not be the only solution. 
It is necessary to search for other options. Many people believe these 
can be found through effective use of flexibilities, called the “new par-
adigm of energy transition”.10 It includes transitional use of traditional 
10 Zrozumieć Energiewende. Najczęściej zadawane pytania dotyczące transfor-
macji energetycznej w Niemczech [Understanding the Energiewende. FAQ on 
the ongoing transition of German power system], Agora Energiewende, https://
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production capacities as complementary sources, but focuses mainly 
on maximising the potential for collaboration between countries (i.e., 
because of the complementary character of weather conditions), energy 
storage, as well as educating consumers about the benefits of reduced 
usage (in other words demand management11). 
There is a belief that complementary weather conditions in dif-
ferent parts of Europe may offer a solution to the problem.12 If there 
is no wind in Poland, perhaps it is blowing instead in Portugal or 
Scotland? True, in Europe the distribution of wind and sunlight is var-
ied, but due to the size of the system and the need to simultaneously 
extend industrial lines it is unrealistic to think that such a system 
would be able to satisfy Europe’s energy demand. Also projects such 
as combining a Scandinavian hydroelectric power station battery with 
the European system, or producing solar energy for Europe in the 
Sahara desert, are too complex to consider as solutions which satisfy 
total European demand. Carrying out such projects would require 
favourable political conditions and the extension of transmission and 
distribution networks in Europe beyond what is conceivable today. 
The same social dynamic which resists traditional methods of pro-
ducing electricity underlies the heated opposition to the extension 
of networks used to transport it. It is one of the greatest dilemmas 
of European energy transition, which is focused on ways of produc-
ing energy, not the means of its delivery. The problem is that the 
extension of renewable energy sources in Europe does not involve 
expanding transmission and distribution lines. For instance, the 
high wind capacities in northern Germany are not connected with 
customers (most of whom are commercial) traditionally located in 
the south of Germany. The construction of such lines was strongly 
opposed by activists and local communities. Consequently, when 
there is a lot of wind activity, in accordance with Kirchhoff’s laws, 
a large part of the generated energy flows out via Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Austria to then loop back and reach users in Bavaria. 
These loop flows (known also as transit, carousel or unplanned flows) 
www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/
Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende_PL_WEB.pdf (accessed: 20.08.2017).
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem.
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destabilize European energy systems, especially the Polish system, 
burdening it with extra costs and limitations.13 We had to confront 
this problem when on the 10th of August 2015 the Polish Transmission 
System Operator was forced to announce restrictions for thousands 
of industrial customers. One factor of power insufficiency in the 
system was the fact that due to wind conditions, only 100MW out 
of a possible 4000MW of generating power in wind sources in the 
National Energy System was being produced. Simultaneously, renew-
able sources in the north of Germany produced electricity, sending it 
via Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria to the south of Germany. 
Transmission lines in Poland were blocked with the transmission of 
idle energy, at least from the point of view of Polish customers. Loop 
flows made intervention import impossible and added to the burden 
of the Polish production system. This situation is going to worsen 
unless a dynamic extension of both transmission and distribution 
networks occurs along with the appearance of millions of individ-
uals simultaneously consuming and producing energy at home. We 
are facilitating the emergence of a hybrid producer and consumer - 
a new entity we call “prosumers”.
Many hope that consumers will turn out to be flexible enough to 
allow a shift towards energy production from RES. There is certainly 
much left for us to do in this respect. Customers, or users – as they 
tended to be called by energy enterprises until quite recently – used 
to be severely neglected. The power sector was too focused on itself 
and its technological perfection to be inclined to provide space for 
active customers. Along with liberalization and digitalization, this 
is changing very quickly. There is great potential on the part of con-
sumers to optimize their consumption of energy and reduce its costs. 
Doubts, however, persist: are we not expecting too much of these 
future recipients? Is the vision of millions of active customers, or even 
prosumers, participating in the energy market en masse, instantly 
adjusting their consumer behaviours to the dynamically changing 
conditions in the system (including prices), not too ambitious? Is it 
13 The problem of inability to channel all the wind power from north Germany has 
its very concrete cost as well. For example, in 2015, one billion euros was spent on 
subsidies for wind capacities which could not be accepted by the system. As a result, 
the produced energy was wasted.
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not utopian to think that they will actively secure their production 
profile with storage capacities or balance it with traditional entities? 
Offering consumers the opportunity to engage in market activity 
does not mean – taking into account the way the market works, requir-
ing constant attention, involvement as well as reasonable knowledge 
and competence – that consumers will really be that active. Many expe-
riences with differentiated day, night and weekend tariffs, including 
tests in Poland, show that some users never become actively involved; 
instead, they simply expect a stable power supply and reasonable prices. 
Although today it is not difficult (from a technological point of view) 
to achieve energy savings, and there are many interesting support 
schemes, these are not as popular as one could expect. It seems we need 
to look for answers not in the very opportunities related to energy, but 
in comparisons with alternative choices ordinary people face every day. 
If a monthly electricity bill is as much as several hundred zlotys, more 
than 10% of savings (which, relatively speaking, is a lot) must compete 
with the opportunity to save – or even earn – a similar amount another 
way. In attracting people’s attention, energy must compete with hous-
ing, food, transport, children and so on, especially considering that in 
a country like Poland for most households the electricity bill is sep-
arate from that for heating (or gas). Any attempt to convert everyone 
into active players is complicated, and it remains unclear whether rais-
ing the price of energy and thus helping focus public attention on this 
problem would be the best way of solving it. 
In turn, the vision of millions of self-sufficient customers is not 
compatible with maintaining current electricity networks. Although 
a self-sufficient prosumer is the dream and ultimate goal of energy 
transition for many, for network operators this is the one surefire way 
towards extinction. The more prosumers leave the network, the more 
others will have to pay to sustain it. The higher the charge for the net-
work, the higher the motivation others will have to leave too. It will 
not be in anyone’s interest to maintain networks connecting millions 
of prosumers. As a result, either the network costs will be partially 
covered by the consumers who have left, or they will be financed cen-
trally, through taxes. Or else the network will just collapse. If it does 
disappear, the question arises whether a mosaic of unconnected indi-
vidual installations is compatible with energy security. Do we really 
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want a jigsaw puzzle of energy autarchies, in which each user takes 
care of their own electricity and is unconnected with others? 
It seems we are not ready for such extremes. In an age when our civ-
ilization is totally dependent on electricity, the privatization of energy 
security is very risky. For many years, the state will feel the need to 
be its guarantor, for example due to the growing importance of elec-
tricity in maintaining critical infrastructure, securing cyber security 
and data bases, not to mention hospitals, schools, nurseries and so 
forth. Thus, if the costs of maintaining networks are transferred to 
the state, we return to the question of the total social cost of energy 
transition, because ultimately the bill will be footed by the community. 
Therefore, looking for independence through individual instal-
lations will be in opposition to maintaining the common system of 
security, especially regarding electricity networks.14 As far as we are 
able to foresee, networks will have to continue functioning and even 
evolving, hence their cost will grow. Freeing users by equipping them 
with the instruments to produce their own energy should not prevent 
us from looking for ways to develop, as well as for new roles for the 
established energy industry, both in terms of production and transmis-
sion networks. European energy transition, as the outcome of social 
expectations regarding new renewable technologies and industrial 
strategies, is already challenging two of the three vertices of the tra-
ditional energy triangle: the costs of energy and the security of supply. 
With respect to the last vertex of the traditional energy triangle, 
i.e., environmental protection, the overall picture is mixed, also many 
very positive things happened. Certainly, after decades of investing in 
better (and increasingly expensive) environmental standards, Europe 
can boast much better quality of air, water and soil than newly indus-
trialized countries such as China or India. However, it goes on ignoring 
some of the environmental consequences of its activity and evading 
inconvenient questions. Most importantly, the notion of decarbon-
ization in Europe has carefully ignored the second most important 
source of carbon dioxide emissions: the transport sector. In some 
cases, activities were undertaken which were – as we have recently 
found out – counter-productive from the point of view of air quality 
14 This difficulty may be illustrated by the decision made by Belgian regulators to 
considerably raise networking fees for prosumers who use photovoltaics. 
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protection, such as promoting diesel engines. Turning a blind eye to 
real vehicle emissions was an encouragement to fraudsters and car-
tels. Instead of reducing nitrogen compound emissions which cause 
smog, automotive concerns focused on manipulating emissions meas-
urements. But without accepting the challenge connected with this 
sector, it will be impossible to combine political aspiration with its 
technical implementation in Europe, or to combine the global challenge 
of climate protection with the local challenge of protecting air quality. 
The issue of eliminating crude oil from energy production in Euro-
pean countries has only gained in importance recently. It may be 
argued that this has mostly happened for reasons beyond our grasp. 
After more than 100 years of stagnation, electric cars are regaining 
popularity. This was first of all caused by rapid development in battery 
technologies, largely thanks to more and more miniaturized individual 
electronic devices (telephones, computers etc.), leading to a spectacular 
fall in lithium-ion cell prices. But we also need to remember that it is 
persistent dependence on hydrocarbons importations that motivated 
the United States to make systemic efforts aimed at reducing it. The 
combination of Americans’ financial capabilities and entrepreneur-
ship has already resulted in a revolution of shale gas and oil, which is 
transforming the USA from a structural importer to the largest pro-
ducer or even exporter of these resources. We are now witnessing 
another revolution, that of electric cars. For California, the leader in 
this field, the electric car is something more than a new business; it is 
a manifestation of the views about the climate and our planet. When 
President Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement, Elon 
Musk did not hesitate to instantly withdraw himself from the presi-
dent’s advisory team, posting on Twitter: “You quit Paris, I quit you”. 
This gesture will surely be very well received by his investors and cli-
ents, many of whom are from California. 
Following the pioneering success of Tesla, America’s e-mobility 
revolution is coming to Europe. It is driven by both the spectacular 
development of electric battery technologies and the dramatic cri-
sis among leading European car producers (its extent still not fully 
known). Nothing can justify the organized fraud perpetrated by 
some of Europe’s biggest automotive manufacturers. Europe, with 
a century-old tradition of intellectual capital relating to combus-
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tion engines and the ability to defend its flagship industries, has no 
reasons to further delay the energy transition of its transportation 
systems. In understanding correctly the growing role of electro-mo-
bility in energy transition, we are devoting an entire chapter of our 
book to the topic.
Additionally, the ambition to eliminate carbon dioxide from the 
European economy has had some unintended side effects. The Euro-
pean industry is facing not only higher and higher costs of energy 
supply but also higher uncertainty. We are seeing the appearance of 
a phenomenon called “carbon leakage”, which in practice causes the 
inhibition of investment processes in many European energy-intensive 
industries. Regulatory solutions, such as subsidies for energy-inten-
sive industries, question the principles of honest competition in the 
European Union. They also face cost barriers. When no other solu-
tions are available, governments resort to chaotically patching up 
gaps. For example, at the beginning of 2016 the British government 
declared it was ready to buy as much as 25% of shares in the manu-
facturing facilities owned by the metallurgic concern Tata (located in 
Great Britain), so as to encourage potential buyers of its steelworks, 
put up for sale by their Indian owner. 
As a result of carbon leakage, the discrepancy between CO2 emission 
and CO2 consumption per capita in wealthy countries is deepening.
15 
In many cases, estimates show that the reduction in greenhouse gases 
emission per capita is not really caused by the efficiency of local energy 
management systems, but rather by the transfer of emissions.16 Sta-
tistically, the share of Europe in global GHG emission is decreasing. 
Soon, it is even going to drop below 10%, but this is accompanied by 
15 D. Clark, New data on imports and exports turns map of carbon emission on 
its head, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/datablog/2011/apr/28/car-
bon-emissions-imports-exports-trade (accessed: 21.08.2017); CO2 emissions are 
being ‘outsourced’ by rich countries to rising economies,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/19/co2-emissions-out-
sourced-rich-nations-rising-economies (accessed: 21.08.2017).
16 Taking an example from North America, the city of Vancouver: the difference 
between communicated numbers of CO2 reduction and estimated consumption is 
considerable: 4.5 vs 19 tons of CO2 equivalent a year. See: J. Petrie, Our post-truth 
culture and greenwash, https://pl.scribd.com/document/147478414/Our-Post-
Truth-Culture-and-Greenwash (accessed: 21.08.2017). 
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the growth and increasing industrialization of non-European econo-
mies: instead of domestic emissions, Europe imports them as a ready 
product. The import is often from countries where lower environ-
mental standards apply, which leads to a global increase in harmful 
emissions. The share of high-emission industries in European econ-
omies is reduced, which is especially negative for a country such as 
Poland, where industrialization is a considerable carrier of growth 
and affluence. 
Also, taking into consideration total carbon dioxide emissions, gas 
may prove to cause more emissions than coal. In direct combustion, 
the ratio of CO2 emission is 1:2, gas being the fuel with lower emission. 
But if we take into account the whole cycle, from extraction, process-
ing and transport via gas pipelines and by LNG carriers, through to 
delivery to the end customer, the losses are so huge that they exceed 
the benefits.17 If gas is a more emission-intensive fuel than coal, it may 
shatter the hopes connected with its “transitional” role. 
Energy transition in Poland  
– “Energy Available For All”
In turning to the specific topic of Polish energy transition, we must 
begin by setting boundary conditions involving the Polish structure of 
energy production, the technical condition of the national transmis-
sion system, geographical and geopolitical conditions, as well as the 
maturity of technological development and technological limitations. 
As mentioned before, it is hard today to talk about a universal path 
to meeting climate objectives as part of national commitments, com-
mon to all member states of the European Union. Despite the active 
policy of many countries, it is impossible to implement unified solu-
tions in all EU countries. If the economy of Germany has the financial 
capability to accept this challenge, and the vast majority of residents 
accept its consequences in spite of growing electricity bills, it does 
not mean the same will occur in other countries. So what should be 
the response of Poland, a country which is flat, more northern than 
17 G. Vaidyanathan, Leaky Methane Makes Natural Gas Bad for Global Warming, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/leaky-methane-makes-natural-gas-
bad-for-global-warming/ (accessed: 19.08.2017).
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southern, rich in coal, but developing rapidly while aiming to further 
increase the share of manufacturing in its GDP?
Since the beginning of systemic and economic transformations in 
the early 1990s, Poland has been on a path of very intensive transfor-
mation and modernization. This has resulted in a 33% reduction in 
the emission of greenhouse gases, so emissions per capita are lower 
than in Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands or Finland. The 
energy-intensity of the economy has dropped by half. The 1990s was 
a period of very intensive reductions in harmful emissions: approxi-
mately 50% less sulphur and nitrogen oxides, and over 90% reduction in 
dusts.18 This dynamic is still true: in the period 2005-2014, the Polish 
energy sector was further reducing oxides emissions: 53% less sulphur 
and 27% less nitrogen.19 Wind energy was developing very quickly, and 
generating capacities exceeded Denmark (6,000 MW). In the coming 
years, new, highly efficient coal installations are going to be incorpo-
rated into the National Electricity System, built using supercritical 
technology, ensuring efficiency of approximately 46% in places such 
as Kozienice, Opole, Jaworzno and Ostrołęka. New gas blocks have 
been or are going to be launched soon in Gorzów, Włocławek, Płock 
and Stalowa Wola. All these are elements of Polish energy transition 
which clearly reduce environmental impact and increase flexibility 
within the system.
Further evolution of the Polish energy industry is inevitable, given 
EU and international obligations, as well as the ambition of sustain-
able and innovative development of the economy. The choice of tools 
and measures should strengthen the competitiveness of the economy 
and foster the creation of new opportunities and sectors. 
Therefore, Polish energy transition is about evolution, not revo-
lution. What matters is that it occurs in a proactive way, following 
a specific order of priorities which may change over time. After a period 
of very intensive investments in a huge environmental programme, 
it is now of key importance that we ensure the lowest cost of energy, 
18 M. Kurtyka, Od restrukturyzacji do modernizacji. Opóźniona transformacja pol-
skich przedsiębiorstw energetycznych w latach 1990-2009 [From restructuring 
to modernization. Late transition of Polish energy enterprises in the 1990-2009 
period], CeDeWu, Warsaw 2013. 
19 Polish power sector ... op. cit.
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continue activities aimed at securing uninterrupted supply and fur-
ther limit both environmental and climatic impacts – in this very 
order of importance.20 
Security will be ensured by production capacities, which will not 
only cover the increase in the future demand for energy, but will be 
adjustable in terms of production profile to the peaks of load, also 
whenever weather-dependent wind and photovoltaic energy fail to 
produce. In the choice of technology, it is necessary to combine high 
performance, flexibility and environmental parameters. The challenge 
is how to reduce so-called “low emissions” (due mostly to individual 
heating devices and transport), especially in medium and small towns, 
where the quality of air is still substandard. Hence the pressure for 
the development of heat distribution networks, especially cogenera-
tion, allowing the use of a single unit of primary energy in two ways: to 
produce electricity and to produce heat. Thanks to lower night tariffs, 
electrical heating should also gain in popularity. All this must be done 
with the intention of ensuring the lowest cost of energy for the system. 
Energy must be affordable, both for domestic and commercial buyers. 
Energy available for all is also energy that brings people together 
and animates local communities. We can now see a change in busi-
ness models. The original model of a centralized energy system where 
power plants, built for the needs of heavy industry in rapid develop-
ment, were located near mines and factories is being supplemented by 
a more decentralized model with multiple dispersed energy sources. 
Therefore, it is worth assisting the formation of local energy clusters 
where combining different technologies producing synergy and open-
ing the space for lower scale innovations will be the asset. This is a way 
to fully use the spectacular drop in prices of renewable technologies 
we are witnessing nowadays (the lowest price in the first half of 2017 
in Germany was €42/MWh), whereas centrally controlled systems 
of support dedicated to single technologies have replaced the idea 
of the local dimension of the energy industry and its optimization.21 
20 L. Jesień., M. Kurtyka, New Electricity and New Cars, The Future of European 
Energy Doctrine, CeDeWu, Warsaw 2016.
21 Nordex: niemiecki rynek wiatrowy na mieliźnie [Nordex: the weakness of German 
wind energy market], http://www.cire.pl/item,149670,1,0,0,0,0,0,nordex-niemiecki-
rynek-wiatrowy-na-mieliznie.html (accessed: 21.08.2017).
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Actually, full use of opportunities resulting from varied technologies 
requires bottom-up initiative and creativity. Ample opportunities are 
to be found in the optimization and harmonious synergy between dif-
ferent technologies.
Regarding new business models, we need to focus on demand 
management. Creating demand for energy supplies is desirable, both 
for economic efficiency and system security. Implementing solutions 
which make it possible to regulate the intake in real time is encour-
agement for customers to change their behaviours. The overall effect 
will be proportional to the maturity of the customer, whose useful-
ness for the optimum functioning of the system will be higher if they 
have better access to information and know how to use it. Its ener-
gy-saving and economically rational use of energy will have beneficial 
effects for the whole energy system. Summarising, Poland has ambi-
tions to become a country which knows where its opportunities lie 
and pursues them in a pioneering way. In this context, the develop-
ment of e-mobility appears particularly attractive as a practical way 
of following global trends and surfing new needs and sectors. There 
is much evidence to prove that the impact of Tesla on the automotive 
industry will be comparable to that the iPhone had on the cell phone 
market. It will redefine the automotive sector, and previous players 
will have to radically transform their strategies if they want to main-
tain their advantage. Ensuring full technical readiness and economic 
availability of electric cars is one of the current Polish government’s 
flagship projects. Its goal is to have a million electric cars on Polish 
roads by the year 2025.22 Batteries which are becoming cheaper and 
more powerful may be the key tool in this transition. If lithium-ion 
batteries reach the price of 100 dollars per 1 kWh and energy density 
of 300-400 Wh per kilogram in the years 2020-2022, as the Depart-
ment of Innovation and Technology Development in the Ministry 
of Energy predicts23, it will make electric vehicles more and more 
popular. Electric cars backed up by a widespread energy production 
22 Elektromobilność [Electromobility], Ministerstwo Energii, http://www.me.gov.
pl/Innowacyjnosc/Elektromobilnosc (accessed: 21.08.2017). 
23 Quoted in the article Electrifying everything. After electric cars, what more will 
it take for batteries to change the face of energy?, The Economist, https://www.
economist.com/news/briefing/21726069-no-need-subsidies-higher-volumes-and-
better-chemistry-are-causing-costs-plummet-after (accessed: 18.08.2017).
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infrastructure is the way to satisfy active consumers. If we can find 
a way to make this combined system cooperate with the public elec-
tricity network, Poland’s energy transition will ensure both dynamic 
mobility and energy distribution. 
Energy available to all is at the heart of Poland’s energy transi-
tion process. By ‘available’ we mean affordable, easy to understand 
and access in ways which are essential to optimum usage, as well as 
being widely accessible across the whole country (including the needs 
of transport and mobility). Finally, it must be available in any weather 
conditions, and in the case of technical emergencies, affecting either 
individual installations or even the technology itself. Today, availabil-
ity also means that regulatory activities must not burden the energy 
industry with costs incurred by households’ and companies’ budgets 
even more than they do now. This is an ambitious, but highly worth-
while task.
Chapter 2
The concept of energy transition
Tomasz MŁYNARSKI24, Adam SZURLEJ25,  
Mariusz RUSZEL26
The concept of transition is naturally associated with innovation 
and new technologies. For millennia, mankind was developing relatively 
slowly, until the 17th century satisfying their energy demands mostly 
with the use of wood (biomass) combustion energy, wind energy, or 
water energy (water wheel). The 21st century is a time of energy tran-
sition defined as a transition from fossil fuels to zero emission or low 
emission energy sources. Sustainable development, which results in 
the formation of sustainable economies, will in the long run lead to 
considerable, and in some cases even complete, replacement of coal, 
oil, and natural gas with renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy 
mix, both in terms of  individual countries and the global structure 
of energy consumption. Energy production from renewable energy 
sources is one of the most prospective foundations of ecology and 
energy modernization.27 It is especially evident in the European Union. 
According to data from EWEA, in 2015 the greatest power increase 
24 Tomasz Młynarski, PhD, Associate Professor in Jagiellonian University, 
Faculty of International and Political Studies, Institute of Political Studies and 
International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, e-mail: tomasz.mlynarski@
uj.edu.pl
25 Adam Szurlej, DSc, Eng., AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty 
of Drilling, Oil and Gas, Department of Gas Engineering, Kraków, e-mail: szua@
agh.edu.pl
26 Mariusz Ruszel, PhD, Department of Economy of the Faculty of Management, 
Rzeszow University of Technology, e-mail: mruszel@prz.edu.pl
27 T. Młynarski, M. Tarnawski, Źródła energii i ich znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa 
energetycznego w XXI wieku [Energy sources and their importance for energy 
security in the 21st century], Difin, 2016, pp. 223-226.   
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occurred in wind power plants (12,800 MW, which was 44.2% of the 
total increase of new power in the EU) and power plants using solar 
energy (8,500 MW, accounting for 29.4%). These two energy technolo-
gies are also going to dominate in the near future. Analyzing the scale 
of increase of generating capacities of wind power plants in 2015, the 
highest increase was traditionally observed in Germany: 6,013 MW. 
Germany is the country with the highest generating capacity of wind 
power plants in the EU and it is followed by Poland with 1,266 MW.28 
Definitions of energy transition
A narrow definition of energy transition is: change from the current 
energy system using non-renewable energy sources (fossil fuels) to an 
energy system mostly based on renewable sources. Therefore, it is an 
important element of the ecological approach in the energy industry, 
involving gradual replacement of exhaustible hydrocarbons and ura-
nium fuel with RES in almost all areas of human activity (transport, 
industry, energy sector, heating, etc.). Factors that promote the devel-
opment of renewable energy are technological advancement, growing 
competition, and an appropriate policy of support, especially in coun-
tries such as the USA, India or China. Besides, more and more countries 
intend to develop renewable energy so as to reduce the impact of the 
traditional energy sector on the environment, diversify energy sup-
plies, and enhance their own energy independence.29 
In a broader sense, energy transition is identified as the popular-
ization of low-emission energy sources on the basis of low-emission 
and effective (energy saving) technologies of energy production. One 
element of energy transition is the development of the idea of energy 
saving, which means an improvement in energy efficiency in different 
sectors of industry and services (i.e., insulation and thermomodern-
ization, energy-saving lighting, cogeneration – generating heat and 
energy at the same time and energy recovery in industrial processes). 
Research carried out by Ludger Gailing and Timothy Moss shows 
that energy transition applies to four aspects: institutional change, 
28 Wind in Power: 2015 European statistics, EWEA, 2016; www.ewea.org
29 The Medium-Term Renewables Market Report, Market Analysis and Forecasts 
to 2021, International Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
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material aspect, power and space.30 In the first aspect, energy tran-
sition means the need of institutional collaboration leading to better 
understanding of the social context of energy transition and the devel-
opment of a relevant strategy.31 The second, material aspect leads to 
the conclusions that energy may not only be generated from fossil 
fuels or RES, but also e.g. from waste processing (waste to energy) 
or improving energy efficiency.32 The third plane, referring to power, 
shows that different actors clash at the local and regional level, often 
representing different interests connected with energy projects that 
follow the concept of energy transition.33 The fourth aspect, related 
to space, highlights that local, regional and national spatial planning 
plays a significant role in the process of energy transition, as it is 
directly related to the location of new investments.34
Energy transition vs sustainable development
The concept of energy transition is also connected with sustainable 
development, which can be defined in two ways: as a process of devel-
opment (e.g. of countries) that unconditionally combines the needs of 
today’s generation with the ability to satisfy the needs of future gener-
ations.35 The other definition of sustainable development is: a chain of 
changes in which the use of resources, the structure of investments, as 
30 L. Gailing, T. Moss, Conceptualizing Germany’s Energy Transition, Palgrave 
Macmillian, London 2016, pp. 4-7.
31 S. Becker, R. Beveridge, A. Röhring, Energy Transition and Institutional Change: 
Between Structure and Agency [in:] L. Gailing, T. Moss, Conceptualizing Germa-
ny’s Energy Transition, Palgrave Macmillian, London 2016.
32 T. Moss, S. Becker, L. Gailing, Energy Transitions and Materiality: Between Dis-
positives, Assemblages and Metabolisms [in:] L. Gailing, T. Moss, L. Gailing, T. Moss, 
Conceptualizing Germany’s Energy Transition, Palgrave Macmillian, London 2016.
33 A. Bues, L. Gailing, Energy Transitions and Power: Between Governmentality 
and Depoliticization [in:] L. Gailing, T. Moss, Conceptualizing Germany’s Energy 
Transition, Palgrave Macmillian, London 2016.
34 S. Becker, T. Moss, M. Naumann, The Importance of Space: Towards a Social-Ma-
terial and Political Geography of Energy Transition [in:] L. Gailing, T. Moss, 
Conceptualizing Germany’s Energy Transition, Palgrave Macmillian, London 2016.
35 W. Sztumski, Idea zrównoważonego rozwoju a możliwości jej urzeczywistnie-
nia [The idea of sustainable development vs the possibility of its implementation], 
Problemy Ekorozwoju, vol.1, 2006, p. 73.
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well as the direction of technological advancement and institutional 
structures must prevent discrepancies between present and future 
needs.36 The idea of sustainable development is mentioned in several 
national and international legal or political documents. In Poland, it is 
referred to in Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.37
Energy efficiency and renewable energy are regarded as twin pil-
lars of sustainable energy policy. Ecological modernization of the 
economy through technological innovations is to ensure progress in 
the achievement of environmental goals and industrial progress (sus-
tainable development).38 Energy transition – not only the transition of 
the energy sector – is centralized, proportional to the development of 
an international regime of counteracting climate change, and is based 
on radical changes in energy policy, i.e. transformation from central-
ized to decentralized and prosumer production (dispersed production 
installation). It is worth emphasising that low and very low capacity 
units (so-called mini and micro cogeneration) have recently appeared 
on the market. They are characterized i.a. by simple installation and 
short time of investment performance. These characteristics, as well as 
the module character of the devices, make them an attractive alterna-
tive to large energy producers.39 Thus, it is ecology-energy transition, 
which allows the separation of economic growth from pollution emis-
sion. In social sciences related to energy, scientific debate is going on 
concerning energy transition.40 It is emphasized that thinking in the 
categories of “transition” leads to understanding how new and inno-
36 Report from the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
1987.
37 A. Pultowicz, Przesłanki rozwoju rynku odnawialnych źródeł energii w Polsce 
w świetle idei zrównoważonego rozwoju [Reasons for the development of renewable 
energy sources market in Poland in the light of the ides of sustainable develop-
ment], Problemy Ekorozwoju – Problems Of Sustainable Development, vol. 4, No 1, 
2009, pp. 109-115. 
38 Cf.: L. van Schaik, S. Schunz, Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Cli-
mate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?, JCMS, Journal of 
Common Market Studies , 2012, Vol. 50. No. 1, p. 178. 
39 E. Mokrzycki (ed.), Rozproszone zasoby energii w systemie elektroenergetycz-
nym [Dispersed energy resources in electricity system], Wyd. Instytutu Gospodarki 
Surowcami Mineralnymi i Energią Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Kraków 2011, pp. 7-8.
40 S. Strunz, The German Energy Transition as a Regime Shift, “Ecological Eco-
nomics“ no. 100, pp. 150-158. 
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vative technologies can develop a more sustainable society. According 
to Robert B. Laughlin, in the future, people will prefer to live with 
clean air, water and natural environment.41 This means that energy 
transition should take into account the needs of civil society in terms 
of reducing the negative influence of the energy sector on the natural 
environment. This is especially important given that the energy sector 
is the main source of greenhouse gases emission. In Poland, energy 
transition is associated with the hope for lower emissions of different 
air pollutants, because according to the report of the European Envi-
ronment Agency of 2016, the level of air pollution in Poland is very high 
(Poland is second in terms of the concentration of particulate matter 
PM10 in the air, and first in terms of benzo[a]pyrene).
42 The report of 
the Supreme Chamber of Control of 2014 also confirms that Poland 
has the most polluted air out of all EU countries.43
Energy transition as a lever for economic 
development
Energy transition understood as conversion towards a sustainable 
development economy does not only promote environmental protec-
tion, but also – in the long run – will enhance the competitiveness 
of the economy, providing thousands of jobs and improving people’s 
quality of life. Modernization of energy industry gives an advantage to 
regional and global regimes of CO2  emissions reduction based on mod-
ern, low-emission energy technologies. Energy transition will support 
the development of industry and employment, attract investments for 
sustainable, innovative and low emission technologies, which improves 
the competitiveness of industry. Adapting the energy sector to climate 
change is becoming a catalyst for the modernization of economies 
(new branches of the economy are emerging, which stimulate employ-
ment). Energy transition is a great opportunity to promote economic 
41 R. B. Laughlin, Powering the Future, Basic Books, New York 2011, p. 5. 
42 Air quality in Europe — 2016 report, European Environment Agency, Copenha-
gen, Denmark, 2016, pp. 29-48. 
43 Informacja o wynikach kontroli: ochrona powietrza przed zanieczyszczeniami 
[Information on the outcome of control of air pollution protection],  Najwyższa Izba 
Kontroli, Warsaw 2014.
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interests based on stimulating economies through the establishment 
of new eco-jobs and the export of low carbon emission technologies. 
Increasing the share of alternative energy sources in the total energy 
balance of a country and improving energy efficiency does not only 
help improve energy security, but also gives some economic benefits 
through ensuring competitive advantage connected with the use and 
export of modern energy technologies reducing GHG emission. In the 
future, the potentially significant rise in the price of the right to emit 
greenhouse gases will enforce even greater profitability of preferred 
technologies supporting low emission economies. Energy transition 
thus means the formation of a more competitive low emission econ-
omy; environmental protection including the reduction of greenhouse 
gases and the prevention of biodiversity loss; the implementation of 
new, climate-friendly technologies of energy production and intelligent 
networks for its transmission (Smart Grid); and educating consumers 
The effect is economic stimulation, creating new jobs, and promotion 
of the development of local communities.  Therefore, energy transi-
tion links economic growth and respect for the natural environment 
by reducing the growth of energy demand, by developing competitive 
renewable energy sources and other low emission energy carriers, 
in particular alternative fuels used in transport, and by improving 
competitiveness connected with the production of clean energy and 
rational energy use (efficiency based on innovative technologies). 
Thus, it integrates three goals: improvement of energy security (sta-
bility of supply from domestic energy sources), development of new 
branches of a “green economy” (increase in competitiveness and GDP), 
and eco-technological modernization of energy production processes 
(eco-jobs).  This way, environmental goals are connected with eco-
nomic goals, and the policy of ecological energy transition achieves 
economic goals.44
It is commonly assumed that new technologies lead to reducing 
energy dependence on fossil energy resources through more effective 
use of or departure from such resources in favor of the development 
of renewable energy based on natural use of sunlight, wind energy, 
river course and geothermal energy. We also need to remember energy 
44 T. Młynarski, M. Tarnawski, Źródła energii i ich znaczenie [Energy sources and 
their importance]... op. cit., p. 203.      
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technologies that allow the combustion of fossil fuels in an environ-
mentally clean way. Whereas the dynamic growth of importance in 
RES in the energy balances of different countries, regions, or the 
world, is certainly true, we need to remember that about 77% of elec-
tricity globally is produced from fossil fuels. In the case of Poland, 
because of its having substantial (with regard to Europe) resources of 
hard coal and lignite, the share of those fuels in electricity production 
in 2015 was 86% and was one of the highest in the world. Therefore, 
CCT (Clean Coal Technologies) are expected to be the main direc-
tion of development towards clean energy technologies in Poland. We 
should remember that clean energy technologies using fossil fuels are 
related to high investment expenditure and higher operating costs 
than  technologies used currently. Among other things, this is due to 
the costs of installation of CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage). With 
the current assumptions of EU energy policy, it seems that apart from 
economic factors, ecological aspects will also play an important role 
in making decisions on the choice of technology of electricity pro-
duction.45 The significance of ecological aspects is proved, not only 
by EU regulations, but also by the provisions of the 21st Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, which took place in December 2015 in Paris. The Paris 
Agreement was signed by Poland on April 27, 2016, in the UN head-
quarters in New York. Accepting the agreement will be connected with 
efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. But it should be stressed that the way 
of achieving this goal is determined by each country independently.46 
However, the crucial issue in achieving the goals of the agreement 
is probably the change in the energy sector, which is the main source 
(at least 2/3) of greenhouse gases emission.47 It is important to see the 
variety of locations of fossil energy resources, as well as geographi-
cal potential enabling their use in renewable energy industry. Taking 
45 D. Kryzia, L. Gawlik, M. Pepłowska, Uwarunkowania rozwoju czystych tech-
nologii wytwarzania energii z paliw kopalnych [Determinants of the development 
of clean technologies of energy production from fossil fuels], Polityka Energetyczna 
– Energy Policy Journal, vol. 19, part 4, 2016, pp. 63-74.
46 B. Zaporowski, Zrównoważony rozwój źródeł wytwórczych energii elektryczne 
[Sustainable development of electricity production sources], Polityka Energetyczna 
– Energy Policy Journal, vol. 19, part 3, 2016, pp. 35-48.
47 World Energy Outlook 2016, International Energy Agency, Paris 2016, p. 35.
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into account the fact that the energy balance structure is different in 
each country, the process of energy transition in the countries will 
also differ. This results from the fact that globally the governments 
of each country have retained the greatest rights to shape national 
energy policies. The situation is the same at the EU level, because 
Article 4 section 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) provides that competencies in the area of energy are 
shared between member states and EU institutions.48 The diversity of 
energy transition in different countries  not only refers to the potential 
connected with geographical conditions and resource potential, but 
also to the diversity of R&D specialization in each economy. Doubt-
less, climate policy, which has become the catalyst for implementing 
new technologies in the energy sector, will have a significant impact on 
energy transition processes, but global energy infrastructure should 
be strengthened in parallel with this process. Currently, it is evident 
that in many countries considerable investments in new capacities of 
renewable energy do not correspond to the speed of development of 
investments in electricity infrastructure. Broad application of renew-
able energy requires the stabilization of electricity networks ensured 
currently by conventional energy. This means that appropriate spa-
tial planning is necessary, even more so because the process of energy 
transition increasingly applies to the transport sector, which is one of 
the most high emission sectors of economy. The process of modern-
ization of the energy sector should strengthen sustainable transport 
through the development of global electromobility. Energy transition 
and the increase in importance of RES in the energy balances of each 
country are closely connected with the problem of energy storage. 
Recently, energy storage technologies (e.g., power-to-gas) have been 
developing, which enables the conversion of energy surplus to a form 
of energy that is easier to store and transport (e.g., hydrogen). The con-
sequence of these activities will be a gradual reduction in countries’ 
oil import dependency and greater use of electricity in the automo-
tive industry. Globally, this will allow many economies to save some 
48 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated text, OJ EU C 
326/47.
G. Moens, J. Trone, The political institutions of the European Union, “Commercial 
Law of the European Union”, Springer, Netherlands, 2010, pp. 26–27.
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financial resources, which – if they are used properly – may become 
a source of financing new investments, improving energy efficiency 
and optimum use of energy resources even more.49 A similar pro-
cess can occur in the area of construction, where modern materials 
are now used which allow the construction of energy-saving passive 
houses. We need to stress that innovation resulting from energy tran-
sition also involves a change of tendencies and a departure from old 
business models in favor of decentralized ones, and the formation of 
local energy clusters combining different technologies and aiming 
at synergy between them.50 For this reason, energy transition is not 
only technological innovation, but also regulatory innovation of the 
energy sector on the global scale.51 The process of energy transition 
will not only lead to protecting the natural environment, but first of 
all, to creating new jobs and enhancing energy security.52 
Analyzing data of the International Energy Agency of 2015, we may 
conclude that energy transition is already a fact. The upward tendency 
of CO2 emissions related to the energy sector came to a halt in 2015, 
mostly as a result of lowering the energy intensity of the global econ-
omy by 1.8%, connected with accomplishments in energy efficiency 
and higher use of low emission energy sources all over the world, espe-
cially renewable energy sources. Maintaining the decrease of GHG 
emissions in the following years will enable countries to meet their 
climate obligations as part of the Paris Agreement. Recently, the drop 
in oil and natural gas extraction investments (the highest within nearly 
seventy years) has been accompanied by growth in investments in the 
sector of clean energy technologies by approximately 1.8 trillion USD 
49 “In 2012 Poland imported almost 25 million tonnes of oil, of which 95 percent 
came from Russia, for over 15 billion euro”. See L. Jesień, M. Kurtyka, New Elec-
tricity and New Cars. The Future of the European Energy Doctrine, CeDeWu, 
Warsaw 2016, p. 118. 
50 M. Kurtyka, presentation at the National Scientific Conference “Polityka ener-
getyczna UE - filary i perspektywa rozwoju” [EU energy policy: foundations and 
prospects of development], Rzeszów 25-26.04.2016.
51 K. Steinbacher, M. Pahle, Leadership by Diffusion and the German Energiewende., 
“SSRN Electronic Journal”, 2015, http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565313
52 D. Tänzler, S. Wolters, S., Energiewende und Außenpolitik: Gestaltungsmacht 
auf dem Prüfstand, “Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, no. 7(2), 2014, 
pp. 133–143.
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a year. On the other hand, the value of subsidies for the consumption 
of fossil fuels fell to 325 billion USD in 2015 from almost 500 billion 
in 2014. This significant reduction is the result of lower prices of fos-
sil fuels and reforms of fuel subsidizing in many countries.53
Data from the market of renewable energy also proves energy tran-
sition. Globally, in 2015, RES installations accounted for more than 
half of new generating capacities (153 GW, i.e., 15% more than in 2014, 
including 63 GW more in wind energy and 49 more in solar energy). 
The IEA estimates that within five years, RES will be the quickest 
developing source of electricity, and their share will grow up to 28% 
in 2021. In 2015, the share of RES was 23%. The IEA forecasts that in 
2021 the costs of technology will be reduced by 25% in photovoltaics 
and by 15% in land wind energy.54
Energy transition is also a comprehensive change in the way of 
thinking about and perception of the energy sector. The perception of 
the process with reference to the energy sector should be interpreted 
much more broadly than merely the replacement of fossil fuels with 
renewable energy.
53 World Energy Outlook 2016, International Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
54 The Medium-Term Renewables Market Report, Market Analysis and Forecasts 
to 2021, International Energy Agency, Paris 2016. 
Chapter 3
Electromobility  
as a new segment  
of the economy
Mariusz RUSZEL55, Adam SZURLEJ56
The transport sector has one of the highest shares in the total con-
sumption of energy in different countries and is mostly based on the 
use of fuels produced from oil: different kinds of gasoline and die-
sel oil. Due to its very uneven distribution, the majority of countries 
need to import oil. It is worth emphasizing that in EU countries the 
dependence on oil and oil derivatives import is the highest out of all 
fuels, and is growing: 2005 – 82.1%, 2014 – 87.4%.57 That is why the 
popularization of electric cars, i.e., the development of electromobility, 
is regarded to be a new segment of the low emission economy, which 
will contribute to a revolution in the automotive industry. However, 
the subject of electromobility is not new: as early as 1881, Gustav 
Trouvé presented the first battery for an electric vehicle.58 That was 
more than 100 years ago, and nowadays there is still global discussion 
on the development of different forms of electric vehicles (e.g., bat-
tery electric vehicle – BEV, range-extended electric vehicle – REEV, 
55 Mariusz Ruszel, PhD, Department of Economics of the Faculty of Management of 
the University of Technology, e-mail: mruszel@prz.edu.pl
56 Adam Szurlej, DSc, Eng., AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty 
of Drilling, Oil and Gas, Department of Gas Engineering, Kraków, e-mail: szua@
agh.edu.pl
57 Eurostat: Energy, transport and environment indicators – 2016 edition. Lux-
embourg, p. 48.
58 M. Bertram, S. Bongard, Electromobilität im motorisierten Individualverkehr. 
Grundlagen, Einflussfaktoren und Wirtschaftlichkeitsvergleich, Springer Vieweg, 
Wiesbaden 2014, p. 1. 
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hybrid electric vehicle – HEV, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle – PHEV, 
fuel cell hybrid electric vehicle – FCHEV).59 
Barriers to the development of electromobility
Analyzing how this sector of economy develops in time, we can see 
that the speed of the development is connected with the need to over-
come certain barriers, which lead to the inhibition of developmental 
processes. The barriers can be classified as political, economic, tech-
nical and social. 
It seems that the main political barrier causing poor develop-
ment of electric cars so far has been, on the one hand, the lack of will 
to make political decisions in different countries, and on the other 
hand, the lack of appropriate instruments, including strategic docu-
ments at the national level of the world’s biggest economies, as well 
as at the level of international organizations. Moreover, the largest 
international oil industry corporations that have invested consid-
erable financial resources in deposits of energy carriers, as well as 
countries rich in oil, have been lobbying to use fossil fuels in trans-
portation. This means that so far there have been no coordinated 
global political processes to allow the implementing of electromobil-
ity globally. Obtaining the relevant political will and making certain 
decisions would help create appropriate instruments of support for 
electric vehicles. Especially important will be the political activ-
ity of the United States of America (USA) and People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), because these countries have a huge influence on the 
world’s economy and are the biggest consumers of energy carriers. 
In addition, trends set by these countries will contribute to adopting 
certain strategic documents at the level of international organiza-
tions, i.e., the International Energy Agency (IEA), United Nations 
Organization (UNO) and the European Union, which is a potential 
and affluent market for electric cars with its 500 million citizens.60 
59 Electromobility in Germany: Vision 2020 and Beyond, Germany Trade & Invest, 
Berlin 2015, p. 5. 
60 Member State compliance with EU law improving, but more work ahead to 
unleash full potential of Single Market, European Commission, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-16-2245_en.htm (accessed: 02.01.2017). 
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Environmental regulations may be of special importance, since they 
may contribute to the development of electromobility. 
From November 30 to December 12, 2015, the 21st Conference of 
the Parties to UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change) and the 11th session of Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP 21 and CMP 
11) took place in Paris, during which a new global climate agreement 
was adopted.61 The Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate 
Change & Call of Action, which is to be based on concrete actions leading 
to the electrification of transport, is very important.62 The declaration 
assumes the accomplishment of at least a 20% share of electric vehi-
cles among all vehicles in the world by the year 203063, and the support 
from a growing number of institutional partners indicates an increase 
in political will concerning the development of electromobility all over 
the world.64 Especially important is the support from an inter-govern-
mental forum EVI, which was established in 2009 and is made up of 16 
countries. It is led by the USA and the PRC jointly, and EVI’s secretariat 
61 Paris UN climate change conference, 30/11-12/12/2015, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/30/ (accessed: 02.01.2017). 
62 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The impact of the con-
clusions of COP21 on European transport policy’, OJ EU C303/10 of 19.08.2016, p. 5. 
63 Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change & Call of Action, 
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/521376/paris-electro-mobility-declaration.pdf 
(accessed: 02.01.2017). 
64 List of partners [as of 02.01.2017]: Avere-Europe, Avere-France, ChargePoint 
Electric Vehicle Charging, Clean Air Asia (Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities 
Center, Inc.), E-poste, Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), EV4SCC (Electric Vehicle 
for Smart Cities and Communities), FIA Foundation, Global Fuel Economy Ini-
tiative, Industry Pledge COP21 to Achieve Electro-mobility Goals, International 
Energy Agency, International Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance (ZEV Alliance), 
Michelin Worldwide, Move Climate Challenge, Partnership on Sustainable - Low 
Carbon Transport (SLoCaT), Polis – European Cities and Regions Networking 
for Innovative Transport Solutions, Renault-Nissan Alliance, SOLUTIONS – 
Global, Taxis4SmartCities, Tesla Motors, United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), Urban Electric Mobility Initiative (UEMI), Wuppertal Institute for Cli-
mate - Environment and Energy, Zero Emissions Urban Bus System (ZeEUS) by 
International Association of Public Transport (UITP). See: Paris Declaration on 
Electro-Mobility and Climate Change and Call to Action. Electrifying Sustainable 
Transport, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/transport/the-paris-declaration-on-
electro-mobility-and-climate-change-and-call-to-action/#downloads (accessed: 
02.01.2017).
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is run by the IEA.65 It is clear that political decisions connected with the 
development of electromobility are going to contribute to achieving the 
set goals of energy/climate policy since, currently, transport accounts 
for the emission of 23% of carbon dioxide globally.66
Another important group is economic barriers, which are funda-
mental from the consumers’ perspective. For this reason, the costs 
of production and operation of an electric vehicle, which translate 
into its market availability, are of key importance. Therefore, it is 
essential to reduce the economic costs of launching the product to 
the market.67 One of the main components of the cost of an electric 
car is the price of the battery. It seemed that when the Frenchman 
Georges-Lionel Leclanche presented the patent of theoriginal battery 
in 186668, the work on creating a cheap battery would accelerate. In 
addition, in 1900, Ferdinand Porsche presented a prototype of elec-
tric vehicle at the world exhibition in Paris.69 But the work is still 
going on to create relatively cheap batteries that would be able to 
store sufficient electricity, recharge quickly, and have an appropriate 
life cycle. In the 2008-2015 period, there was a dynamic reduc-
tion in the costs of battery production and the growing potential 
of energy content (Figure 1). Yet, the costs of batteries and energy 
storage facilities are still one of the main barriers to the develop-
ment of electromobility.70 
The third group of barriers is technical, which mostly refer to 
the need to extend and modernize energy infrastructure so that it 
65 Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.
66 Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change and Call to Action. 
Electrifying Sustainable Transport, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/transport/
the-paris-declaration-on-electro-mobility-and-climate-change-and-call-to-ac-
tion/#downloads (accessed: 02.01.2017). 
67 L. Fazel, Akzeptanz von Elektromobilität. Entwiklung und Validierung eines Mod-
ells unter Berücksichtigung der Nutzungsform des Carsharing, Springer Gabler, 
Chemnitz 2013, p. 54. 
68 A. Kampker, Elektromobil-produktion, Springer Vieweg, Berlin Heidelberg 2014, p. 43. 
69 Electromobility in Germany: Vision 2020 and Beyond, Germany Trade & Invest, 
Berlin 2015, p. 3. 
70 Global EV Outlook 2016. Beyond one million electric cars, International Energy 
Agency, France 2016, p. 4.
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would be able to satisfy the growing electricity demand at its peak. 
This means the need to ensure appropriate capacities in the electric-
ity system, including its stability, and to create a relevant number of 
charging stations. In November 2016, the biggest car manufacturers 
signed an agreement concerning investments in charging stations in 
order to stimulate interest in electromobility.71
Figure 1. Evolution of battery energy density and cost.
Source: Global EV Outlook 2016. Beyond one million electric cars, International 
Energy Agency, France 2016, p. 4 [for:] US DOE (2015 and 2016) for PHEV battery 
cost and energy density estimates; EV Obsession (2015); and HybridCARS (2015). 
The fourth group of barriers are social ones connected with con-
sumers’ habits and distrust in new technologies. Icek Ajzen highlights 
in his theory of planned behavior (TPB) that the main factor affect-
ing consumers’ behaviors is their attitude formed by knowledge and 
experience, as well as subjective norms accepted by the society.72 
This means that drivers’ habits combined with strong marketing by 
oil companies may consolidate the positive image of a combustion 
vehicle. Interestingly, electric cars do not occur in movies and series 
watched by the society. Instead, well-known combustion cars are 
71 eMobility - nowy dział Innogy [eMobility: a new segment of Innogy], http://www.
cire.pl/item,138723,1,0,0,0,0,0,emobility---nowy-dzial-innogy.html (accessed: 
28.12.2016). 
72 I. Ajzen, The theory of planned behavior, “Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes“ 1991/50, pp. 179–211.
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often shown. And there is research to confirm that the media affect 
consumers’ decisions.73 
Public opinion studies show that when we buy a car, the following 
criteria are significant for us: costs, reliability, safety, and comfort.74 
Research carried out in several EU countries in 2012 showed that cit-
izens emphasize the excessive costs of electric cars and the need to 
create conditions for recharging them in their private garages as the 
main barriers to the development of electromobility.75 Similar prob-
lems connected with the development of electric vehicles use were 
mentioned by Poles. In a study performed by ARC Rynek i Opinia, the 
main factors discouraging people from using electric cars were: the 
high costs of purchase (81%) and an insufficient number of charging 
stations, including problems with charging on the way.76 In February 
2016, a study was carried out in Great Britain, confirming that only 
5% were thinking of buying an electric car.77 
A study by Suzanna M. Long shows that social approval for electric 
cars will be the basis for commercial success, and hence, consumers’ 
expectations need to be treated seriously. It proved that citizens are 
afraid of the insecurity connected with electric cars, which translates 
into low trust in electromobility, and tax incentives are not going to 
help much. More important will be the implementation of appropriate 
educational programmes and instruments supporting the lowering of 
costs of operation of the vehicles. Political decision makers of different 
countries will respond to arguments connected with energy security 
and climate policy through the media.78 
73 B. Lane, S. Potter, The adoption of cleaner vehicles in the UK: exploring the consumer 
attitude–action gap. “Journal of Cleaner Production”, 2007/15 (11–12), p. 1085–1092; 
E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, fifth ed Free Press, New York 2003.
74 Public attitudes towards electric vehicles: 2016 (Revised), Department of Transport 
2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/551446/electric-vehicles-survey-2016.pdf (accessed: 09.01.2017).
75 Attitude of European car drivers towards electric vehicles: a survey, JRC Scien-
tific and Policy Reports, European Commission, 2012, p. 19. 
76 ARC Rynek i Opinia: http://www.arc.com.pl/polacy_o_samochodach_elektry-
cznych-41999612-pl.html (accessed: 10.01.2017). 
77 Public attitudes towards electric vehicles: 2016 (Revised), Department of Transport 
2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/551446/electric-vehicles-survey-2016.pdf (accessed: 09.01.2017). 
78 S. M. Long, Barriers to widespread adoption of electric vehicles: An analysis 
of consumer attitudes and perceptions, “Energy Policy”, September 2012, p. 724. 
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Strategic resources of electromobility
It should be stressed that global development of the electromo-
bility sector will cause, on the one hand, a systematic decrease in 
demand for oil in the automotive industry, and on the other hand, 
an increase in demand for certain resources, such as lithium, cobalt, 
or nickel. According to data from USGS (United States Geological 
Survey), global resources of nickel are estimated at 34 million tons; 
including 9 million tons in Bolivia and Chile; 6.5 million tons in 
Argentina; 5.1 million tons in People’s Republic of China; 1.7 million 
tons in Australia; Canada, Congo and the Russian Federation have 1 
million tons each; Brazil and Mexico, 180 thousand tons each; and 
Austria, 130 thousand tons.79 In 2015, the largest amounts of nickel 
were produced in Australia, Chile, Argentina, and People’s Republic of 
China. The second significant resource affecting the development of 
electromobility is cobalt, whose identified global deposits (according 
to USGS) are 25 million tons; on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean, 
Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean there may be more than 120 mil-
lion tons. In 2015, the largest amount of cobalt was extracted in 
Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (almost 50% of the 
world’s production). The greatest business partner of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is People’s Republic of China, which imports the 
highest amounts of cobalt produced in that country. Apart from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cobalt is produced in China, 
Canada, the Russian Federation, Australia, Zambia, the Philippines 
and Cuba.80 When manufacturing batteries, synthetic graphite is 
also used, and graphite mostly comes from Poland and Japan.81 As 
modern technologies using new materials and resources for their 
production develop, the importance of certain resources may change 
over time, corresponding to the most energy- and cost-effective bat-
teries for electric vehicles. 
79 Lithium, United States Geological Survey, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/
pubs/commodity/lithium/mcs-2016-lithi.pdf (accessed: 12.12.2016). 
80 Cobalt, United States Geological Survey, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
commodity/cobalt/mcs-2016-cobal.pdf (accessed: 12.12.2016).
81 S. Kane, These 5 arguments slowed the electric car revolution — and they’re 
all bogus, http://www.businessinsider.com/electric-car-myths-inaccura-
cies-2016-2?IR=T (accessed: 8.01.2017). 
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Electromobility: a new branch of industry
Electromobility is regarded as a new branch of industry which 
will contribute to the development of low emission technologies to be 
applied in transport and electricity storage. Together with the devel-
opment of electromobility, the demand for oil from the automotive 
industry, especially cars, will begin decreasing.82 Given the uneven 
global distribution of oil, most countries are dependent on importing 
this energy resource, as well as ready fuels and other energy products.83 
Oil is mostly used in the transport sector to produce fuels. Accord-
ing to the IEA, in 2014, 64.5% of the world’s oil consumption was in 
transport. In 1973, the share was 45.4%.84 This energy resource has 
become the object of competition and collaboration between countries 
in the context of geopolitical competition. It seems electromobility is 
going to be a new factor changing the rules of competition and collab-
oration (a game changer).85 The automotive revolution that will lead to 
popularizing electric cars will allow countries that spend considerable 
amounts on imported oil (only in Poland import expenses connected 
with the purchase of oil increased from 5.23 to 15.22 billion euros 
between 2005 and 2012)86 to spend it on electricity instead. In most 
cases, electricity is produced in the countries that actually use it.87 In 
other words, financial resources that are spent on imported fuels now 
could be spent within the country, contributing to the development 
of some areas of industry. Obviously, this will work assuming that 
electricity is produced domestically, not imported. This process will 
correspond to the growing number of installations based on renewable 
energy sources, which are connected to electricity networks, and to the 
82 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2016, Paris 2016.
83 M. Gałczyński, M. Ruszel, P. Turowski, R. Zajdler, A. Zawisza, Globalny rynek 
LNG [Global LNG Market], Wydawnictwo Rambler, Warsaw 2015, pp. 22-23.
84 International Energy Agency, Key world energy statistics 2016, Paris 2016, p. 33.
85 J. A. Bolanos, The future of oil: Between cooperation & competition, Department 
of War Studies, EUCERS, King’s College London, Strategy Paper Thirteen, p. 37. 
86 Raport o stanie handlu zagranicznego [Report on international trade], Minis-
terstwo Gospodarki, Warsaw 2015, p. 90. 
87 P. Turowski, Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne na szczycie NATO w Warszawie: 
priorytetem dywersyfikacja ropy i gazu [Energy security at the NATO summit in 
Warsaw: oil and gas diversification as the priority], “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe“ 
2016/I-IV, pp. 154-160.
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process of formation of energy clusters. It will be necessary to extend 
energy infrastructure to recharge electric vehicles, and the digitaliza-
tion of electromobility will develop along with those processes. This 
means that cyber security will be another challenge. These processes 
will also affect the development of technologies connected with elec-
tricity storage. At the same time, the development of electromobility 
will surely also occur in the segments of utility cars, buses, taxis, bicy-
cles, and even electric scooters. Thus, electromobility will contribute 
to the development of GDP and creating new jobs. 
The process of introducing new electric vehicles also translates 
into an innovative approach to cars, since car sharing is becoming 
more and more popular. It seems the interest in this form of using 
a car will go on increasing proportionally to the growing costs of 
operating one’s own vehicle.88 In 2015, 1.26 million electric vehi-
cles began their journey all over the world. More than half of them 
appeared in the USA and People’s Republic of China (Figure 2).89 
Notably, in Norway the share of electric cars in relation to the total 
number of registered vehicles is almost 20% (this country is the 
leader in terms of the number of electric cars per 1 thousand resi-
dents). In the Netherlands, it is 10%, while in China, e-scooters are 
extremely popular.90 The IEA estimates that by 2030, about 100 mil-
lion electric cars will appear on the roads globally.91 Electromobility 
will stimulate the R&D sector in the context of using alternative and 
low-emission fuels, different technologies of battery production, and 
energy storage. More and more projects are connected with the use of 
hydrogen in transport and power-to-gas technology. In some coun-
tries, hydrogen is perceived as a potential fuel to propel trucks.92 It 
should be emphasized that the popularization of electric cars will 
influence the development of research connected with the use of IT 
technologies in the electromobility sector. 
88 Rzędowska: 2016 był rokiem elektromobilności? [Was 2016 a year of electromo-
bility?], http://biznesalert.pl/rzedowska-2016-rokiem-elektromobilnosci/ (accessed: 
30.12.2016). 
89 Global EV Outlook 2016. Beyond one million electric cars ... op. cit. 
90 Ibidem.
91 Ibidem, pp. 5-6. 
92 L. Jesień, M. Kurtyka, New Electricity and New Cars. The Future of the Euro-
pean Energy Doctrine, CeDeWu, Warsaw 2016, p. 95.
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Figure 2. Evolution of the global electric car stock, 2010-15.
Source: Global EV Outlook 2016. Beyond one million electric cars, International 
Energy Agency, France 2016, p. 4. 
Conclusion
Remembering international agreements referring to climate and 
the reduction of atmosphere pollution, countries’ declarations con-
cerning support for the purchase of electric vehicles (e.g. through 
appropriate tax policy and changes in the regulatory environment), the 
high dynamics of sales of those vehicles, technological advancement 
in electricity storage and the parameters of batteries for electric cars, 
and the announcements of automotive companies regarding higher 
expenditure on investments connected with electromobility, we can-
not but agree with the assessment of German minister of transport 
Alexander Dobrindt, who said that the world is facing “the greatest 
mobility revolution since the invention of the car”.93 Especially that in 
the years 2014-2015, the number of electric vehicles nearly doubled, 
and at the end of 2016, it exceeded 2 million.94 In 2016, People’s Repub-
lic of China was the most dynamic market for electric vehicles (40% of 
global sales). The IEA forecasts that the number of electric cars will 
reach 30 million by 2025, and exceed 150 million by 2040. According 
to T. Szeba, some factors, such as the reduction in prices of electric 
93 N. Doll, Multimillionen-Förderprogramm für Wasserstoffautos,
https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article160261283/Multimillionen-Foerderpro-
gramm-fuer-Wasserstoffautos.html (accessed: 10.01.2017). 
94 Global EV Outlook 2017. Two million and counting, International Energy Agency, 
France 2017, p. 5. 
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cars, lower costs of operation and higher durability than in the case of 
combustion cars, will ultimately lead to the popularization of electric 
cars and the collapse of the oil industry.95 He also forecasts a further 
reduction in the price of oil, which will cause lower profitability of 
drilling, and as a result affect the financial condition of oil exporters 
and some automotive concerns. In Europe, the sale of electric cars is 
also increasing, and some cities have banned traditional vehicles from 
entering their centers (Paris, Madrid, Athens) or are planning to do 
so (London, Brussels). Apart from electric vehicles, European cities 
are developing public transport and bicycle transport (Copenhagen, 
Helsinki, Amsterdam). It seems that this “mobility revolution” will be 
inevitable to considerably reduce the emission of CO2 in the transport 
sector of EU countries. This sector was the only one to increase GHG 
emissions by 27% in the 1990-2010 period. In Poland, CO2 emissions 
from road transport grew from 26.52 million tons to 42.33 million tons 
between 2000 and 2014. In that period, the number of cars doubled 
and reached 20 million in 2014.96 Analyzing emissions in different 
areas of the transport sector in the EU, it is worth emphasizing that 
road transport had the greatest share: 72.1% of total GHG emissions 
from transport (data as of 2010)97. Thus, the development of electric 
cars may help reduce CO2 emissions, of course on the condition that 
electric cars will be powered with electricity produced in low or zero 
emission energy technologies. In the case of Poland, due to the high 
share of solid fuels in the structure of electricity production, assuming 
electricity consumption of 15 kWh/100km per electric car, we need 
to expect the growth of CO2 emission by approx. 13 kg.
98 Practically 
the same CO2 emission level occurs in the case of a combustion car 
95 J. Arbib, T. Seba, Rethink X. Disruption, Implications and Choices. Rethinking 
Transportation 2020-2030, 2017. 
96 Central Statistical Office, Environment 2016. Warsaw; www.stat.gov.pl (accessed: 
1.06.2017).
97 U. Motowidlak, Polityka Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zwiększenia efektywności 
ekonomicznej i środowiskowej transportu [European Union’s policy of enhancing 
energy efficiency and environmental efficiency of transport]. Part 2. Dekarbon-
izacja transportu [Decarbonization of transport]. Logistyka 3/2014 (accessed: 
1.06.2017), pp. 4515-4523.
98 http://samochodyelektryczne.org/porownanie_zuzycia_energii_samochodow_
elektrycznych_z_2013r.htm (accessed: 1.06.2017).
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(with an engine consuming 5.6 l/100 km of gasoline or 4.9 l/100 km 
of diesel oil)99. Obviously, in the case of older combustion cars with 
higher fuel consumption, which dominate in Poland, the levels of CO2 
emission are higher. 
In accordance with an EU document, it is forecast that the share 
of CO2 emission from European transport in the total emission of the 
gas in the EU will go on growing and will reach 38% in the year100 
2030 and almost 50% in 2050. This will be caused by a relatively 
small reduction of CO2 emission from transport in comparison to 
other sectors, and especially the energy sector. It is anticipated that 
air and sea transport will be the branches responsible for the greatest 
dynamics of growth of CO2 emission, by 150% and 110% respectively 
in the years 1990 – 2050.
Overcoming barriers connected with the development of electro-
mobility and creating appropriate instruments of support will help 
develop electric vehicles. Research shows that fiscal measures, such 
as subsidizing the purchase of electric cars (e.g. in Germany), tax or 
fee exemptions, as well as benefits in the form of scrapping the old 
combustion vehicle (e.g. in the Netherlands or France) are one of the 
elements leading to electric vehicles becoming more popular. But 
enhancing social trust in electric vehicles will be of key importance. 
Electromobility will have an influence on the development of research 
connected with the use of new materials and contribute to creating 
new jobs, as well as affect geopolitics through changing oil demand. 
The development of electromobility will also require transformation 
in the regulatory environment of the electricity market. On the one 
hand, the need to extend electricity networks is emphasized, but on 
the other hand, there is a challenge connected with building an inter-
active market, where digitalization will play a significant role. 
 In the case of some EU countries it seems that a well developed 
market of fuels alternative to the traditional ones may be an extra 
barrier to the dynamic development of electromobility. For exam-
ple, Poland with 2.914 million LPG vehicles is the European leader 
99 http://www.kaizenfleet.pl/nowe_normy_emisji_spalin/ (accessed: 1.06.2017).
100 Accompanying the White Paper - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area 
– Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, SEC(2011) 391 
final, Brussels 2011.
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in this regard and is the fifth country in the world in terms of LPG 
consumption in cars.101 In Italy, in turn, the market of CNG (Com-
pressed Natural Gas) is very well developed, with approximately 900 
thousand vehicles powered with CNG. In the near future, apart from 
electric vehicles, we may also expect increased use of natural gas (CNG/
LNG) as an alternative fuel in transport. But the direction and speed 
of development will surely mostly depend on price relations between 
natural gas, traditional fuels and electricity.102 
101 Raport roczny 2015 [Annual report 2015], Polska Organizacja Gazu Płynnego 
(POGP), Warsaw 2016, p. 11.
102 Szurlej A., Ruszel M., Olkuski T., Czy gaz ziemny będzie paliwem konkurencyjnym? 
[Will natural gas become a competitive fuel?] Rynek Energii, 2015 no. 5, pp. 3–10.
Chapter 4
The role of fossil fuels 
in energy transition
Lidia GAWLIK103
Technological development in the last century contributed to the 
improvement of mankind’s living conditions. This development is indis-
pensably connected with energy demand. The world was fi rst fascinated 
by oil, then by nuclear energy, gas, and nowadays, by renewable energy 
sources. Coal has always been in the background, serving an impor-
tant role in ensuring the security of supply and stability of prices.104
Chart 1. Global consumption of primary energy carriers in 2014
Source: author’s study based on: IEA105.
1 including the production of peat and oil shale; 
2 geothermal, solar, wind energy etc.
103 Lidia Gawlik, DSc, Eng., Associate Professor in Mineral and Energy Economy 
Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, 31-261 Kraków, ul. Wybickiego 7, 
e-mail: lidia.gawlik@min-pan.krakow.pl
104 L. Gawlik., E. Mokrzycki , R. Ney, Acceptability of Coal –  A Way to Energetic 
Safety, Prace naukowe GIG. Górnictwo i Środowisko, special issue No. IV. 2008, 
Wyd. GIG, pp. 79–90. 
105 Key World Energy Statistics 2016, International Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
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Fossil fuels’ (coal, oil, and gas) share in global consumption of 
primary energy carriers is 81.2%. The structure of consumption of 
primary energy carriers in 2014 is presented in Chart 1.
Global primary energy consumption in 1973 was 6,115 Mtoe, which 
means that 41 years later the world is consuming more than twice 
(2.25 times) as much energy. At that time, the share of fossil fuels was 
86.6%, including: coal 24.5%, oil 46.2%, natural gas 16.0%.
Between 1973 and 2014, the share of oil decreased by 14.9 percent-
age points, while the share of coal and natural gas grew.
Resources and production of primary energy carriers
In recent years (Table 1), there has been a constant growth in pro-
duction of all fossil fuels: natural gas by 9.4% in 2015 as compared to 
2010, oil by 9.0%, and coal by 6.0%. Coal and oil production slightly 
decreased in 2013. The data for 2015 are only preliminary, but on their 
basis we may conclude that the increase in fossil fuels production has 
slowed down (it was only +0.5% more than in 2014), which was the result 
of lowering coal production by 2.8%, accompanied by slightly greater 
increases in oil and gas production (+3.1% and 1.9%, respectively). Coal 
production decreased both in OECD countries and in China.106
Table 1. Global production of fossil energy carriers  
in the years 2010-2015
Fuel Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Coal Mt 7,229 7,783 7,831 7,823 7,925 7,709
Oil Mt 3,973 4,011 4,142 4,117 4,200 4,331
Natural gas bcm 3,282 3,388 3,435 3,479 3,524 3,590
Source: author’s study based on: Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy 
Agency, Paris, issues of 2011-2016.
The use of fossil fuels is dependent on their availability. Regional pref-
erences for their use result from the location of deposits of the resources.
Proved recoverable reserves of fossil fuels as of the end of 2015 
are presented in Table 2.
106 Key World Energy Trends, Excerpt from World Energy Balances, International 
Energy Agency, Paris 2016. 
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Table 2. Proved recoverable reserves of fossil fuel deposits 
in the world
Fuel 
Global resources
Oil Natural gas Coal
billion tons trillion m3 billion 
tons
239.4 186.9 893.531
including:
North America 35.9 12.8 245.088
Central and South America 51.0 7.6 16.641
Europe and Eurasia 21.0 56.8 310.538
Middle East 108.7 80.0
32.936
Africa 17.1 14.1
Asia-Pacifi c 5.7 15.6 245.088
Source: author’s study based on: Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petro-
leum, 2016.
Chart 2. Percentage share of each region in terms of oil, natural gas 
and coal
Source: author’s study based on: Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petro-
leum, 2016.
47.3% of all global deposits of oil has been documented in the Mid-
dle East. In that region there is also 42.8% of the world’s resources of 
natural gas, but no deposits of coal. In Europe and Eurasia the great-
est resources of oil are in Russia (14 billion tons) and Kazakhstan 
(3.9 billion tons). Russia also has the largest resources of natural gas 
in the region (32.3 trillion m3), followed by Turkmenistan (17.5 tril-
lion m3). The largest deposits of coal (hard coal and lignite) can be 
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found in Europe and Eurasia, where Russian resources dominate as 
well (157 billion tons). In Asia and Pacific region there are 32.3% of 
global deposits of coal: mostly in China (114.5 billion tons), Australia 
(76.4 billion tons) and India (60.6 billion tons). 
North America is a region rich in fossil fuels. It has 14.0% of the 
global resources of oil, 9.7% resources of natural gas, and 27.5% 
resources of coal (Chart 2). The USA is noteworthy in the region, 
with its 10.4 trillion m3 of natural gas and over 237 billion tons of 
coal. The biggest deposits of oil belong to Venezuela (47 billion tons) 
and Canada (27.8 billion tons). 
Fossil fuels production (Table 3) is connected with the available 
resources, but also with their management and the level of develop-
ment of the mining industry.
Table 3. Largest producers of oil, natural gas and coal in 2015  
and their share in the global production of those energy sources
Oil Natural gas Hard coal and lignite
Country
Produc-
tion
Mt
Share
% Country
Produc-
tion
Mt
Share
% Country
Produc-
tion
Mt
Share
%
Saudi 
Arabia 572 13.2 USA 769 21.4 China 3,527 45.8
USA 567 13.1 Russia 638 17.8 USA 813 10.5
Russia 533 12.3 Iran 184 5.1 India 691 9.0
Canada 221 5.1 Canada 164 4.6 Australia 509 6.6
China 215 5.0 Qatar 164 4.6 Indone-sia 469 6.1
Iraq 175 4.0 China 134 3.7 Russia 349 4.5
Iran 168 3.9 Norway 122 3.4 South Africa 252 3.3
UAE 160 3.7 Saudi Ara-bia 87 2.4 Germany 185 2.4
Kuwait 160 3.7 Turkmeni-stan 83 2.3 Poland 136 1.8
Venezuela 144 3.3 Algeria 82 2.3 Kazakh-stan 107 1.4
Others 1416 32.7 Others 1163 32.4 Others 671 8.7
Total 4331 100.0 Total 3590 100.0 Total 7,709 100.0
Source: author’s study based on: Key World Energy Statistics 2016, International 
Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
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Ten countries produce more than two thirds of the world’s oil; 
only three countries, Saudi Arabia with the production of 572 Mt in 
2015, the USA (567 Mt) and Russia (533 Mt) account for 38.5% global 
production. The other OPEC countries (Iran, Iraq, UAE and Kuwait) 
combined produce another 663 Mt of oil. 
Two countries are leaders in natural gas extraction: the USA (769 
bcm) and Russia (638 bcm), and the group of ten largest producers 
provide 67.6% of the world’s production of the fuel. 
Coal production is dominated by China, which in 2015 extracted 
over 3.5 billion tons. Although that was a decrease in comparison with 
2014 (3.65 billion tons), still it is almost half (48.5%) of global extrac-
tion. The ten biggest producers provide 91.3% of coal to world markets. 
The reserves-to-production ratio (R/P), i.e., the amount of proved 
recoverable reserves divided by the amount of production in a year, 
shows that there is enough oil for 50.7 years (if it is extracted as inten-
sively as in 2015), natural gas, for 52.8 years, and coal, for 114 years.107 
The use of primary energy carriers
Primary energy carriers are mostly used to generate electricity 
(Table 4). 
Table 4. Electricity production by energy carriers in selected years, TWh
Energy carrier 1973 2004 2013 2014
Coal1 2,348 6,944 9,633 9,707
Oil 1,520 1,170 1,028 1,023
Natural gas 742 3,419 5,066 5,155
Nuclear energy 203 2,748 2,478 2,535
Hydro energy2 1,281 2,808 3,801 3,906
Others3 36 361 1,316 1,490
Total 6,131 17,450 23,322 23,816
Source: author’s study based on: IEA.108
1 including all solid fossil fuels, also peat and oil shale, 
2 without energy from pumped storage power plants, 
3 renewable (geothermal, solar, wind etc.) and non-renewable (waste etc.).
107 Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, 2016.
108 Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency, Paris, issues of 2006, 
2015, 2016.
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The increasing importance of coal and natural gas in electricity 
production is a constant phenomenon, and the use of oil is decreas-
ing (Table 4). Within the last 40 years, there has been a 3.88-fold 
growth in global electricity production. The last decade (2004-2014) 
saw a 36% rise, and the highest increases in electricity production 
occurred in production from natural gas (51% increase in 2014 in 
comparison to 2004), with decreasing use of oil (-12.6%) and nuclear 
energy (-7.8%). In that period, electricity production from coal rose 
by approx. 40%, which means that coal is still the basic fuel to pro-
duce electricity globally, despite the small reduction of the share in 
fuel structure of electricity production in 2014 in favor of dynami-
cally developing other (renewable) energy sources, especially wind 
energy (Chart 3).
Chart 3. Structure of energy carriers used in electricity production  
in selected years
Source: author’s study based on: Key World Energy Statistics 2016, International 
Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
Global production of nuclear energy in 2014 was 2,535 TWh, 
accounting for 10.6% of the energy supply. It was the second year of 
slight rise in production after the extremely low production level in 
2012 (2,461 TWh). The drop in nuclear energy production from approx. 
2,760 TWh in 2010 was the result of a change in many countries’ 
approach to nuclear energy after the tragic accident in Fukushima 
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(Japan) in 2011 caused by the enormous tsunami109, which resulted in 
the greatest nuclear power plant disaster since Chernobyl). 
As of the end of 2015, 390 GW of nuclear energy was functioning. 
In spite of some countries’ declarations to discontinue nuclear energy 
production, at the end of 2015, 65 reactors with the total capacity of 64 
GW were under construction110. New nuclear power plants are being 
built in China, India and Russia. The analysis of planned development 
shows that nuclear energy is going to develop in the Far East, whereas 
in North America and Western Europe the use of nuclear energy to 
produce electricity is going to gradually decrease. For rapidly deve- 
loping countries such as China or India, nuclear energy is considered 
to be a good alternative to traditional energy based on fossil fuels due 
to its reduced emissions, and problems connected with the flexibility 
of the source, water consumption, and a supply of cheap energy will 
gradually be solved through technological development (small mod-
ular reactors, generation IV reactors, etc.).
Hydro energy is the traditional way of generating renewable elec-
tricity. Its share in global electricity production in 2014 was 16.4%, 
accounting for 72% of renewable electricity. The generating capacity 
of hydropower plants in 2015 reached 1,209 GW, including 145 GW 
of pumped storage power plants, which means an increase by more 
than 30% than in 2007. China has the highest number of hydropower 
plants (26% of global production capacity); the USA (8.4%), Brazil 
(7.6%) and Canada (6.5%) have much fewer. The unused global techni-
cal potential of water energy is estimated to be approximately 10,000 
TWh, 72% of which is in Asia.111 New investments are concentrated in 
China, Latin America, and Africa. We can expect that because of the 
growing use of RES, characterized by high changeability of operation, 
the potential of water energy will develop wherever there are appro-
priate conditions for it, being a flexible source stabilizing the work of 
electricity networks. 
109 The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Report by the Director General, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna 2015, http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/
pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pdf  
110 World Energy Resources/Nuclear [in:] World Energy Resources 2016, World 
Energy Council, London 2016.
111 World Energy Resources/Hydro [in:] World Energy Resources 2016, World 
Energy Council, London 2016.
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A characteristic feature in recent years is the development of RES 
because of growing fears connected with climate changes resulting from 
the higher and higher emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
The latest 15 years have seen an unprecedented development of 
technologies connected with RES, especially wind energy. The huge 
market growth has caused the increase of new investments. Many new 
RES-based production capacities have been established. Lowering 
investment expenditure and operating costs has become a fact, and 
as a result, economic growth and GHG emissions, formerly linked, 
have been partially separated.112 
In 2015, generating capacity in wind energy reached 432 GW (420 
GW onshore and 12 GW offshore), which accounted for around 7% of 
global generating capacity. In 2015 alone, there was 63 GW of new 
wind installations, and the value of the wind energy market was US$ 
109 trillion (2015). 
Chart 4. Gross electricity production by fuels in the European Union 
(EU-28) in the 1990-2014 period, TWh
Source: author’s own study based on data from: Energy, transport and environ-
ment indicators, Eurostat, Luxembourg 2016.
(1) without energy from pumped storage power plants. 
Solar energy has had exponential growth over the last 10 years. 
In 2015, generating capacity reached 227 GW, producing about 1% of 
112 World Energy Resources 2016, Summary, World Energy Council, London 2016, 
http://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2016/world-energy-resources-2016/
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the world’s electricity. In solar heating and cooling systems, generat-
ing capacity reached 406 GW.113
The fuel structure of electricity production depends on the region 
and is the product of many factors, the most important of which is 
access to energy carriers, current and historical economic determi-
nants, and the adopted direction of development. Chart 4 presents 
the fuel structure of electricity production in the European Union in 
the 1990-2014 period.
Two characteristic features make the fuel structure of electricity 
production in the European Union (Chart 4) different from the global 
structure (Table 4, Chart 3). First, in the European Union the growth 
in production of electricity has slowed down, or has even decreased. 
The reasons for the phenomenon are related to growing energy effi-
ciency in the use of energy. Furthermore, in 2014: 
1) the share of solid fuels was 25.3%, whereas the global average was 
40.8%, and coal consumption lowered by 15.8% as compared to 
the year 2005;
2) oil, with the share of 1.8%, became unpopular (just like in the 
global scale), but in the European Union the process of resigning 
from its use was much quicker;
3) the share of natural gas was 15.4%, far below the global average 
(21.6%), and its consumption fell by 44% as compared to the year 
2010;
4) nuclear energy accounted for 27.5%, which means a decrease of its 
share by 4.6 percentage points as compared to 1995. The share of 
nuclear energy in Europe was significantly higher than the global 
average (10.6%);
5) the use of renewable water resources in hydropower was lower in 
the EU (11.8%) than globally (16.4%), although there was a little 
growth of electricity production in hydropower plants in compar-
ison to the year 2005, when it had been very low (9.8%);
6) the share of other energy sources in electricity production was 18.3% 
– almost three times higher than the global average (6.3%), which 
points to the preferred direction of the Union’s energy transition. 
The European Union is the leading force in the development of elec-
tricity production from renewable energy sources (Chart 5), due to the 
113 Ibidem.
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implemented and consistently applied climate package, and especially 
newer plans concerning climate protection to be implemented until 
2030114 and in the long-term perspective (Energy Roadmap 2050).115 
The wind energy industry is particularly dynamic. Within just four 
years (2010-2014), wind energy production grew by 70%. In 2015, in 
Denmark the share of production using wind turbines was 42% of 
total electricity production.116 In Germany, after another year of grow-
ing production, wind energy accounted for a 13% share in electricity 
demand, and generating capacity reached 45.2 GW, giving the country 
third place among the biggest wind energy powers, after China (148 
GW) and the USA (74.3 GW). The fourth place in terms of generating 
capacity of wind energy was India (24.8 GW), followed by EU coun-
tries: Spain (23 GW) and Great Britain (13.6 GW).117
Chart 5. Development of the use of renewable energy sources 
in electricity production in the European Union 
in the 1990-2014 period, TWh
Source: author’s own study based on data from: Energy, transport and environ-
ment indicators, Eurostat, Luxembourg 2016.
114 Framework 2030: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. Green 
paper, European Commission (EC). COM(2013) 169 fi nal, http://cor.europa.eu/en/
activities/stakeholders/Documents/comm169-2013fi nal.pdf.
115 Roadmap 2030: Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions. Energy Roadmap 2050, COM(2011) 885 fi nal, European Commission (EC),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0885&-
from=EN.
116 World Energy Resources/Wind [in:] World Energy Resources, World Energy 
Council, London 2016.
117 Ibidem.
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The final global energy consumption in 2014 was 9,425 Mtoe. The 
shares of final energy carriers in this amount were:
  coal and other solid fossil fuels – 11.4%,
  oil – 39.9%,
  natural gas – 15.1%,
  biofuels and waste – 12.2%,
  electricity – 18.1%,
  other final energy carriers (including geothermal, wind, solar and 
other kinds of energy) – 3.3%.
Thus, the share of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) in final consumption 
is 66.4%, and an additional 18.1% is the consumption of electricity, 
66.7% of which, globally, is a transformation product of fossil fuels.
Final consumption of primary energy carriers is presented in 
Chart 6.
Chart 6. Directions of final consumption of the main energy carriers 
globally in the years 2004 and 2014, Mtoe
Source: author’s study based on: IEA.118 
In the chart, ’other sectors’ include all sectors of the economy except 
industry and transport, i.e., agriculture, commerce, public adminis-
tration and households.
The final consumption of all energy carriers has grown within the 
last 10 years. The greatest increase occurred in the case of coal con-
118 Key World Energy…, 2006, 2016, op. cit.
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sumption (by 67.2%). The second quickest developing final energy 
carrier is electricity (37.7% increase). The final consumption of na- 
tural gas and oil has risen by 16.4 and 16.2%, respectively. The least 
increases were in other final energy carriers (11.6%). In this item, final 
energy from geothermal power, biofuels, biomass, sun, wind and waste 
(renewable and non-renewable) was aggregated. 
Within the analyzed 10 years, there was a clear tendency to change 
final energy consumption in transport. Although the share of oil 
and oil derivatives is still dominant (92% in 2014), it is lower than 
in 2004 (94%), because the increase in oil consumption (30%) is 
slower than the increase in natural gas (43%) and other carriers 
(five-fold increase). 
Climate change vs fossil fuels
A problem that is inseparable from the use of fossil fuels is the fact 
that their extraction and use involves greenhouse gases emission to 
the atmosphere.
The global amount of emitted greenhouse gases is growing 
at a high rate. The main reason is the combustion of fossil fuels 
(Chart 7). 
Chart 7. World emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels 
combustion in selected years, millions of tons of CO2
Source: author’s study based on: Key World Energy Statistics 2016, International 
Energy Agency, Paris 2016.
63The role of fossil fuels in energy transition
If humankind do not take any new steps to reduce emissions, we 
should expect warming by 4.5°C before the end of the century, and 
the rise would be hard to stop in the next centuries, leading to disas-
trous consequences. 
Target global warming by 2°C is regarded as the safety thresh-
old. The scenario of reducing temperature growth by 2°C involves 
quick reduction of emissions, by 80-90% before the middle of 
the century and to zero in the second half of the century. This 
means the use of only approximately half of the fossil fuels used 
so far. The European Union has accepted the challenge, and in its 
plans described in Roadmap 2050119 and finalized in agreements 
concerning activities taken before 2030120 it declared the decar-
bonization of the Union economy, especially the energy industry. 
It also announced a binding objective of the Union, assuming the 
reduction of GHG emissions before 2030 by at least 40% in com-
parison to the level of 1990.121 
The response of the rest of the world was not unambiguous, and 
negotiations continued at the next UN conferences on climate change. 
The agreement made in 2015 in Paris during COP21 is regarded as 
a breakthrough in international climate policy. The Paris agreement 
assumes that the parties will strive to stop the increase in warming 
and to maintain the temperature at about 1.5°C above the temperature 
from before the industrial age; the ways of conduct were agreed upon 
which took into consideration specific conditions of all the parties, 
and funds will be made available to allow low-emission development 
and counteract the effects of climatic changes. 
Before the conference, 187 countries voluntarily commissioned 
themselves to reduce emissions, signing INDC (Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions). These include the goals to be achieved 
in the 2020-2030 period. Achieving them would allow  reduction 
of warming to 2.7-3.5°C before the end of the century, which is not 
enough. Hence, in the text of the agreement there were provisions on 
periodical reviews of performance of obligations every 5 years, begin-
119 Roadmap 2030…, op. cit.
120 Framework 2030…, op. cit. 
121 Conclusions – October 23–24, 2014 . 2030 climate and energy policy framework, 
European Council, EUCO 169/14, CO EUR 13, CONCL 5, 24.10.2014.
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ning in 2023, so as to deepen them and make them enough to achieve 
the global goal of preventing warming below the agreed limit. 
Another COP conference in November 2016 in Marrakesh did 
not give any significant progress, but it confirmed the wish of col-
laboration between countries to enable the performance of the Paris 
Agreement. It must be emphasized that among the signatories of the 
Paris Agreement there were countries that in their previous climate 
policy had not accepted self-limitation in terms of reducing green-
house gases, e.g., China and the USA, but later on president Trump 
has withdrawn this promise.
Conclusion
Global intentions concerning energy transition and reduction of 
greenhouse gases emission will require changes in energy systems 
and the structures of consumption of primary energy carriers, which 
will be connected with the reduction of fossil fuels. The desired 
directions of development include particularly: increase in energy 
efficiency, energy saving, and the development of low emission tech-
nologies, with particular consideration of renewable energy sources. 
Technological development oriented at technologies that meet the 
conditions of emission reduction will require concentrating power 
and expenditure on research and development and will refer not 
only to the energy industry, but also to all other sectors of the econ-
omy, especially the transport sector. The growing market of electric 
cars is one example. 
The requirement of emission reduction first eliminates coal as 
the highest emission fuel. There are even short-term plans to replace 
coal with gas (regarded as a fuel the combustion of which causes less 
emission of greenhouse gases) before energy production becomes 
fully no-emission. 
Energy transition, understood as the application of innovative tech-
nologies to achieve sustainable social development thanks to ensuring 
energy availability while limiting negative effects to the environment, 
is a process that requires a comprehensive approach to production 
processes and the use of primary energy sources with consideration 
of conditions and interests of regional communities. Conditions dif-
65The role of fossil fuels in energy transition
fer from region to region and from country to country, so the ways to 
achieve low or zero emission economy are bound to differ, too. 
Lowering the share of fossil fuels in the structure of primary energy 
carriers from the current 80% globally is inevitable, but it is not clear 
what level of reduction is really achievable. Some countries that tra-
ditionally use those fuels will rather invest in clean technologies of 
using fossil fuels than change all their economies to renewable energy 
sources.
Chapter 5
Prospects for RES and nuclear 
energy in the process  
of energy transition
Tomasz MŁYNARSKI122
In 2014, fossil fuels accounted for 82% of total primary energy pro-
duction. Popularizing renewable energy sources (RES) and nuclear energy 
(together accounting for one third of global electricity production) as 
zero emission energy sources improves the transition processes towards 
a low emission economy based on energy sources without GHG emission. 
Energy transition brings certain economic benefits, not only connected 
with the improvement of air quality and limitation of the negative effects 
of coal production to the environment (the greenhouse effect) but also 
with the development of production of low emission devices and tech-
nologies as well as services that are the object of business and export 
strategies. In the 21st century, the main criterion for evaluating the use-
fulness of individual energy sources will not only be the ability to ensure 
long-term energy supplies but also their ecological properties. In 2015, 
more than 140 countries submitted their Intended Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which altogether is expected to reduce the 
global CO2 emission by 8% per capita by 2025 and 9% by 2030.
123 Many 
countries intend to reduce the role of fossil fuels and other non-renew-
122 Tomasz Młynarski, PhD, Associate Professor in Jagiellonian University, Faculty of 
International and Political Studies, Institute of Political Studies and International 
Relations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, e-mail: tomasz.mlynarski@uj.edu.pl
123 Renewable Energy and Electricity, WNA, November 2016, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/renewa-
ble-energy-and-electricity.aspx (accessed: 12.15.2016). 
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able resources in their energy mix by means of replacing them with low 
emission energy sources such as RES and nuclear energy.  
The role of RES in energy transition 
As anticipated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
development of renewable energy in many countries will raise its 
share in global electricity production from 23.7% in 2015 up to 1/3 in 
2040.124 International Renewable Energy Agency prognoses that as 
early as 2030, RES will achieve approx. 36-40% share in total elec-
tricity production of the world. Renewable energy sources are one 
of the fastest-developing methods of generating energy.125 The year 
2015 saw bothan increase in generation capacity (147 GW from RES 
added in 2015, which is the greatest increase in the history), and in 
the amount of energy generated using those technologies.126
The increase of RES share, especially in the sector of electricity, 
is promoted e.g., by improving the cost competitiveness of renewable 
technologies, better access to financing, expansion to new markets, 
i.e., the growing demand for renewable energy in developing coun-
tries, as well as the capacity for dispersed energy generation (energy 
production by small units connected directly to distribution networks 
or being part of the recipient’s electricity network), usually produc-
ing electricity from renewable energy sources.127 In 2015, worldwide 
electricity production was dominated by large sources of electricity 
124 World Energy Outlook 2014, IEA, p. 5; Renewables 2016. Global Status Report, 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, p. 18; T. Młynarski, M. Tar-
nawski, Źródła energii i ich znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w XXI 
wieku [Energy sources and their importance for energy security in the 21st cen-
tury], Kraków 2016, p. 128; World Development Indicators: Electricity production, 
sources, and access, The World Bank, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.7 (accessed: 
15.12.2016); Renewables 2016. Global Status…, p. 32. 
125 In 2014, RES provided about 19.2% of the final energy consumption (hydroelec-
tric power plants provided 3.9%, and biomass, 8.9%), data from: Renewable Energy 
Policy Network, Renewables 2016. Global Status …, p. 28.   
126 Ibidem, p. 17. 
127 Dispersed energy generation is a dynamically developing sector of electrical engi-
neering, which is characterized by lower power than professional generation units, 
private ownership, independence from central administration and integration with 
medium and low voltage grid.
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(exceeding 1 MW) belonging to municipal companies or big investors. 
At the same time, markets of low capacity energy sources developed. 
Among them, Bangladesh is the leader (house solar systems) and other 
developing countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, China, India, Nepal, 
Brazil and Guiana), where small-scale RES are developing which pro-
vide electricity for residents living far from energy networks.128 Global 
technical, economic, and market transformation of the energy sector 
is accelerating. In the second half of the second decade of the 21st cen-
tury, more power in the electricity sector is generated annually from 
RES than from all fossil fuels. In favorable conditions (good envi-
ronmental availability and legal regulations), electricity from water, 
geothermal energy, and some biomass sources was cost competitive 
to fossil fuels, even without encumbering the latter with externalities.
The growing share of RES in the global fuel and energy balance 
helps save the resources of fossil fuels, improve countries’ energy 
security, and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG).  According to the IEA, 
global production of electricity from renewable sources will grow by 
almost 45% before 2020.129 The costs of generating energy from renew-
able energy sources are gradually decreasing. Between 2010 and 2015, 
average costs of onshore wind energy production dropped by approx. 
30%, and of solar energy, by two-thirds.130 The high level of subsidy is 
no longer necessary for the development of PV and wind energy, but 
the economic attractiveness of those energy sources is still dependent 
on a market regulatory framework. 
In the third decade of the 21st century, the construction of new RES 
capacity will expand geographically (especially in countries beyond the 
OECD), and renewable technologies will become more cost competitive. 
This is confirmed by global investments in the years 2000-2013, 57% 
of which was power plants supplied with renewable energy sources, 
whereas fossil fuel plants 40%, and nuclear energy plants only 3%.131 
This dynamic is especially visible in Asian countries (China, India, 
Japan, South Korea), where the development of new zero emission 
128 Renewables 2016. Global Status…, op.cit., p. 18.  
129 Renewable Energy. Medium-Term Market Report 2014, Market Analysis and 
Forecasts to 2020, OECD/IEA, 2014, p. 4.  
130 Renewable Energy. Medium-Term Market Report 2015, Market Analysis and 
Forecasts to 2020 (Executive Summary), OECD/IEA, 2015, p. 5.   
131 M. Schneider, A. Froggatt, et al., The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, 
Paris, London, Washington, D.C. 2014, p. 10.  
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capacities determines economic development, lowering the dependence 
on fuel importation. Whereas in the first decade of the 21st century 
Europe accounted for 40% of global RES investments, in the second 
one the main actor in the development of new RES capacities is China, 
responsible for nearly 40% of the global increase and over 60% of the 
increase in countries out of the OECD.132 In 2014, China alone was 
responsible for 40% of the global increase of the potential of renewa-
ble energy sources (three times more than the aggregate value of RES 
capacity in Great Britain).133 The region of the Middle East is also in an 
early, though also very dynamic, phase of development of renewable 
energy technologies (Saudi Arabia, UAE). In OECD countries the sta-
ble increase of RES will mainly be supported by the need to diversify 
energy sources and decarbonization policy, as well as decapitalization 
of conventional power plants’ infrastructure. 
In the EU, the increase of RES capacities in electricity production is 
dynamically growing, though solar systems have also been integrated 
with several urban heating systems (mainly in Western Europe). RES, 
however, especially fluid biofuels with a 4% share in the global fuel 
structure of the transport sector, do not play a crucial role. Although 
the popularity of electric cars is growing (the technology is even used 
in trucks), policy support for RES in the transport sector is much lower 
than policy support for RES in the sector of electricity production. 
Decarbonization policy and the fight against global warming makes 
renewable energy one of the most dynamically developing areas of 
energy industry. RES are more and more widely used in four basic sec-
tors: electricity production, heating and cooling, in transport, and as 
a source of energy in areas without a permanent energy infrastructure. 
The increase of RES is also dependent on the behavior of individual and 
industrial consumers, who more and more often buy electricity from 
renewable sources. 
The development strategy of renewable energy is not only designed 
to improve energy security, but also to stimulate economies, including 
the creation of new eco jobs.134 In 2015, employment in the RES sector 
132 Renewable Energy. Medium-Term Market Report 2014, op.cit., p. 5., p. 8. 
133 Renewable Energy. Medium-Term Market Report 2015, op.cit., p. 4.    
134 A. Jordan, D. Huitema, T. Rayner, H. van Asselt, Governing the European Union: 
policy choices and governance dilemmas, [in:] Climate Change Policy in the Euro-
pean Union Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation?, A. Jordan, 
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grew to approx. 8.1 million workplaces (direct and indirect), mainly in 
the segment of PV and biofuels (except big hydropower plants): mostly 
in China (3.52 million), Brazil (0.91 million), the USA (0.76 million), 
India (0.41 million), Japan (0.38 million) and Germany (0.35), and 
in the whole EU, 0.64 million).135 In terms of all RES technologies, 
China, Brazil, the USA and India were the leading employers. The 
segment with the highest share of jobs in renewable energy sector all 
over the world is photovoltaics (2.8 million), the second, liquid biofuel 
production (1.67 million), and the third, wind energy (1.08 million). 
Approximately 1.3 million people were employed in the hydrological 
energy sector (mainly in China, 34%).136  
Thus, the policy of energy transition is oriented toward economic 
goals, and in this context the policy of developing renewable energy 
sources is a relatively new but very dynamically developing field of 
economy in many countries, which intend to make use of their techno-
logical advantage on the global market. This way the policy of adjusting 
the energy sector to climate changes is becoming a catalyst to mod-
ernize economies, and leading to the emergence of a new sector of the 
“green” economy.137 
In the following decades of the 21st century, RES are bound to 
gradually replace fossil fuels as a result of energy transition. The main 
advantages of renewable energy sources are their availability, the lack of 
costs of obtaining the resources/fuels, low costs of processing, as well 
as being non-exhaustible and natural environment-friendly (no emis-
sion when producing electricity) and the possibility to use wasteland 
such as coastlines or rocks. An important advantage of solar systems 
is that they are dispersed and can be launched close to the places of 
demand, reducing costs and losses of electrical current transfer from 
traditional power plants often located far away from the end custom-
ers.138 The main drawback is the instability of energy generation (too 
D. Huitema, T. Rayner, H. van Asselt, F. Berkhout (eds.), Cambridge University 
Press 2010, pp. 29-50. 
135 Renewable Energy and Jobs Annual Review 2016, IRENA, p. 5, p. 11.  
136 Ibidem, p. 9. 
137 The opportunity to use hydrogen on the large scale as a transport fuel in the future 
increases the potential both of renewable energy sources and of electricity supplies.
138 In Germany, 1.5 million solar PV installations with the capacity of 40 GW sup-
plies 940 equivalent hours of full electricity load annually. On working days in the 
summer, it covers 35% of German grid demand, and at weekends, almost 50%.
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low or too high wind speed, clouds). Clouds for example can reduce 
energy production by 70% in a minute, which is a serious problem in 
integrating solar systems with the standard grid. Innovative battery 
systems have reduced the loss to 10% per minute. Therefore, batter-
ies or other energy storage technologies are necessary in order to use 
solar and wind energy in individual systems. Over the last two dec-
ades, wind turbines have developed considerably, and photovoltaic 
technologies are more and more effective and efficient. Significant 
progress in the storage of energy generated from renewable sources 
is also visible. Along with governmental encouragement to use these 
energy sources, their costs have dropped and are currently compara-
ble to the costs of fossil fuels if we take into account the charges for 
CO2 emission. But there is a problem with periodic production of large 
amounts of electricity, which causes difficulties with maintaining the 
economic reliability and profitability of the whole system. Therefore, 
large-scale use electricity from solar and wind energy in main grids is 
difficult. So in order to use RES in standard grids it is necessary (due 
to quickly changing weather conditions, especially in the case of solar 
and wind energy) to ensure an extra source (back-up) with high avail-
ability. This means that it should be able to start operations quickly 
so as to make up for changes in energy production. So the basic con-
dition of popularizing RES in the process of electricity production is 
to use them in such a way that they will meet the demand (especially 
at peak moments), taking into consideration its changeable character 
and dispersed nature.139
The role of nuclear energy in energy transition 
Nuclear energy supplies a significant part (11% in 2015) of global 
electricity production in a way that is neutral to the problem of green-
house effect.140 It is a reliable zero emission high power source of energy 
139 Hydroelectric power plants are able to respond to seasonal and daily changes in 
energy demand by regulating the amount of water flow. Another source may be gas 
power plants, quick to use. Renewable Energy and Electricity, WNA, November 2016, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/renewa-
ble-energy-and-electricity.aspx.
140 Nuclear energy is treated as separate from renewable sources, because reactors 
use mineral fuel (uranium ores) and clearly exhaust the available uranium resources, 
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(the lowest emission of greenhouse gases in the whole life cycle out 
of all the energy production sources), so it can play an important role 
in mitigating the effects of climate change. The Director General of 
World Nuclear Association XXX put it this way: “We must meet the 
world’s growing energy needs and protect the planet. We will need 
all low carbon energy options to work together to achieve this, and 
nuclear will make a major contribution, because it is scalable, reli-
able and competitive.”141
According to World Energy Outlook 2016, in order to reduce the 
growth of temperature all over the world below 2°C it is necessary to 
ensure the increase of nuclear production capacity by nearly two and 
a half times by 2040 (so as to obtain electricity production growth in 
nuclear power plants from 2535 TWh to 6101 TWh).142 This means that 
approximately 80% of electricity generated all over the world should 
be low-emission. It is a global challenge, which requires the use of 
all the available low-emission technologies.143 Therefore, the nuclear 
industry has set itself the goal of tripling its production capacity up to 
over 1,000 GW on the basis of new facilities by 2050, so that nuclear 
energy would meet 25% of the global demand for electricity.144 France, 
Switzerland, and the Ontario province in Canada have created a model 
of low-emission energy mix in the electricity sector, achieving more 
than 80% of the produced electricity from nuclear energy, developed 
in harmony with renewable sources.145 
According to IEA, by the middle of this century, the number of 
countries that use reactors will grow from 31 to 36. As the number of 
but in the future they will use again the combusted fuel, so they will achieve the 
“renewability“ effect. Moreover, common elements such as thorium are more and 
more often used as a fuel. 
141 Nuclear key to a clean energy future: IEA World Energy Outlook, WNA, 16 Novem-
ber 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/
nuclear-key-to-a-clean-energy-future-iea-world-ene.aspx (accessed: 12.10.2016). 
142 Ibidem.  
143 Nuclear for Climate, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/nuclear-
forclimate.aspx (accessed: 10.11.2016). 
144 Nuclear must be part of the international response to climate change, 17 Novem-
ber 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/
nuclear-must-be-part-of-the-international-response.aspx
145 Ibidem. 
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countries introducing nuclear energy exceeds the number of countries 
that discontinue its use146, nuclear reactors may contribute to the relia-
bility of the energy system – especially where they increase the level of 
technological diversification. For energy-importing countries this may 
reduce their dependence on supplies from abroad and their sensitivity 
to changes in fuel prices on the international market. Energy tran-
sition also gives real socio-economic benefits, such as the mitigation 
of effects of climate change or the improvement of health conditions. 
For these reasons, the environmental benefits of developing nuclear 
energy involve the reduction of harmful emissions, as nuclear power 
plants do not emit any greenhouse gases or pollutants (ashes, dust) 
into the atmosphere. Within the last 45 years (since 1971), the equiv-
alent of two years of total global emission of carbon dioxide (almost 
80 tons of CO2) has been avoided thanks to NE.
147 If conventional 
power plants were to be replaced by nuclear ones to produce the same 
amount of energy, 2,581 tons of CO2/GWh would be saved in compar-
ison to lignite, 1,773 tons of CO2/GWh in comparison to oil, and 1,183 
tons of CO2/GWh in comparison to natural gas combustion.
148 Just 
like in the case of RES, common application of nuclear energy in the 
global scale allows a substantial reduction of dependence on the three 
main fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) in total consumed energy, 
and as a result, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Replacing 
fossil fuel energy with renewable energy sources or nuclear energy is 
going to result in similar reductions of greenhouse gases.149 IEA fore-
casts that in 2014, the annual reduction of emissions will be almost 
50% in South Korea, 12% in Japan, 10% in the USA, 9% in the Euro-
pean Union, and 8% in China.150 The mean cost of emissions avoided 
thanks to new nuclear capacities depends on the mix and fuel prices 
(and it may be from very low up to over 80 dollars per ton). 
146 World Energy Outlook 2014, IEA, p. 7. 
147 Ibidem, p. 6.
148 Greenhouse gas emissions avoided through use of nuclear energy, http://www.
world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/greenhouse-gas-emissions-avoided.aspx (accessed: 
10.11.2016).  
149 According to the World Nuclear Association, comparing emissions from the 
life cycle of nuclear energy and renewable energy (all the main kinds of renewable 
energy sources: solar, wind, biomass, hydropower plants), we can see they are all 
on a comparable level.
150 World Energy Outlook 2014, op. cit., p. 6.
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More than 52% of the world’s fleet of nuclear reactors are over 30 
years old, so by the year 2040, about 200 out of 450 reactors all over 
the world (2016) will be removed (most of them in Europe, the USA, 
Russia, and Japan). For these reasons, nuclear energy will rather play 
an intermediate role in the process of energy transition before the 
share of renewable sources in the global energy mix grows consider-
ably (Fig. 3)151 Nuclear energy will be a very dynamically developing 
sector of industry in the nearest 20-40 years, mainly in Asia (China, 
India, Japan, South Korea), which is especially important, as the region 
accounts for 40% of global CO2 emissions (2014).
152 In 2016, in China 
and India 40% of the world’s reactors were under construction.153 
Figure 3. Energy sources in energy transition
 
Source: M. Tripathi, COP21, challenges and opportunities, European Nuclear Young 
Generation Forum 2015.  
Energy transition improves energy independence and the flexi-
bility of the energy system. Diversification of energy sources helps 
improve energy security of the country that applies it. In this sense 
151 IAEA 2015, www.iaea.org.   
152 CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, OECD/IEA, 2016, p. 12. 
153 The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, IAEA Power Reactor Information 
System, https://www.iaea.org/pris (accessed: 10.11.2016).
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nuclear energy can be treated as a domestic source of energy, which 
was emphasized in May 2008 by the contemporary president of the 
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, at the European Nuclear 
Energy Forum in Prague: “But in addition, nuclear energy, as one of 
the cheapest low carbon energy sources and with less vulnerability to 
fuel price changes than some other energy sources, can help protect 
our economies against price volatility”.154 The nuclear energy industry 
also ensures measurable short-term and long-term economic benefits 
connected with the creation of new jobs and economic growth. Obvi-
ously, nuclear energy does not generate as many jobs as traditional 
energy production, but it promotes development of highly qualified 
specialists, whose resources can be used in other areas of the economy. 
Nuclear power plants are usually constructed in poorly populated and 
economically developed places. Therefore, they generate an increase in 
employment in the region, an influx of new residents and financial prof-
its from taxes, as well as the development of local service infrastructure. 
Nuclear industry fosters research, supporting the modernization of many 
areas of industry (construction, machinery, electrical or chemical), and 
highly qualified researchers can support the national economic system 
in other areas (medicine, nuclear chemistry, environmental engineer-
ing, automatic control, electronics or IT). 
Conclusions 
  The future of the world energy industry lies in the use of varied 
low emission technologies ensuring the security of supply with 
a minimum impact on the environment. An important role in the 
process will be played by renewable energy and nuclear energy 
as zero emission sources of electricity. Nuclear energy may also 
significantly support the efforts connected with ensuring energy 
supplies while reducting greenhouse gases emissions and suppor-
ting sustainable development. For these reasons, many countries 
are considering the development of nuclear energy in the process 
of energy transition. 
154 J. M. Barroso, Address to the European Nuclear Energy Forum, SPEECH/08/259, 
Nuclear Energy Forum, Prague, 22 May 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_SPEECH-08-259_en.htm (accessed: 10.12.2016).
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  The need to change an economy into a low emission one is con-
nected with gradual reduction of the role of the fossil-fuel-based 
energy industry. Despite benefits offered by conventional energy 
industry (high energy value of conventional fuels, familiar techno-
logy, or advanced system of extraction – transfer – storage system), 
high emission of greenhouse gases is its basic disadvantage. There-
fore, countries should be given the opportunity to choose from the 
whole spectrum of energy technologies reducing CO2 emission. This 
provides an opportunity for nuclear energy, which is characterized 
by low emission, availability, and competitiveness.
  IEA assumes that the basic source of low emission electricity pro-
duction in the 21st century will still be renewable energy sources 
and nuclear energy, which contribute greatly to the process of tran-
sition of the energy system in the face of the need to counteract 
climate change. The transition in the energy sector, which is the 
source of two-thirds of greenhouse gases emissions, is necessary 
to achieve the goal of inhibiting the increase of CO2 emissions 
globally. It requires the acceleration of implementing renewable 
energy sources, and wherever it is politically and socially accepta-
ble, also nuclear energy, as the two basic sources of energy without 
GHG emission.
  Preventing climate chang through promoting a low-emission eco-
nomy means adjusting economic policy through technological 
innovations which will ensure progress in achieving environmental 
goals and economic benefits, including the formation of new eco 
jobs. The development of RES and nuclear energy may contri-
bute to eliminating the relationship between economic growth 
and emission growth. In addition, the prospect of growing costs 
connected with CO2 emissions in developed countries in the future 
will considerably change the economic perspective of no-emission 
energy sources.
Chapter 6
Energy efficiency
Tomasz MIROWSKI155
Energy transition is identified with a change from fossil fuels 
to low emission energy sources. It means replacing previously used 
energy carriers and saving fuels and energy as well as improvement 
of energy efficiency through certain activities. Lowering the con-
centration of greenhouse gases and other harmful pollutants in the 
air requires a fundamental transformation of the energy supply sys-
tem, including the replacement of fossil fuels with alternative energy 
sources and technologies such as renewable energy sources, nuclear 
energy, or clean coal technologies – CCT.156 At the same time, technol-
ogies capturing CO2 emission from exhaust fumes through CCS cause 
a number of application problems, have operation faults, and involve 
different risks. But first of all, they are very expensive in relation to 
other ways of lowering CO2 emissions, such as e.g., improvement of 
energy efficiency, substitution of input fuel, or some kinds of RES.157 
This part of the chapter presents the approach to energy efficiency 
as one of the instruments for reducing the consumption of energy 
resources and the emission of greenhouse gases.
155 Tomasz Mirowski, PhD, Eng., Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute, 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 31-261 Kraków, ul. Wybickiego 7A, 31-261 Kraków, 
e-mail: mirowski@min-pan.krakow.pl
156 T. Młynarski, Energetyka jądrowa wobec globalnych problemów bezpieczeństwa 
energetycznego i zmian klimatu w XXI wieku [Nuclear energy vs global challenges 
of energy security and the non-proliferation regime in the age of climate changes], 
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka, Kwartalnik Krakowskiej Akademii im. A.F. 
Modrzewskiego, Kraków 2016, no. 1 (XXII), pp. 17-28. 
157 L. Gawlik, D. Kryzia, M. Pepłowska, Uwarunkowania rozwoju czystych tech-
nologii wytwarzania energii z paliw kopalnych [Determinants of the development 
of clean technologies of energy production from fossil fuels], Polityka Energetyczna, 
2016, Vol. 19, part 4, pp. 63-74.
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The concept of energy efficiency and the ways of its improvement 
are sometimes erroneously identified only with the performance of 
energy equipment and activities aimed to improve it. An extended defi-
nition of energy efficiency proposed in the work explains the concept 
fully158: Energy efficiency is lowering primary energy consumption 
at the stage of voltage change (energy transformation), transfer, 
distribution, or final energy consumption, caused by technological 
changes, changes in behavior, or economic changes, ensuring the 
same or a higher level of comfort or services. Solutions increasing 
the effectiveness of final energy consumption reduce both the con-
sumption of energy consumed by end users and of primary energy. 
The definition of energy efficiency in Polish law (Act of 2016) is 
formulated for the needs of trade mechanisms with energy efficiency 
certificates (so-called white certificates) discussed further in the chap-
ter. The definition is as follows: energy efficiency is the ratio of the 
obtained operational effect of the facility, technological device, or 
installation in typical conditions of operation or use, and the amount of 
energy consumed by the facility, technological device, or installation, 
or as a result of the provided service necessary to achieve that effect.
Global primary energy consumption
Global primary energy consumption grew from 3,730 Mtoe in 1965 
to 13,147 Mtoe in 2015, more than a three-and-a-half-fold increase 
within half a century (Fig. 3).
The accumulated rates of increase of primary energy consumption 
per capita also display high dynamics, especially in Asian and Middle 
East countries. Chart 8 presents the percentage increment of the con-
sumed primary energy represented on the left axis by world regions 
(bars). The lines (curves) represent energy consumption per capita in 
the regions expressed as accumulated increase toe/person in percentage. 
Comparing data concerning the demand for energy and demographic 
changes within the latest 50 years, we can see a kind of relationship. In 
places where population is dynamically growing, energy consumption 
158 T. Skoczkowski, Wprowadzenie do efektywności energetycznej. Inteligentna 
energia. Efektywne zarządzanie energią w małej i średniej firmie [Introduction 
to energy efficiency. Intelligent energy. Effective energy management in a small 
or medium-sized enterprise], KAPE, Warsaw 2009.
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per capita is also increasing.159 Economically developed regions, such 
as North America or Europe and Eurasia, have maintained a similar 
stable level over the last fi ve years, with a downward tendency.
Chart 8. Accumulated increase in primary energy consumption 
(left axis) and energy per capita (right axis) for world regions 
in the years 1965-2015
Source: Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, 2016, www.bp.com 
(accessed: 09.12.2016).
159 Population growth database, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org (accessed: 
14.12.2016).
Figure 4. Global and regional primary energy consumption 
in the years 1965-2015 in Mtoe
Source: Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, 2016, www.bp.com 
(accessed: 09.12.2016).
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Governments intend to reduce primary energy consumption 
through saving, and to reduce final energy at the user through mod-
ern energy technologies and energy management techniques. 
EU energy efficiency policy
The future of energy is more and more often discussed due to the 
prospect of exhaustion of fossil fuels and climate changes connected 
with the emission of gases during their combustion with growing 
energy consumption per capita. After the European Union announced 
the so-called climate package, governments of member states intensi-
fied their work on setting the direction of development of the national 
energy industry. Documents included in the package (colloquially 
called “3x20”) set the activities to take in order to meet the three 
basic assumptions by 2020. The main aim is to increase energy effi-
ciency by 20% in comparison to a scenario which does not involve any 
activities in this regard. It is so important because all the goals are 
interrelated, and the improvement of effectiveness is of key impor-
tance for meeting the other obligations. The other assumptions of the 
package are to increase the share of renewable energy sources and to 
decrease the emission of greenhouse gases. After negotiations at the 
national level, quantity targets were decided for each member state, 
which will allow the whole EU to meet the goal. The base year was 
negotiated individually by selected (developing) countries to which the 
reduction of greenhouse gases emission applied. Developing countries 
have a higher share of the industry sector in the national economy, so 
they emit more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Imposing on 
them the same requirements as on developed countries could lead to 
inhibiting national economies, and thus, development. The assump-
tions of the climate and energy package are also the main goals of the 
“Europe 2020” strategy aimed at intelligent, lasting and social inclu-
sion-promoting economic growth (Komorowska A., 2016). For that 
purpose, activities have been taken to limit greenhouse gas emission 
through the introduction of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
which is the European Union’s priority system for limiting green-
house gases emission from industrial installations, transport, and 
big power plants. New investments in low emission technologies pro-
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moted by the ETS are also an example of activity aimed at improving 
energy efficiency in the main sectors of the economy of every country. 
ETS refers to 45% greenhouse gases emitted in the European Union. 
According to the strategy “Europe 2020”, those emissions should be 
reduced by 21% before the year 2020. The year 2005 was adopted as 
the base year. The remaining 55% of greenhouse gases are emitted in 
the sectors of housing, agriculture, and waste management. National 
emission reduction targets were established in order to reduce them. 
The scope of intervention differs depending on the level of economic 
development and affluence of the country. The most developed coun-
tries are obliged to reduce GHG emissions by 20% before 2020, and less 
developed ones may increase the emissions by 20% at the maximum. 
Another activity of the European Union is the support for renewable 
energy. The objectives in this regard have also been divided depend-
ing on the capacity for renewable energy production and the initial 
position of member states. The last but not least area supported by 
the European Union is energy efficiency.160
Two indices are used to evaluate the improvement of energy effi-
ciency in member states’ economies. These are GDP energy intensity, 
i.e., the ratio of GDP to energy consumption, and the ODEX index. 
ODEX is an aggregated energy efficiency index of the end consumer. 
It has been introduced to monitor the energy efficiency of EU coun-
tries. It has a simple methodology behind an understandable, simple 
and comparable index to illustrate progress in the energy efficiency of 
member states. ODEX indices are useful in monitoring the achievement 
of the indicative objective of energy efficiency determined in Directive 
2006/32/EC. There are two alternative methods of computing ODEX. 
The first of them is aggregation based on the effect of unit consump-
tion, combining the progress in energy efficiency achieved in all the 
subsectors based on the amount of saved energy in Mtoe: it is based 
on “the effect of unit consumption”. The other method (“weighted 
average method”) weighs a separate index of unit consumption of 
each subsector on the basis of its share in the energy consumption of 
160 A. Komorowska, T. Mirowski, Mechanisms to improve Energy efficiency in the 
context of the objectives of climate and Energy package. Humanistas and Social 
Sciences, 2017, HSS-24-(x-2017) (in printing).
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the whole sector.161 The disadvantage of this index is that it does not 
show the current level of energy intensity but progress as compared 
to the base year.
Energy savings in the EU in 2013 are estimated to be approx. 200 
Mtoe. In other words, without energy saving, the consumption of fi nal 
energy would be 200 Mtoe (or 19%) higher in 2013 than in 2000. If 
we compare the amount of energy saved this way with the energy of 
natural gas consumed in Germany, we can see it is the equivalent of 3 
years’ gas consumption (2013-2015). For Poland, the saved energy is 
equivalent to almost 15 years of natural gas consumption (2001-2015). 
As a result of the economic crisis, the annual rate of energy consump-
tion in the EU has dropped to 12 Mtoe/year, as compared to 16 Mtoe/
year before the crisis. In 2013, approximately 33% of the savings was 
in the sector of households, 30% in industry, 28% in transport, and 
9% in services. In 2012, the amount of saved energy was 180 Mtoe for 
the whole EU as compared to the year 2000, which is equivalent to 
17% of the energy consumed by the end customers. Chart 9 presents 
the accumulated values of energy saved in EU countries divided into 
two periods: before the economic crisis (2000-2007) and after the 
economic crisis (2007-2013). 
Chart 9. Energy savings in the EU by sector
Source: Odyssee-Mure, Synthesis: Energy Effi ciency Trends and Policies in the EU. 
An Analysis Based on the ODYSSEE and MURE Databases, Fraunhofer ISI Ger-
many and ENERDATA France, September 2015.
161 System Monitorowania Rozwoju [Development monitoring system], Strateg 2017, 
www.strateg.gov.pl (accessed: 07.12.2017).
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Improvement of energy efficiency illustrated  
with the example of selected EU countries
In order to increase energy efficiency, some mechanisms of activity 
have been established and included in Directive 2012/27/EU.162 Each 
member state should establish its own system of energy efficiency 
obligations. It obligates both the distribution sector and the energy 
sales sector to meet the combined energy saving target by the end 
of 2020. An alternative to this system is to implement other ways of 
improving energy efficiency, allowing countries to meet the end cus-
tomer targets of energy saving. The following energy efficiency policy 
instruments can be applied163:
  taxation of energy or CO2, leading to end customers reducing 
energy consumption,
  financial plans and instruments or tax incentives, which result in 
the introduction of new, energy effective technologies and lead to 
the reduction of energy consumption by end customers,
  regulations or voluntary agreements that lead to the application 
of energy effective technologies or techniques and result in lower 
energy consumption by end customers,
  norms and standards aimed at the improvement of energy effi-
ciency of products and services, including buildings and vehicles,
  energy marking systems,
  training and education, including energy advisory programmes, 
which lead to the application of energy effective technologies and 
result in lower energy consumption by end customers.
The improvement of energy efficiency since 2000 is the highest 
in 6 EU countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria and 
Poland), exceeding 2%/year (Figure 4). In the other 20 countries, the 
improvement has been between 1% and 2%/year. This does not mean 
that countries such as Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark or Italy do 
not have energy policies promoting the improvement of energy effi-
ciency.  In those countries the living standard is much higher, thanks 
162 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2012/27/EU of 25 Octo-
ber 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU 
and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC.
163 A. Komorowska, T. Mirowski, Mechanisms to improve Energy…, op.cit.
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to which in the households and services sectors and partially, the 
transport sector, a high level of savings was achieved in the 1990s. 
Decarbonization in EU-15 countries through the replacement of coal-
based energy technologies with nuclear power plants and RES led to 
the situation in which savings at the level of the countries of the “new 
Union”, e.g., Poland, are impossible.  
Chart 10. Progress in energy effi ciency in different countries 
(without the services sector)
Source: Odyssee-Mure, Synthesis: Energy Effi ciency Trends and Policies in the EU. 
An Analysis Based on the ODYSSEE and MURE Databases, Fraunhofer ISI Ger-
many and ENERDATA France, September 2015.
Poland
In Poland, energy saving was included in the assumptions of Polish 
Energy Policy until 2030. Since 2005, most of the planned activities 
concerning energy effi ciency have been carried out or at least com-
menced:
  support for cogeneration on the basis of utility heat demand on 
the internal market (implementation of Directive 2004/8/EC) 
through the introduction of a system of certifi cates of origin from 
cogeneration, also applying to natural gas energy (so-called red 
and yellow certifi cates),
  review of energy intensity of selected branches of economy and 
the possibility to reduce energy losses in the national electricity 
system; the results of these analyses were used when developing 
system solutions concerning the reduction of energy intensity of 
economy,
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  launching an information campaign by the Ministry of Economy 
promoting rational energy use,
  implementing Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of 
buildings, promoting pro-efficiency activities, in particular ther-
momodernization,
  implementing Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency 
and energy services,
  adopting the Act of 15.04.2011 on energy efficiency (Journal of Laws 
No. 94, item 551 as amended), which set the national objective of 
economical energy management, tasks of public sector entities in this 
regard, the rules of obtaining and redemption of energy efficiency 
certificates and rules for performing an energy efficiency audit.
The currently applicable Act on energy efficiency of 20 May 2016 
(Journal of Laws of 2016, item 831) points to three basic areas in which 
measurable effects of energy efficiency improvement can be obtained 
with the use of appropriate instruments. These are the white cer-
tificates system, energy efficiency audits in enterprises, and energy 
management systems. Energy efficiency certificates, (so-called white 
certificates) are a mechanism that stimulates and enforces pro-sav-
ing behaviors. The Act on energy efficiency imposed the obligation to 
obtain and submit for the President of the ERO a certain number of 
energy efficiency certificates for redemption or to pay a substitution 
fee. The obligation lies with:
  energy enterprises that sell electricity, heat or natural gas to end 
customers connected to the grid within the Republic of Poland 
(RP),
  end customers connected to the grid within the Republic of Poland 
that are members of the mercantile exchange, as regards transac-
tions made individually on the mercantile exchange,
  commodity brokerage houses or brokerage houses, as regards 
transactions made on the mercantile exchange at the order of end 
customers connected to the grid within the Republic of Poland.
Energy efficiency certificates and their redemption are administered 
by the President of the Energy Regulatory Office, and the property 
rights resulting from them are transferable, being an exchange com-
modity tradable on power exchange. This market mechanism makes 
it possible to obtain energy saving in three areas:
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  end customers,
  own equipment of energy producers and suppliers,
  reduction of losses of electricity, heat or natural gas in transfer or 
distribution.
For the three above-mentioned project categories aimed at improv-
ing energy effi ciency, the President of the ERO organizes at least three 
times a year tenders for projects used to improve energy effi ciency for 
which energy effi ciency certifi cates (white certifi cates) can be granted. 
They can be received for already carried out pro-effi ciency activity 
(completed after 01/01/2011) or for an activity that is planned. An 
energy effi ciency certifi cate can be received for an activity as a result 
of which annual primary energy saving is at least 10 toe, or for a group 
of activities of the same kind, whose combined effect exceeds 10 toe.164
Table 5 presents the latest ODEX indices for Poland in the 2000-
2014 period as compared to the mean of EU countries. 
Table 5. Increase of energy effi ciency in the main sectors since 
2000 in Poland and EU countries
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
HOUSEHOLDS SERVICES*
Source: Odyssee-Mure, on-line database: http://www.indicators.odyssee-mure.eu/
online-indicators.html (accessed: 27.01.2017).
Although the effi ciency of energy use in Poland has improved a lot 
in recent years, further measures are needed to reduce the distance 
from the mean value obtained by EU countries. Industry has had the 
164 Website devoted to energy effi ciency, Energopomiar, 2016, www.bialecertyfi katy.
com.pl (accessed: 11.11.2016).
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greatest share in reducing energy intensity. However, changes in the 
sector require high costs and are introduced slowly, usually if there 
are financial benefits to be achieved. The most important sectors in 
which energy efficiency needs to be improved in Poland are residen-
tial construction and transport. Anywhere that the consumption of 
energy from fossil fuels is lowered or replaced with renewable sources, 
energy efficiency is improved. In construction energy consumption can 
be cheaply reduced. Thermomodernization and conversion of heating 
technologies powered by fossil fuels into RES systems (solar collec-
tors, biomass boilers, heat pumps, photovoltaic panels) contribute to 
the improvement of energy balance in the municipal and residential 
sector. It is worth remembering that the changes are largely dependent 
on the participation of individual customers, so any changes reduc-
ing primary energy consumption are beneficial. That is why so much 
attention has been given to rational energy use recently. Information 
programmes, device marking, subsidies to RES systems, and stimu-
lating energy consumption by price diversification (dedicated tariffs) 
are designed to develop the habit of saving energy in citizens. 
The situation in transport regarding energy efficiency is slightly 
different. In this case, apart from increasing the use of final energy 
through technological changes (e.g., energy-saving engines), economic 
changes and changes in users’ behaviors are necessary. Many towns 
all over the world have changed or are changing the organization of 
town transportation, promoting public transport and cycling at the 
same time. This involves e.g., banning passenger car traffic in town 
centers, combined with the creating of parking lots at the borders of 
closed areas and offering public transport from there, assigning bus 
passes on roads with more than one lane, regulating public transport 
ticket prices, incentives for environment-friendly vehicles (hybrid and 
electric cars) and the extension of tramway, subway and electric urban 
railroad infrastructure.
Conclusion
Energy policy is a significant element of economic development of 
every country. High energy consumption and dependence on exter-
nal supplies of energy resources and ready fuels are reasons to look 
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for new solutions to ensure energy security. The first oil crisis of 1973 
contributed to the inclusion of energy security among the priorities of 
energy policy. Rational use of fuels became an important element of 
the European strategy of reducing the dependence of the whole Euro-
pean Union on oil importation. An example of response to this can be 
changes introduced in the automotive sector in Germany. Volkswagen 
AG introduced new models with small gasoline engines (from 1,100 
ccm) and at the end of the 1970s, diesel engines for compact cars of 
1,500 ccm, consuming on average 5.5 liter/100km, and after 1980, 
1,600 ccm consuming on average 5.0 liter/100 km.165 In the energy 
sector, the oil crisis changed the fuel mix of many countries. In France, 
the use of oil converted into primary energy decreased from 64% in 
1970 to 31% in 2012166 (IEA 2014). Power plants using heavy fuel oil 
were liquidated and replaced with nuclear blocks. Seeing the positive 
effects of this approach, in the following years, activities connected 
with the optimization of consumption were extended to other energy 
sectors as part of the broad objective of improving energy efficiency. 
So the aim is to diversify the supply of energy and to look for new 
deposits of energy resources, but departure from the basic fuel involves 
much investment and transformation of the industrial infrastructure. 
By introducing the idea of sustainable energy development into their 
policies in order to ensure a clean, ecological, and secure energy future, 
countries concentrate on improving efficiency and diversifying energy 
sources. This is to be promoted, not only by increasing the share of 
renewable energy sources (RES) and decreasing energy intensity of 
sectors, but also by the introduction of nuclear (not necessarily large 
scale) energy, and energy management as part of intelligent networks. 
165 Fuel consumption reports for Volkswagen Golf I 1.5 D 50KM 1976-1980 and 1.6 
D 54KM 1980-1983, www.autocentrum.pl, (accessed: 07.12.2016).
166 Energy mix source: 2009 and 2014, International Energy Agency Statistics, 
International Energy Agency, www.iea.org.
Chapter 7
Storage of electrical and thermal 
energy
Tomasz MIROWSKI167, Mariusz FILIPOWICZ168
Storing energy is indispensable to the search for solutions to 
improve effective use of energy in energy systems. This applies both 
to large-scale electricity, heating, gas or oil systems, and to medium 
(up to 5 MW) and small or micro scale (up to several kW) ones. In gas 
and oil systems, storage technologies have been thoroughly studied in 
terms of technological and economic issues, so they are no challenge 
for researchers nowadays. But electricity and heat storage facilities 
are still the object of research and development work. 
As energy is generated, the problem of its effective use arises, 
because the supply does not always equal the demand. This especially 
applies to electricity. Energy demand is not always the same or easy 
to predict. Daily and seasonal volatility of some renewable energy 
sources makes the balancing of energy in energy systems even more 
difficult. Usually, whenever a large amount of energy is needed, only 
a small amount or no energy can be generated. So as to eliminate the 
effects of this inappropriate though natural supply of energy, when 
there is always a surplus when the demand for energy is low, it is nec-
essary to store it. The means of storage must be adjusted to its method 
of generation and the needs of the recipient.
Energy can be stored in different forms. Storing thermal, electrical, 
and mechanical energy arouses the highest interest. The growing number 
167 Tomasz Mirowski, PhD, Eng., Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute, 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 31-261 Kraków, ul. Wybickiego 7A, 31-261 Kraków, 
e-mail: mirowski@min-pan.krakow.pl
168 Mariusz Filipowicz, DSc, Eng., Associate Professor in Department of Sustaina-
ble Energy Development, Faculty of Energy and Fuels,  AGH University of Science 
and Technology in Kraków, e-mail: filipow@agh.edu.pl
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of unstable renewable energy sources and the surpluses of unused heat 
from big conventional coal or nuclear power plants make energy storage 
a necessary element of such systems of energy generation. The objective 
is to fi nd solutions that are highly effective and environment-friendly. 
The basic role of energy storage is presented in the diagram in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. The role of storage
Source: author’s study
We can see that energy storage occurs between the source of energy 
and the supplier, and meets several important goals:
  it allows the source of energy to work at  nominal power, when it 
is more effi cient,
  it supplies energy when the source is not working or is working 
with lower power: this has fundamental importance when unstable 
renewable sources are used,
  it compensates the lower quality of electricity.
For practical reasons, we can identify storage of heat and storage 
of electricity. They involve completely different technologies and con-
struction of storage facilities, as well as kinds of sources and customers.
Storage of electricity
The growing demand for electricity is strongly related to its qual-
ity and the security of supply. Storing electricity contributes to the 
reduction of transmission limitations and – through monitoring the 
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Figure 6. Application of electricity storage facilities
Source: author’s study based on: S. Kalaiselvam, R. Parameshwaran, 2014169
grid load – to higher reliability and quality of energy supplies. Locally 
stored electricity can be used in emergency situations (e.g., when the 
grid is covered with ice) in order to continue the supply at least for 
some customers. The problem is especially important in production 
sectors, where the quality of supply is one of the main elements of 
the technological process. UPS systems can secure the supply to the 
most vulnerable devices or technological chains, but more and more 
demands in this regard are being transferred to network operators. 
It is time to expand the scope of activities beyond the local market. 
This is possible thanks to intelligent networks, in which electricity is 
transferred in two directions, and the collection and processing of 
source-grid-customer information is the basis for the functioning of 
the Smart Grid. During the work of an electricity system, the energy 
stored in tanks can used to balance the supply and demand, to supply 
system services (regulation and reserve), to eliminate transmission 
limitations, to manage the demand from end customers, to increase 
169 S. Kalaiselvam, R. Parameshwaran, Thermal Energy Storage Technologies for 
Sustainability. Systems Design, Assessment and Applications. Academic Press, 
2014, Elsevier Web Library: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-417291-3.09983-7.
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the reliability and controllability of renewable sources, and to reduce 
the costs of connecting sources to the system.170 Figure 6 presents the 
role of energy storage facilities.
Figure 7 shows the services on the electricity market which thanks 
to the storage of energy would doubtless facilitate the work of transmis-
sion and distribution networks operators, allowing quicker development 
of energy, based on local balancing of energy from big generation 
sources and from dispersed sources, including RES.
Figure 7. Services in electricity engineering which can be ensured 
thanks to energy storage
Source: DOE/EPRI Electricity Storage Handbook in Collaboration with NRECA, 
Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, Califor-
nia 2015. 
The following methods are used to store electricity:
  high temperature superconducting – HTS (magnetic fi eld),
  supercapacitors (electric fi eld),
  spinning wheels (mechanical),
170 T. Siewierski, M. Szypowski, Zasobniki energii elektrycznej i bilansowanie 
odnawialnych ź ródeł energii [Energy storage facilities and balancing renewa-
ble energy sources], Elektroenergetyka – Współczesnoś ć i Rozwój, 2012, nos. 3−4 
(13−14), pp. 65−75. 
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  compressed air energy storage – CAES (compressed air),
  chargeable and non-chargeable batteries (electrochemical),
  pumped storage power plants.
The possibilities to apply selected technologies in three areas of 
services in electric energy engineering is presented in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Diagram of selected energy storage technologies: 
discharge time – power
Source: DOE/EPRI Electricity Storage Handbook in Collaboration with NRECA, 
Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, Califor-
nia 2015.
Storage with the use of magnetic fi eld requires superconductors. 
Accomplishments in the fi eld of making high temperature supercon-
ductors which can be cooled with liquid nitrogen allow the production 
of many energy transmission and storage systems. The use of brittle 
ceramic material may be a problem, but the technology of supercon-
ductive tapes has been developed, and the tapes are used to make 
superconductive cables. Examples of application of such storage facil-
ities are so-called D-SMES, i.e., Dispersed Superconducting Magnetic 
Energy Storage (in this case, low temperature superconductors are 
used). They are installed wherever there are problems with the quality 
of electricity, e.g., voltage dips, deformed course, etc. Power parame-
ters can be improved through temporary “injection” of stored energy.
Using the phenomenon of levitation between the magnet and the 
superconductor allows the building of no-friction bearings, which are 
used in the construction of low-loss fl ywheels used to store mechan-
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ical energy, which is converted into electricity and back in a special 
engine/generator system (High-Power Flywheels technology). Example 
structures of such storage facilities have been developed, e.g., flywheels 
storing between several and more than ten kWh energy and the peak 
power of several hundred kW.
They are able to perform over 100 thousand loading/unloading 
cycles, but a failure may occur due to fatigue of the rotor. Since these 
are rather short-term storage systems, they are not attractive for large-
scale network support. Currently, these units are being launched to the 
market. Examples are the 23 MW unit installed by Okinawa Power, 
or the 20 MW unit working since 2011 in Stephentown, USA, used to 
regulate frequency.171
Another technology is supercapacitors (electric double-layer capac-
itors), whose capacities are thousands of times higher than in the case 
of classic capacitors thanks to unfolded electrodes and a special elec-
trolyte. In practice they still store relatively little electricity, but they 
already have more and more applications, such as assisting vehicle 
batteries, regenerative brakes, or bus propulsion. Supercapacitor bus 
in Shanghai is an example of that. The network involves network sta-
bilizers based on storage systems made up of lithium-ion batteries 
and supercapacitors.
Storage facilities based on compressed air are also becoming more 
and more important. They use underground containers with the proper 
parameters (e.g., unused salt or limestone mines), into which air is 
pumped so as to achieve the proper pressure. When there is an excess 
of energy, the reversible engine/generator system uses the system of 
compressors to pump air. In the case of energy intake, compressed 
air is used to power the gas turbine. No compressor integrated with 
a gas turbine is needed then to supply compressed air to the com-
bustion chamber. This way, the efficiency of gas turbine improves 
greatly. It is also possible to construct a system with a turbine work-
ing on compressed air without the need to use fuel (second-generation 
CAES systems).
Currently, apart from pumped storage power plants, only CAES 
systems are used commercially to collect large amounts of energy.
171 Energy storage. Technology Brief, IEA-ETSAP and IRENA Technology Policy 
Brief E18, IRENA, 2012, www.etsap.org/www.irena.org (accessed: 10.11.2016).
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The first installation was the Huntorf system with a 300 thou-
sand m3 container, a 60 MW compressor consuming energy to pump 
air for 8 hours a day, and a 290 MW gas turbine releasing energy dur-
ing the 2-hour demand peak. Another example is the storage facility 
in Macintosh, USA, with the following parameters: 110 MW capacity, 
cave of approx. 70x300 m, 100 thousand m3, pressure approx. 75-45 
bar, unloading time 26h, 100 MW gas turbine. 
Units are also possible which do not involve underground stor-
age facilities. Overground facilities are used in that case. However, 
those units have lower capacity (3-50 MW) and unloading time of 2-6 
hours. They are also easier to construct but more expensive (in rela-
tion to a unit of power). This is connected with requirements regarding 
aboveground facilities.
Other ways of storing energy are chemical and electrochemical 
facilities. Chemical storage facilities are: hydrogen, biofuels, syn-
thetic fuels, substitute natural gas, and methanol. Electrochemical 
ones are: batteries, flow batteries, and fuel cells. The use of chemical 
energy storage facilities is connected with the possibility to generate 
hydrogen from electrolysis with electricity, obtained e.g., from renew-
able energy sources. Chemical fuels can be produced from biomass 
(or other carboniferous materials). 
Electrochemical batteries have the following advantages: good 
voltage characteristics, convenient size, and a long history of man-
ufacture. The disadvantages are: a limited number of charge cycles 
and limitations to working voltages and currents, often detrimental 
to the environment.
The oldest solution of electrochemical batteries is lead-acid batter-
ies, invented in the mid-19th century and still widely used, especially 
in transport. The positive electrode is lead oxide, and the negative one, 
metallic lead. Sulfuric acid is the electrolyte.
One variation of it is the use of carbon in one of both electrodes, 
improving battery parameters. Other advanced technologies, substan-
tially improving the parameters of lead-acid batteries, are also being 
applied. One example is the 1MW/1.5MWh unit in Metlakatla (USA). 
A number of units with the capacity of 1-20 MW are operating. Another 
example is the Tappi Wind Park in Japan, where advanced lead-acid 
batteries with the capacity of 10.4MWh are used to stabilize the 15 
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MW wind power plant. Flow batteries have two liquid electrolytes 
containing metal ions, which flow through porous, graphite-coated 
electrodes separated with a membrane through which protons can be 
transferred.  During the exchange of charge, current flows through 
the electrodes, which can be used by a battery-powered device.
This reaction can be reversed, allowing for a full charge cycle of 
the battery. The cost of storage is approx. USD 500 per 1 kWh. If the 
battery charge level is low, the discharged electrolyte “powering” the 
battery can be simply replaced with a charged one. After the electro-
lyte is pumped out, it can be refilled at a gas station. Storage systems 
with flow batteries require large amounts of electrolyte in case of stor-
age needs of megawatt hours. The systems are designed to survive 10 
thousand charge cycles, although Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd., 
manufactures 20 kW batteries with 13 thousand cycles. Examples are 
the 600 kW unit with a capacity of 3.6 MWh installed in Gills Onions, 
Oxnard, the USA, or the 1MW/5MWh system installed in Japan.172
Sodium–sulfur batteries are still another solution. In a cylindrical 
chamber of sodium sulfide there is a negative electrode, which is sur-
rounded by liquid sodium at the service temperature. Another active 
component of this battery is liquid sulfur surrounded by graphite felt. It 
is not only used to transport electrons, but it also absorbs polysulfides 
formed when discharging the battery, which ensures the supply of sul-
fur to the zone of electrochemical reaction. Sodium-sulfur batteries 
have better parameters than ordinary batteries (high performance, 
temperature-independence, and the lack of self-discharge). The only 
problem is that they work at high temperatures (approx. 300oC). Cur-
rently, it is a commercial technology used in units supporting network 
operation or in integration with a network of wind turbines. What is 
important in this is the possibility of long discharge (approximately 6 
hours). Possible energy density is 170 kWh/m3 and 117 kWh/ton. The 
number of charge cycles is 4,500, and the designed life cycle is 15 years.
Sample uses are: the biggest single installation with a capacity of 
34 MW located in Rokkasho (Japan), stabilizing the power from wind 
turbines; in Tokyo there are smaller units which, combined, produce 
160 MW.
172 DOE/EPRI Electricity Storage Handbook in Collaboration with NRECA, Sandia 
National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California 2015. 
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At the moment, 221 units operate with the power of 316 MW and 
a storage capacity of 1,896 MWh.
Sodium-nickel chloride batteries, just like sodium-sulfur ones, are 
high temperature devices. They are based on a reversible reaction of 
sodium chloride with nickel (metal dust). Units with the power of 50 
kW – 1 MW are currently produced. A sample application is the 222 
kWh unit installed in the Duke Energy Rankin Substation in New 
York. Wider application in units integrating renewable energy sys-
tems and the grid is planned.
Other examples of electrochemical devices are iron-chromium 
batteries or zinc-bromine batteries, but in comparison to previously 
mentioned electrochemical units they have a much narrower range 
of applications.
One significant electrochemical energy container are lithium-ion 
batteries. Currently, this technology is commercialized and mostly 
used in electronic devices or various electric vehicles. The capacities 
of those batteries may reach 50 kWh.
Small scale (5-10 kW/20 kWh) and large scale (1 MW) demon-
stration systems with a discharge time of 15 minutes until frequency 
regulation are presently being implemented.
They are also used in off-grid systems, where they ensure the users 
power supply for 1-3 hours after the failure of grid power supply. They 
may also serve as energy banks in PV systems.
Currently, pumped storage power plants have the greatest storage 
capacities, which are quite commonly used to store energy in electricity 
systems. The idea involves a reversible turbine/pump placed between 
two containers, an upper and lower one. When there is a surplus of 
energy, water is pumped from the lower to the upper container, and 
when there is a demand for energy, water released from the upper 
container propels the turbines. Certainly, the system has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. Its advantages are high capacity, efficiency 
about 80%, and the possibility to start quickly in the case of emer-
gency. The disadvantages are limited possibilities for localization and 
interference with the natural environment.
The system has the greatest storage capacity, because the only lim-
itation is the size of the upper and lower water tank.
In Poland, the pumped storage power plant in Żarnowiec is the big-
gest. Its capacity is 716 MW for turbine work and 800 MW for pump 
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work. Globally, their storage ability is over 99% of the total capacity 
of all storage facilities (Chart 11), providing 127 GW storage capacity 
and 740 TWh of energy.173 The world’s biggest installation (USA) has 
a capacity of approx. 3 GW. By the year 2020, more units are planned 
in Europe, with total capacity of up to 15 GW.
Chart 11. Share of pumped-storage hydroelectricity in the global 
electricity storage system (in MW)
Source: Renewables and electricity storage. A technology roadmap for REmap 
2030, IRENA, 2015, www.irena.org (12.11.2016).
Thermal energy storage
In the case of storing thermal energy, we can identify the follow-
ing methods (Fig. 9). The basic parameters of thermal energy storage 
facilities are the density of the stored energy, capacity, the time of load-
ing and unloading the tank (or charging and discharging the battery), 
working temperature and total effi ciency.
Each currently used energy storage facility has the capacity of 
200÷2·1016J, and power of 6·10-4 ÷1015W. The time of thermal energy 
storage is between several seconds and several decades.
The most frequently used methods are:
  methods of underground thermal energy storage,
  the use of the specifi c heat of the water,
  phase change materials,
  other, less often used methods.
173 Ibidem. 
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Underground thermal energy storage may be achieved thanks to 
the following technologies:
  BTES (Borehole Thermal Energy Storage),
  ATES (Aquifer Thermal Energy Storage),
  UTES (Underground Thermal Energy Storage).
Figure 9. Methods of thermal energy storage
Source: author’s study.
Systems based on BTES are already in use on a small and large 
scale. The small scale is e.g., a detached house with a solar thermal 
collector, a BTES unit, and a system of heating including a heat pump. 
The excess heat from the summer season is stored in a borehole, and 
in winter the heat is regained by the heat pump for the purpose of 
a low temperature heating system in the building. This way, because 
of the higher temperature of the bottom heat source, the effi ciency of 
the heat pump considerably increases.
The large scale is much bigger projects for residential areas etc. 
One example is a residential area near Calgary with 52 houses, where 
144 boreholes have been made. They are integrated with 800 solar 
thermal collectors with a surface area of 2,300 m2.
The use of ATES involves similar depositing of energy in under-
ground water layers; it may also be cold energy. One example is the 
Arlanda airport in Stockholm, where two groups of “cold” and “hot” 
wells have been used, providing thermal power up to 10 MW and 
annual heat savings of up to 10 GWh.
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The use of specific heat of water involves using different water 
tanks of different sizes, coupled with thermal systems. These may be 
both renewable systems (e.g., storing heat absorbed by the surface of 
a parking lot in underground tanks and using it later to melt snow). 
Another example is the application of two water tanks with a total 
capacity of 580 m3 in Crailsheim for a system of 7,300 m2 of solar col-
lectors and borehole energy storage. The storage of ice water for the 
needs of large cooling installations is also possible.
Quick technological and application development can be observed 
in phase change materials. Their important advantage is that their 
temperature does not change during the facility loading/unloading. 
The basic materials are paraffins, hydrated salts, and liquid salts.
The criteria for selecting the appropriate PCM are their physical 
properties (phase change temperature, latent heat of synthesis, ther-
mal conductivity, phase separation, steam pressure, volume change, 
density, and crystal growth), chemical properties (chemical stability, 
security) and economic ones (availability, profitability).
They can be used e.g., as a support for passive cooling/heating 
systems in passive or low-energy buildings (improvement of thermal 
properties or reduction of temperature oscillation), which allows e.g., 
reducing the power of classic heating/cooling systems. Building walls 
constructed for this purpose contain a PCM layer e.g. in the form of 
micro capsules placed in gypsum board or insulation material. Active 
solar walls which store heat can also be constructed. 
Systems that make use of chemical reaction heat or the release of 
water from hydrates or zeolites are much more rarely used. 
The development of energy storage may occur as a result of pop-
ularizing so-called virtual power plants based on dispersed energy 
systems. In order to connect a number of different energy produc-
ers and customers with different characteristics of production and 
reception, it is necessary to monitor and predict in advance both the 
production and consumption of energy. In the case of a high share of 
power plants based on renewable sources, it is necessary to use energy 
storage facilities which can be set up remotely using an appropriate 
control and management system. 
Nowadays, technological development means new possibilities of 
energy storage. A number of solutions need to be better studied and 
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implemented; at the moment they are treated as so-called emerging 
technologies. These are:
  storage based on the use of condensed air; currently, small-scale 
demonstration systems are being constructed,
  no fuel (or low consumption) CAES and isothermal systems,
  underground pump power plants (in the research phase),
  nano-supercapacitors (in the phase of laboratory tests),
  advanced flywheels (in the phase of research and development),
  a number of advanced battery systems (H2/Br flow batteries, advan-
ced lead-acid batteries, advanced lithium-io).
Chapter 8
The role of exchanges and hubs  
on contemporary gas markets
Marcin SIENKIEWICZ174
Many contemporary natural gas markets are undergoing inten-
sive transition from a closed and monopolistic model towards an 
open and liberal one. Clear progress in the process is visible first 
of all in the European Union and North America. One goal of the 
Third Energy Package adopted by EU countries in 2009 is to build 
an intra-European, liberalized market of natural gas. Competition 
is to be the basic principle of the functioning of the European natu-
ral gas market. In the case of natural monopolies, usually occurring 
in transmission and storage areas, market participants make use of 
applicable regulations protecting them from excess prices (tariffs) 
and discriminatory practices (the Third Party Access principle). Mar-
ket mechanisms are implemented e.g., through the abolishment of 
price tariffs in extraction and trade segments.175 In the case of the 
United States, the market transition is referred to as the “shale rev-
olution”, which means the rapid increase of extraction of natural gas 
from unconventional resources in the USA. Thanks to the populari-
zation of extraction methods using hydraulic fracturing of deposits, 
natural gas production in the USA grew by 42% between 2005 and 
2013.176 As a result, the United States became the world’s greatest 
174 Marcin Sienkiewicz, PhD, Department of International Relations of Poland, Fac-
ulty of Social Sciences, University of Wrocław, plac Uniwersytecki 1, 50-137 Wrocław, 
e-mail: mar.sienkiewicz@wp.pl  
175 K. Nowak, Rynek gazu ziemnego – zasady funkcjonowania [The rules of function-
ing of natural gas market], [in:] Vademecum gazownika, Tom IV, ed. A. Matkowski, 
Kraków, 2012, p. 23.
176 R. F. Aguilera, M. Radetzki, Rewolucja łupkowa: Światowe rynki gazu i ropy 
naftowej w warunkach transformacji [Shale revolution: Global gas and oil markets 
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gas producer, whose extraction level reached 767.3 m³ in 2015.177 The 
global significance of natural gas as a fuel in the energy sector and 
as a resource in the chemical industry is growing. This is proved by 
the 86.4% increase in turnover at international gas markets between 
2001 and 2012.178 The development of the LNG sector is becoming 
a factor that creates good integration conditions even for gas markets 
that are geographically distant. An example of this process in action 
is the first supplies of American liquefied gas to European ports in 
Portugal and Spain in 2016. The increase in natural gas supply com-
bined with its increased mobility (thanks to LNG technology and the 
development of sea transport) is conducive to more and more evident 
price emancipation of natural gas as a commodity in relation to oil. 
In the transformation process described above, leading to open and 
liberal markets, commercial infrastructure is becoming increasingly 
significant. Commercial infrastructure is formal institutions allow-
ing market participants to carry out sale transactions. It includes gas 
exchange markets and electronic trade platforms dedicated to OTC 
(over-the-counter) market. More complex institutions, such as gas 
hubs combining commercial and logistic functions, have also been 
formed on gas markets. 
Gas exchanges
Gas exchanges are mercantile exchanges. They are institutions 
that allow and organize trade in natural gas, usually with brokerage 
houses as intermediaries in the trade. Exchanges are a transparent 
source of information on terms and conditions of transactions and give 
more entities access to the market. In practice, gas exchanges oper-
ate as part of bigger entities such as mercantile or specialized energy 
exchanges. In the USA, organized wholesale trade with natural gas 
takes place at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), which 
under transition], “Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi”, 2015, Volume 31, Part 1.
177 The Statistics Portal, Natural gas production in the United States from 1998 to 2015
https://www.statista.com/statistics/265331/natural-gas-production-in-the-us/, 
(accessed: 13.11.2016).
178 A. Szurlej, P. Janusz, Natural Gas Economy in the United States and European 
Markets, “Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi”, 2015, Vol. 29, Part 4, p. 78.
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belongs to the CME Group from Chicago. In Europe, gas exchanges in 
the form of separate markets function within the framework of mer-
cantile energy exchanges, e.g.: 
  APX Group – established in 1999 in Amsterdam, currently ope-
rating on energy markets in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium. The exchange gas market was launched in 2003.
  EEX – European energy exchange operating in Germany. The gas 
market was opened in July 2007.
  Nord Pol – Scandinavian energy exchange. The exchange gas trade 
began in March 2008. 
  Powernext – a pan-European energy exchange operating on the 
markets of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In November 
2008, PEGAS was set up, which runs two natural gas markets: 
Powernext Gas Spot and Powernext Gas Futures.
  CEGH Gas Exchange – run since December 2009 by Vienna Stock 
Exchange as part of the Baumgarten Central European Gas Hub 
AG.
  ICE group – operating globally. In Europe it engages in exchange 
gas trade in the Netherlands and Great Britain.
  Towarowa Giełda Energii S.A. – Polish Power Exchange, with gas 
exchange launched in December 2012.
Chart 12. Trading volume on natural gas exchanges in Europe in 2015 
(TWh)
Source: Raport Roczny 2015 [Annual Report 2015], GPW, http://raportrocznygpw.
pl/pl/grupa/otoczenie-rynkowe/rynek-towarowy#start (accessed: 13.11.2016).
7 Data for British and Dutch markets, not including data from the USA.
8 Data for all PEGAS markets.
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Gas exchanges play a special role on the market, offering the possi-
bility to change gas prices in a transparent process which enables the 
publishing of price indices. Exchanges are also a transparent source of 
information on terms and conditions of transactions and give more enti-
ties access to the market. However, in order to participate in exchange 
trade, market participants need to meet certain formal requirements, 
after which they become exchange members. This is so because trade 
on exchange is organized and based on two basic documents: exchange 
statute and rules. The first of them describes e.g., the conditions of 
membership, the object of activity, the internal structure, as well as the 
bodies of the exchange and the mode of appointing them. As already 
mentioned, exchange members are usually brokerage houses and direct 
participants in the exchange market. The rules include information con-
cerning e.g., the obligations of exchange members, categories of traded 
commodities, as well as units, place of delivery, or collateral. Exchange 
transactions concluded on gas markets are cleared through clearing 
houses, thanks to which the parties to the transactions may remain 
anonymous and the transaction risk is minimal. 
Energy exchanges that run the natural gas market also need to meet 
reporting obligations established in the Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (EU) no. 1227/2011 of 25 October 2011 
on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency – REMIT.
The basic function of the exchange on a gas market is to establish 
an objective market price, i.e., a share price, thanks to concentrat-
ing and organizing supply and demand in one place. The transparent 
mechanism of the functioning of exchanges is a guarantee that the 
established commodity price will only reflect the balance of power 
between the supply and demand at the moment. This way of gas pric-
ing is alternative to the model based on indexing to the prices of oil 
and oil derivatives adopted in long term contracts, now functioning 
for several dozen years.179 
In Europe, PEGAS has the broadest product offer. It offers spot 
products and futures contracts, as well as spread transactions using 
price differences between hubs. In the first case, sale transactions are 
cleared at the currently applicable price with the clearance deadline 
179 Institute of Energy for South-East Europe, The Outlook for a natural gas trading 
hub in Europe, An IENE Study Project (M19), Athens, July 2014, p. 111.
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usually up to 2 days of its conclusion. Futures contracts are contracts 
made between two parties, one of which commits itself to buy, and 
the other, to sell so-called underlying, at a specific date, at a specific 
price, and in a specific amount, under the conditions determined by 
the exchange in the standard of derivatives. The performance of the 
contract follows the principles set out in the contract standard (deliv-
ery of the commodity or financial clearance). In the case of exchange 
gas future contracts, the performance of the contract involves gas 
delivery to the relevant gas hub. Contracts cleared in money, e.g., on 
the basis of the estimated index of gas prices, are rare. 
In Poland, since December 20, 2012, intraday market (IDM) and 
day-ahead market (DAM) natural gas trade has been carried out on the 
Polish Power Exchange. Gas trade occurs every day in the fixed quota-
tion system.180 The establishment of the exchange was connected with 
the implementation of the policy of liberalizing the natural gas market. 
Its development was the result of the coming into force of amendments 
to Energy Law Act on September 11, 2013, which introduced the obli-
gation of exchange trade for energy enterprises trading in gas fuels in 
the form of high methane gas pumped into the transmission network 
in the given year.181 The obligation was introduced gradually: 
  from September 12, 2013, to December 31, 2013: 30% of natural 
gas;
  from January 1, 2014, to December 31, 2014: 40% of natural gas;
  from January 1, 2015: 55% of natural gas.
In 2015, 97 entities were members of the Polish gas exchange, 
including 25 companies directly trading in gas. The total trading volume 
on gas markets run by TGE in 2015 was 106.9 TWh. The development 
of an exchange market in Poland should be fostered by the abolish-
ment of the obligation of tariffing wholesale gas prices in 2017 and 
carrying out diversification projects involving transmission connect-
ing with the Norwegian shelf, as well as the extension of regasification 
capacities of the Świnoujście LNG terminal.
Wholesale trade carried out on gas exchanges has not yet become 
dominant on EU markets, although in recent years it has been dynami-
180 O giełdzie [On the exchange], Polish Power Exchange, https://www.tge.pl/pl/2/o-
gieldzie (accessed: 13.11.2016). 
181 Energy Law Act of 10 April 1997, Article 49b, Journal of Laws 1997 No. 54 item 348.
107The role of exchanges and hubs on contemporary gas markets
cally growing. In the years 2013-2015, the share of exchange trade in gas 
in the EU nearly tripled, from 6% in 2013 to 16% in 2015 – Chart 13.182
Chart 13. Trading volume and structure in selected European energy 
markets in 2015
Source: Trayport Euro Commodities Report, Trayport, December 2015, p. 4, http://
www.trayport.com/cms/uploads/december-2015-trayport-euro-commodities-re-
port-media-version_001.pdf, (13.11.2016).
Legend: 
Broker bilateral Transactions concluded by brokers (entities functioning as 
intermediaries) on the OTC market, not cleared by clearing 
houses.
Broker Cleared Transactions concluded by brokers and cleared by clearing 
houses.
Exchange Executed Transactions concluded at exchanges and cleared by clearing 
houses.
Electronic trading platforms
On the wholesale market of natural gas, electronic trading plat-
forms, also referred to as brokers’ platforms, are an alternative to gas 
182 Trayport Euro Commodities Report, Trayport, December 2015, p. 5.
 http://www.trayport.com/cms/uploads/december-2015-trayport-euro-commodi-
ties-report-media-version_001.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2016). 
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exchanges.183 The platforms are properly organized virtual places run 
by specialized entities, where natural gas supply and demand concen-
trate. Sale transactions are concluded through a relevant transaction 
programme, to which market participants receive access if they meet 
some formal requirements. In this case, the requirements are not as 
strict as in the case of mercantile exchange. Participation in the plat-
form is based on a framework agreement including rules. No broker’s 
license is needed to trade on the platform. The business partners lose 
their anonymity after concluding a transaction on the platform and 
signing a bilateral sales contract (partnership contracts), usually based 
on the model developed by the European Federation of Energy Trad-
ers (EFET).184 Besides, trading platforms give an opportunity to make 
commercial offers 24/7. Trade on wholesale OTC platform market is 
not controlled by institutions supervising the financial market. Unlike 
on exchanges, the transactions are not cleared by clearing houses, 
which substantially reduces the costs of participation on the trading 
platform. The functioning of electronic trading platforms dedicated 
to the OTC market is based on the following principles: 
  non-discrimination of access and equal principles of participation 
for all entities that have concluded a relevant accession agreement;
  uniform conditions of concluding transactions;
  uniform access at the same time to market information, ensuring 
the transparency of product quotations, volumes and prices.185
Gas hubs
Gas hubs were established independently in different places all 
over the world when national natural gas markets were developing 
and diversifying. Originally, they were created in places with high 
concentration of transport and storage infrastructure. One example is 
Henry Hub located in Louisiana by the Gulf of Mexico. It is the oldest 
183 It also applies to electricity market, where this form of organized trade has emerged 
before. 
184 EFET, European Federation of Energy Traders, http://www.toe.pl/pl/stand-
ardy-umow/efet, (accessed: 17.11.2016).
185 Information on Polish and Internet Trade Platforms, Towarzystwo Obrotu Energią 
[The Association of Energy Trading], http://www.toe.pl/pl/ (accessed: 22.11.2016). 
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and the biggest gas hub in the USA (functioning since 1990). It was 
established at the junction of 13 gas pipelines transporting gas from 
different sources, and near 3 gas storage facilities. Connecting them 
all allowed physical trade with natural gas.  Henry Hub is an example 
of a physical hub, defined as a natural gas market center, which allows 
clients (suppliers, customers) access to a higher number of gas pipeline 
systems, ensures transport between the pipelines, and offers admin-
istrative services that facilitate the transmission of gas and transfer 
of ownership rights. Sales transactions involve the need to reserve 
capacity and a route through which the commodity can reach from 
the point of entry to infrastructure to the point of exit (end customer).
Besides physical hubs, there are also virtual hubs. The largest one 
is the National Balancing Point (NBP) located in Great Britain. It cov-
ers the whole system of gas transport in Great Britain. It is a virtual 
point where natural gas sales and exchange transactions take place. 
In this case, the object of transaction is natural gas occurring within 
the defined infrastructure area with specified points of entry and exit. 
In a virtual hub, the place of “meeting” the routes of gas transmis-
sion is not a point but a whole gas system managed by the network 
operator. A virtual hub can be established in a gas system where the 
fees for transmission are collected at the entry and exit points, not 
linearly for a section of transmission. This allows gas trade in the net-
work (at a virtual point) without the need to reserve capacity. Thus, 
virtual hubs do not have a physical location, but their operation cov-
ers the whole national gas system. The virtual model of gas hub can 
be described as organizing the wholesale gas market defined as the 
sum of systemic activities in the areas of the gas trade, gas supplies, 
changes of ownership of the commodity, transaction clearance, and 
balancing the system. Virtual hubs develop much more quickly and 
are the future of the European gas system.
To sum up, gas hubs are first of all the points of trade in gas, affect-
ing market prices of natural gas regardless of changes in oil pricing. 
They are based on a well-developed, diversified, and varied transport 
infrastructure (gas pipelines, LNG terminals), allowing a range of 
services. Gas hubs are a comprehensive commercial and infrastruc-
ture solution, considerably improving the functioning of the natural 
gas market by improving its transparency, liquidity, and infrastruc-
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ture passability. Hence, gas hubs can be treated as a systemic solution 
serving the following market functions:
a) Commercial function
Gas hubs make it possible to conclude sales transactions on elec-
tronic trading platforms and on gas exchanges cooperating with the 
hub. Trade on gas hubs is an alternative to the traditional model based 
on long-term 20- or 30-year contracts in which the price was based on 
indexation to oil and oil derivatives. It contributes to greater transpar-
ency of the pricing mechanism and the prices’ relevance to the market 
situation. Thus, trade on hubs allows the establishing of a market price 
for natural gas and achieves a balance between the supply and demand. 
Trade on a hub also helps meet one of the conditions for maintaining 
energy security, i.e., buying gas fuel at a price acceptable for both par-
ties to the transaction. Gas hubs give access to short-, medium- and 
long-term contracts, increasing the flexibility of gas trade.
b) Service function
The natural gas market is an infrastructure market. Gas hubs also 
offer participants a whole spectrum of infrastructure services. In this 
field, they closely cooperate with operators of storage and transmis-
sion systems, together developing formal/procedural and technical 
solutions improving access to the gas infrastructure. The essence of 
functioning of a gas hub is to simplify the process of trade in natural 
gas. Hence, clear principles of market access must apply to a gas hub, 
and all the participants of an organized market need to be treated 
equally. Infrastructure services should be available for different mar-
ket participants at equal prices. In order to observe the principle of 
non-discrimination, a separate legal person serving as an operator 
may be appointed.186 Gas hubs may also do the obligatory reporting 
(REMIT) to ACER on behalf of the clients.
c) Information function
The institution of a gas hub ensures all market participants trans-
parent knowledge on the concluded transactions, volumes and prices.
186 European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas, Gas Regional Initiative – 
Region: South-South East. The hub used as a balancing point, Brussels, p. 4., http://
www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIA-
TIVES/GRI/South_South_East/Final%20docs/GRI-SSE-SG-02-05_HUB.pdf, 
(accessed: 26.11.2016), p. 4.
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A gas hub will collect knowledge on the development of the gas 
market situation. It will be a specific center of market information for 
gas market participants. A gas hub will first of all become the source 
of knowledge on gas prices, formed by the market mechanism. It will 
also show dynamically the relations between supply and demand. 
Access to historical and current data archived by the hub will facili-
tate business decisions made by gas market participants. 
d) Balancing function
Gas hubs allow physical and commercial balancing of the system 
of natural gas transmission. This function involves balancing the 
demand for natural gas with its supplies. 
On contemporary gas markets, the commercial function of gas hubs 
is becoming more and more important. Gradually, they are assum-
ing the role of centers determining the reference price, not only for 
national but also for regional markets. The Henry Hub in the USA, 
as well as NBP and TTF in Europe, already have this market status. 
In this respect, there is competition between gas hubs on European 
markets to take over the greatest gas volumes and the highest num-
bers of trade participants. The “churn” rate is an indicator to assess 
the competitiveness of the organized wholesale market (an exchange 
or an electronic trading platform operating as part of the hub). The 
rate “... is the ratio of the total volume of gas traded on a hub and the 
amount of gas physically supplied for consumption through the hub. 
The value shows to what extent the price of natural gas on the hub 
can be regarded as reliable market price. It is based on the fact that 
multiple trade with a unit of natural gas by many market participants 
is treated as a mechanism that confirms that the price determined 
this way is a market price.”187
Conditions for the establishment of a gas hub 
In terms of geographic distribution of gas hubs, we can see they are 
especially numerous is two regions: North-Western Europe and the 
USA. As already mentioned, gas hubs were established and developed 
in places with a well developed and diversified transport infrastruc-
187 R. Zajdler, Polski rynek gazu ziemnego na tle rynków Unii Europejskiej [Polish 
natural gas market against the background of European Union markets], War-
saw 2014, p. 31.
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ture and sufficient demand for natural gas. In Europe, the formation 
of a hub was not always the result of natural consolidation processes; 
instead, it was often a governmental decision. In 2005, the government 
of the Netherlands announced that the objective of their policy was 
to establish a gas hub that would play the role of a transport, storage, 
and distribution center for domestic and foreign customers. Launch-
ing the project was mainly justified with the intention to ensure gas 
supplies to the Netherlands and to promote the continuity of gas sup-
plies to the European Union.188 Dutch authorities saw the project as 
an opportunity to improve the competitiveness of the Dutch economy 
through the reduction of natural gas prices.189 The activities involved 
i.a., strengthen the diversification of natural gas supplies by obtaining 
direct access to the global LNG market. The first Dutch LNG terminal 
was established for that purpose in the Europort of Rotterdam. The 
reloading capacity of the gas port launched in September 2009 was 
12 bcm a year, with a possible extension up to 16 bcm.190
The history of the Iberian Gas Hub also began upon a decision 
made by the Spanish government. The project was officially launched 
in March 2011 together with the establishment of a dedicated company, 
which currently operates as Sociedad Bilbao Gas Hub, AF. The aim of 
the project was to strengthen the competitiveness and integration of the 
Iberian market (integration of the Spanish and Portuguese markets), 
and to enhance the fluency of trade by improving its infrastructure 
and commercial functionality. Unlike the Netherlands, Spain’s prob-
lem was not insufficient diversification of external markets. Thanks 
to its LNG terminals and transmission connection with Africa, Spain 
was fully secure in terms of diversification of external supplies. After 
188Working Group on Audit of Extractive Industries, The Netherlands as a Euro-
pean gas transmission hub A gas hub: benefits, need and risks, 2012, p. 2, http://
www.wgei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/A-gas-hub-benefits-need-and-risks.
pdf (accessed: 25.11.2016).
189 Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Voorzienings- en leveringszekerheid ener-
gie (29.023); brief regering; Voortgangsrapportage Gasrotonde 2011 (TK, 112),
https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20111107/brief_regering/info (accessed: 
26.11.2016).
190 Pierwszy holenderski morski terminal LNG [First offshore Dutch LNG termi-
nal], “Portalmorski.pl“,
 http://www.portalmorski.pl/zegluga/inne/19667-pierwszy-holenderski-morski-
terminal-lng-8211-otwarty, (accessed: 18.11.2016).
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2008, a considerable decrease in consumption, which resulted in grow-
ing costs of the functioning of the storage infrastructure developed 
before, became a serious challenge to Spanish gas sector. The gas hub 
was to stimulate the Iberian wholesale market integrated within it. 
The authorities of Spain are also trying to attribute European impor-
tance to the project, presenting it as the western pillar of security of 
gas supplies and trade for the European Union.191
Practice resulting from the history of establishing and develop-
ing gas hubs in North America and Europe proves that the success of 
such projects depends upon meeting at least the following conditions: 
a) access to at least three different independent gas sources (through 
the diversification of supply directions and sources obtained thanks 
to properly extended transport infrastructure, e.g., 7 gas pipelines 
crossing at the Zeebrugge hub);
b) free access of market participants to transport and storage infra-
structure (implementation and observance of the principle of third 
party access to the infrastructure – TPA);
c) a high number and diversification of market participants (differ-
ing in terms of profile and scale of activity);
d) contracts worked out by the operators of gas infrastructure (stand-
ardized offer of infrastructure services for market participants);
e) infrastructure operators’ support for the development of organized 
wholesale trade (trade instructions facilitating the development 
of an exchange market and facilitating new entities’ entering the 
gas market and simplification of the rules of use of the transmis-
sion system;192
f) annual demand for gas in the future market area of the hub should 
be approx. 20 bcm;193 the existence of an aftermarket for unused 
transmission capacity.
191 M. Sienkiewicz, G. Małecki, Rynek gazu ziemnego w Królestwie Hiszpanii [Nat-
ural gas market in the Kingdom of Spain], “Wiadomości Naftowe i Gazownicze“, 
no. 12, 2015, pp. 18-23.
192 M. Fantini, Conditions for a Gas Hub to Appear in CEE Countries, GasReg21- 
Regional Market Places & Infrastructure panel, Poznań, 11.05.2016.
193 Working Group on Audit of Extractive Industry, The Netherlands as a European 
gas transmission hub.
A gas hub: benefits, need and risks, 2012, http://www.wgei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/A-gas-hub-benefits-need-and-risks.pdf, (accessed: 20.11.2016).
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Conclusion
The trade infrastructure described above is currently the crucial 
element of natural gas markets in the European Union and the USA. 
For many participants of the markets, trade on the gas exchange or 
a gas hub has become an attractive and competitive option beside 
long-term contracts concluded in a single supplier. Considered from 
the perspective of an economic entity, it allows the creationof pro-
curement strategies and risk management in this respect on the basis 
of flexible pricing models. Liberalized trade in gas has also become 
a solution alternative to the traditional model of external supplies, 
based on long-term contracts including clauses that limit customers’ 
freedom in terms of using the purchased commodity (the territorial 
clause). Doubtless, the development of gas trade carried out by gas 
exchanges and hubs was supported by the implementation of Regu-
lation no. 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of 
the gas supply. The list of market measures promoting supply secu-
rity introduced with this legal act included “enhancing gas flexibility” 
and “diversification of gas sources and routes of supply”.194 Thus, the 
regulation made a formal basis which could be used to question the 
provisions concerning a ban on re-export included in contracts for gas 
supplies concluded with Russian Gazprom.  Appropriate regulations 
ensuring the freedom of gas trade, as well as transport infrastructure 
diversifying the directions and sources of gas supplies, make a foun-
dation for the development of trade infrastructure on contemporary 
gas markets.
194 Regulation (EU) no. 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and 
repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC, Annex no. II, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union, 12.10.2010, L295/1.
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Introduction: Energiewende – energy transition  
as a label
The definition of “Energiewende” (German Energy Transition) is 
vague and gives room for various interpretations. Literature shows that 
the term ’energy transition’ (in German Energiewende) was first used 
in 1980 by a German think-thank Öko-Institute to refer to the model of 
energy modernization from a system based on fossil fuels to a system 
based on renewable energy.196 The Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Energy refers to it as “… our way to a secure, environmentally friendly 
and economically successful future”.197 Two major pillars appeared in 
the centre of Germany’s energy policy in the last decade: The expansion 
of renewable resources and the phase-out of nuclear power. The politi-
cal targets and measures are, however, much broader and increasingly 
complex. Moreover, the national energy visions and policy framework 
194 Nicole Kaim-Albers, MA, Head of Office, World Energy Council Germany, Ber-
lin, e-mail: kaim@weltenergierat.de
195 Mariusz Ruszel PhD, political scientist, assistant professor at the Department of 
Economy of the Faculty of Management, Rzeszow University of Technology, e-mail: 
mruszel@prz.edu.pl
196 F. Krause, H. Bossel, K. F. Müller-Reissmann, Energie-Wende Wachstum und 
Wohlstand ohne Erdöl and Uran, S. Fischer, Frankfurt 1981, p. 13.
197 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiewende/gesamtstrategie.
html, “Die Energiewende ist unser Weg in eine sichere, umweltverträgliche und 
wirtschaftlich erfolgreiche Zukunft”.(accessed: 4.11.2016)
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are complemented with an international perspective: On the bilateral 
level, Germany’s energy policy has an impact on the market structures 
and physical conditions of the energy systems of its neighbor countries. 
On the European level, national energy policies have to be in accor-
dance with the European regulatory framework. At the same time, 
Germany is takeing an active part in shaping European internal and 
external energy policy, which leads to the international dimension: 
Is Germany able to sell its “Energiewende” – its standards, products, 
and vision – in Europe and beyond? It is obvious that parts of this 
vague and highly complex concept will be or have been adopted by 
others.198 Some countries might adopt equivalently ambitious goals, 
however, while implementing more innovative measures. 
Energy policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is affected by 
internal and external factors.199 It is often highlighted that the Federal 
Republic of Germany is an example of a country with geo-economic 
power.200 Scientific literature demonstrates that the foreign policy 
model of the German geo-economy is characterized e.g., by defining 
national interest from an economic perspective, the dominant role of 
export-oriented business affecting foreign policy, and the use of eco-
nomic power to impose the country’s national preferences on others.201
The implementation of the above model is connected with Ger-
man energy policy, oriented at improving the competitiveness and 
innovativeness of the economy. It can also lead to strengthening the 
“geo-economic power”, which is based on different scale instruments 
such as export initiatives, communication of Energiewende through 
the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Accelerator, as 
well as regulations and standards. The aim of this article is to deter-
mine how the process of energy transition affects the improvement of 
energy efficiency, energy security, and how it might strengthen Ger-
many’s economic competitiveness.
198 German energy policy – a blueprint for the world? Survey by the Weltenergierat 
– Deutschland (2015). http://www.weltenergierat.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
Energiewende-Survey-English-final.pdf (accessed: 9.11.2016).
199 J. Schild, S. Harnisch, Deutsche Außenpolitik und internationale Führung: 
Erwartungen, Ressourcen, Partner, Praktiken, [in:] Deutsche Außenpolitik und 
internationale Führung, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2014.
200 H. Kundnani, Germany as a Geo-economic Power, “The Washington Quarterly”, 
vol. 34, no. 3, 2011, pp. 31-45.
201 H. Kundnani, Germany as a Geo-Economic Power ... op. cit., pp. 31-45. 
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Energiewende – the long history of the energy debate 
in Germany
The idea of an environmentally friendly energy system has a long 
history in Germany. The anti-nuclear movement has been particularly 
strong in Germany, finding its roots in the late 1970s, among others 
with the establishment of the Öko-Institut in 1977. This Öko-Institut 
claims to be “the attorney of the environmentalist movement”.202 Simul-
taneously, political discussions on energy transition were intensified 
due to oil crises (1973, 1979), which showed the effects of excessive 
dependence on imported oil. To a high degree, decisions on the mod-
ernization of the German energy sector were the result of a statement 
by the Saudi Minister of Oil, Scheich Yamani, published in “Le Monde” 
on October 19, 1979: “Ich glaube, wir verlieren jede Kontrole über die 
Erdölpreise ...”.203 Like the Öko-Institut, the Green Party, founded in 
the late 1970s as an anti-nuclear movement, has lasted until today and 
even increased its influence.204 Interestingly, even if the Green party’s 
programme is located on the left side of the political spectrum, links 
and coalitions with the conservative CDU were not excluded. This 
relationship reached its peak so far in the government of Baden-Würt-
temberg, with over 10 million people the third biggest state within 
Germany. In May 2016 the first coalition between the Green Party 
and the CDU started – with the CDU as junior partner and with Win-
fried Kretschmann as first green prime minister.205 One could say 
that this government is the heritage of a much longer cooperation: 
The founders of the famous Electricity Feed-in Law, the predecessor 
of today’s Renewable-Energy-Act (EEG), were equally a conserva-
tive-green couple.206 
202 Öko-Institut e.V., “Unser Leitbild“ (2005) https://www.oeko.de/uploads/oeko/
download/leitbild_oei.pdf (accessed: 9.11.2016).
203 F. Krause, H. Bossel, K. F. Müller-Reissmann, Energie-Wende Wachstum ..., op. 
cit., p. 13. 
204 Über uns: 1977-1979 http://www.gruene.de/ueber-uns/1977-1979.html (accessed: 
06.01.2017).
205 Die Landesregierung, https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/regierung/ 
(accessed: 09.11.2016).
206 “Das unterschätzte Gesetz”, Article, Die Zeit http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/39/
EEG/komplettansicht (accessed: 9.11.2016).
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This law allowed the feed in of electricity generated by renewable 
resources and introduced a remuneration mechanism in 1991. Its 
successor, the German-Renewable-Act increased incentives for renew-
ables in the year 2000 (with amendments in 2004, 2009, 2012, 2014, 
2016). The installed guaranteed feed-in-tariff for the various renewable 
technologies was slowly replaced by more market-orientated remu-
neration mechanisms. While PV for example received a remuneration 
of around 50 Euro Cents per KWh in the year 2000, ten years later 
it was reduced to around 18 Euro Cents per KWh. A corridor for the 
expansion of renewable energies was established to control and limit 
the growth of renewable energies in order to cope with demand and the 
development of the electricity grid. Recent revisions to the EEG have 
removed administratively determined feed-in-tariffs or feed-in-pre-
miums for most renewables. Instead, investors must now take part 
in competitive tenders.207 
From the institutional side, competences in energy policy-making 
were traditionally divided by the ministry of economy and the min-
istry of environment. After the election in 2013, the new government 
tried to establish a more holistic approach, which resulted in the com-
plete movement of energy competences to the ministry of economy. 
However, the competences in climate and nuclear safety have been 
left in the ministry for the environment, which has caused political 
struggle sometimes, especially after the COP21 Paris agreement.208 
The most important milestone in the recent history of the Ener-
giewende is the energy concept of 2010 where major goals of energy 
policy have been defined until 2050.209 The Concept aimed at accelerating 
the shift towards an energy system which broadly relies on renewable 
energy sources. The change in Germany’s energy policy was further 
intensified by the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011. As a result, 
Germany decided to completely exit from nuclear energy by 2022. 
207 Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzt, https://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/EE/Reda-
ktion/DE/Dossier/eeg.html?cms_docId=132292 (accessed: 9.11.2016).
208 Handelsblatt.de http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/bundesum-
weltministerin-hendricks-klimaschutzplan-ist-eine-klare-ansage/14842734.html 
(accessed: 9.11.2016).
209 Energiekonzept für eine umweltschonende, zuverlässige und bezahlbare 
Energieversorgung, https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/_
Anlagen/2012/02/energiekonzept-final.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 (accessed: 
8.11.2016).
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Chart 14. Objectives of the German Energy Concept
Sources: Energy concept of the German federal government.
The defined targets of 2010 will only be partially accomplished in 
2020. A tremendous expansion dynamic has been achieved in Ger-
many’s renewable electricity production, which has tripled to about 
33% of electricity production in 2015 compared to 11 % in 2010. More-
over, energy consumption has decreased to the lowest level since 
1990. However, other targets like the reduction of Green House Gas 
emissions, the reduction of final energy consumption in the transport 
sector, reductions in the use of electricity, and the increase of energy 
efficiency by 2.1 % annually, are not on track, on the contrary. The use 
of lignite in Germany has increased due to low coal and CO2-prices 
under the European emission trading system, and also over the course 
of the nuclear phase-out. Germany will most likely not reach its cli-
mate goals for 2020. Furthermore, the German government wants 
renewable electricity to become the most important source of energy, 
used also for heating, transport and industrial production.210 Due to 
this larger area of application for electricity, the goal for a reduction 
of electricity use is contested. 
210 Strom 2030. Langfristige Trends – Aufgaben für die kommenden Jahre, BMWI, 
Berlin 2016.
122 Nicole KAIM-ALBERS, Mariusz RUSZEL
Another key feature of the German Energiewende is that a grow-
ing number of consumers are starting to produce their own electricity 
(for example with a photovoltaic system on the roof top) and become 
“prosumers”. Energy production is thus no longer in the hands of 
a few major electricity companies, but with a variety of players – 
about 50% of renewable electricity is generated by citizens.211 New 
business models and start-ups in the energy sector are emerging. 
Starting in 2017, Germany will begin a rollout of smart meters, to 
be completed in 2032. This should help to better integrate renew-
able energies, enhance flexibility in the energy system, and generate 
new business models. 
The spirit of the energy transition has been a trigger for ideas 
and innovation in the whole value chain of the energy sector and the 
growing start-up business in Germany. Fortunately, this transition is 
more and more linked to another transition: the digitalization of pro-
cesses. The collection of “big data” brings in new efficiencies in the 
energy market, especially in the sphere of control systems, sales, and 
analysis. In German cities and universities the network of start-up 
companies is growing. So is the engagement by major utility com-
panies who themselves hold shares in start-up companies and offer 
support for innovative businesses.212 Bootcamps and accelerators 
both public and private are growing. The Ministry of Economy has, 
for example, installed “German Accelerators” in the United States. in 
Silicon Valley, to support German start-ups entering the market.213 
Public programmes like the “export initiatives of energy efficiency” 
and the “export initiative on renewable energies” have even a longer 
history in selling solutions and technologies on the international mar-
ket (since 2002). 
Generally, Germany is not particularly known as the best place for 
venture capital. In a ranking of the OECD countries it is only repre-
sented in the 17th position.214 Also, research policy and research funds 
211 Trend:Research 2013, https://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/media/file/284.
AEE_RenewsKompakt_Buergerenergie.pdf (accessed: 19.03.2017).
212 U. Franke, N. Paladini, Intelligente Vernetzung – Notwendigkeit und Chance in 
der Energiewende, in: “Schriftenreihe des Kuratoriums”, Forum für Zukunftsen-
ergien, p. 118.
213 German Accelerator, http://germanaccelerator.com/ (accessed: 11.04.2017). 
214 U. Franke, N. Paladini, Intelligente Vernetzung – Notwendigkeit ... op. cit., p. 119.
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are not of particular volume compared to other OECD countries, even 
if the public budget on research has doubled since 2006, with renew-
ables and efficiency in the centre of support.215 
Structure of the electricity balance
In 2016, German economy consumed 592.7 TWh of electricity; 
in comparison to 2015, this means a decrease by approx. 0.4% (2.4 
TWh).216 The main source of electricity production is coal (hard coal 
and lignite) with a 41.3% share in the electricity balance (including 
23.1% lignite and 18.2% hard coal), followed by renewable economy 
sources (29.5%), nuclear energy (14.2%), natural gas (9.2%) and crude 
oil (5.1%).217 The security of supply is still very high. According to 
the SAIDI Index, the minutes of electricity interruption in Germany 
even decreased in the last years (12.70 minutes in the year 2015).218 
However, the interference of the transmission system operators has 
dramatically increased with the expansion of fluctuating renewables. 
While TSO spent around 1500 hours for re-dispatch activities, in 2015 
they were already at 15800 hours.219 Of special relevance on the topic 
of security of supply is, on the one hand, the lack of investments in 
new capacities in power plants and, on the other hand, the delay of 
the expansion of high-voltage transmission grids. As a consequence 
the expansion of wind-onshore has been limited for some areas in the 
North of Germany. The background to this is that all off- and most 
on-shore wind projects are located in the North of Germany, whereas 
major consumers are located in the South of Germany.
215 P. Nießen, C. Rolle, Forschungsprioritäten für die Energiewende(n), “Energiew-
irtschaftliche Tagesfragen” No. 66/2016.
216 P. Graichen, M. M. Kleiner, Ch. Podewils, The energy transition in the power 
sector: State of affairs 2016. A review of the major developments in Germany and 
an outlook for 2017, AgoraEnergiewende, Berlin 2017, p. 4. 
217 Ibidem, p. 4. 
218 http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/
Unternehmen_Institutionen/Versorgungssicherheit/Stromnetze/Versorgungsqual-
itaet/Versorgungsqualitaet-node.html (accessed: 10.04.2017).
219 http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Unter-
nehmen_Institutionen/Versorgungssicherheit/Stromnetze/Engpassmanagement/
Redispatch/redispatch-node.html (accessed: 10.04.2017).
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The dimension of competitiveness is particularly discussed in Ger-
many, as the costs for the transformation of the system have increased 
more than expected. The Renewable-Energy-levy (“EEG-Umlage”) 
that was implemented to finance the RES-subsidies also rose sig-
nificantly from 2.05 cent/KWh in 2010 to 6.35 cent/KWh in 2016. 
To ensure that German industry does not suffer a competitive disad-
vantage as a result, around 2000 energy-intensive companies (e.g., 
steel production) were freed from this levy. However, 48 % of the total 
“EEG-Umlage” is still paid by industry, commerce, and service com-
panies. Germany’s household electricity prices rose in average from 
23.7 cent/KWh in 2010 to 28.7 cent/KWh today. Over 50 % of the elec-
tricity price are taxes and levies in Germany. In 2010 the total cost 
for electricity for an average household was 69.1 € per month, which 
rose to 83.7 € per month in 2016. Further costs have to be added to the 
overall electricity bill: the costs for re-dispatch as well as the costs of 
grid expansion on various levels. The decision to favor underground 
cables instead of high-voltage lines above the ground to foster accep-
tance, will increase the delay and the costs likewise.220 
The German “Energiewende” is constantly under debate. It rep-
resents the unique transition of an industrialized country, with a 23% 
share of industry in the GDP, towards a decarbonized future. The long-
term targets in energy policy have been set; however, the milestones in 
between will not all be reached, and not all of the market assumptions 
made are still valid. This sometimes leads to questions about the effec-
tiveness of measures and to discussion about short term reactions. One 
example is the early shutdown of 2.7 GW of old lignite power plants to 
reduce up to 12.5 million t CO2. The utilities receive around 1- 3.6 bil-
lion euros as compensation, also to function as back-up capacity in case 
of electricity shortage until 2020.221 It is necessary that the monitor-
ing process and discussion about this unique transition continues to 
ensure regular assessment about the past and the future. Sometimes 
measures and targets have been confused, for example the target of the 
share of renewables which could represent more of an instrument for 
the reduction of fossil fuels in the electricity mix. Feed-in tariffs gave 
opportunities for new businesses and for economies of scale, not exclu-
220 Energie für Deutschland 2016, Weltenergierat – Deutschland, p. 117.
221 https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/klimareserve-fragen-und-antworten-101.html 
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sively in the German market. It led to an important rise of renewable 
electricity into the system, however, not without any conflict for mar-
ket, technological, and even ecological questions, as the expansion of 
renewables has not led to greenhouse emission reduction so far.
The “Energiewende” are leading to a change in the market with 
more and more new actors emerging, offering new ideas in the sphere 
of demand-side-management and storage, prosumers and small scale 
systems of production and consumption (the “blockchain”), as well as 
new investment structures.222 The success of most innovations are nev-
ertheless highly dependent on the extremely regulated energy market. 
Moreover, “Energiewende” is not a guarantee itself for an innovative 
economy: in a globalized market, ideas, standards, and products could 
be also well developed in other parts of the world and then imported 
to the German market. 
Energy efficiency
According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Econ-
omy, Germany is already the world champion in energy efficiency, and 
scores the most points in the categories of national efforts, buildings, 
and industry.223 Since the 1990s energy consumption in Germany has 
been stagnating despite economic growth. Between 2008 and 2014 
energy productivity rose annually by 1.6% on average. However, this 
efficiency rate is still beyond the proclaimed target of 2.1% annually 
until 2020. Also not on track is primary energy consumption reduc-
tion with its target of minus 20% in comparison to 2008, as in 2014 
a reduction of only 8.7% was achieved. The same is true for electricity 
consumption: in 2014 a 4.6% reduction was achieved in comparison 
with 2008. It is likely that electricity consumption will rather rise 
than decrease with the ongoing electrification of the society. Final 
energy consumption in the transportation sector has increased about 
1.7% in comparison with 2005 and will fail to reach the 10% reduc-
tion target in 2020.224 
222 Energie für Deutschland 2015, ... op. cit., p. 19 ff. 
223 P. Kiker, Germany, Italy, and Japan Top World Energy Efficiency Rankings, http://
aceee.org/press/2016/07/germany-italy-and-japan-top-world (accessed: 01.02.2017).
224 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Monitoring Report , p. 23 ff. 
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To enhance the efforts for energy efficiency and comply with 
European Union legislation, the German Government introduced 
in 2014 the so called “National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency” 
(NAPE) with several programmes and instruments such as legis-
lation, financial incentives, and information. At the centre of the 
short-term measures of NAPE were the introduction of new compet-
itive tendering for energy efficiency; funding for building renovation 
and introduction of tax incentives, and the setting up of energy effi-
ciency networks together with business and industry. The aim of 
NAPE is to achieve a reduction of 390 to 460 PJ by 2020.225 To what 
extent the various measures have been successful has to be evalu-
ated in the future. 
Figure 10. Short-term measures and long-term work processes 
of NAPE for the 18th legislative term
Sources: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.
The “efficiency potential” has various dimensions: it has to be distin-
guished between technological potential, economic potential, feasibility 
225 https://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/M-O/nationaler-aktionsplan-
energieeffizienz-nape,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
(accessed: 12.04.2017). 
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potential, and the realistic potential.226 Keeping the extreme complex-
ity of industrial processes and value chains in mind, the definition of 
an absolute target is very difficult to achieve: various components of 
the system have completely different dimensions of potential, includ-
ing technical and economic limitations on different levels. Moreover, 
with a growing demand for flexibility in the electricity system due 
to the fluctuation in renewable power production, efficiency is not 
always the overall objective. In each branch, company, or production 
site, the limitations of efficiency have to be considered. On the other 
hand, the potential of demand-side-management in the industry is as 
difficult to calculate as it is for efficiency: in the industry the potential 
is estimated between 3 and 15 GW.227 In an electricity system, where 
demand-side-management is crucial for stability, the controlling of 
decrease or increase of demand for electricity represents a service 
which has to be incentivized adequately (and compensate e.g., the loss 
of production, the inefficient use of various components, extra time 
for storage etc.). In Germany, this is partially the case in the industry 
sector.228 Small consumers, however, are not yet part of the compen-
sation system. Neither do consumers benefit from price differences 
on the wholesale market as their price per kilowatt hour is fixed. With 
the rollout of the smart meter from 2017 on and the further increase 
of smart systems, demand-side-management might gain importance 
in the future.229 Especially, energy productivity is relevant in the con-
cept of energy efficiency. It can be assumed, however, that even if 
efficiency is further enhanced, Germany is still increasing its energy 
consumption. This is related to the so called “rebound effect”, which 
argues that the energy which is saved due to efficiency measures is 
spent elsewhere. It is estimated that up to 70% of the efficiency is lost 
in the “rebound effect”.230
226 Energie für Deutschland 2015, ... op. cit., p. 85.
227 F. Holtrup, Potenzial für Demand Side Management der energieintensiven Industrie 
in Deutschland, http://www.weltenergierat.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016-
01-DSM-Papier-v8.pdf (accessed: 10.04.2017).
228 Ibidem.
229 U. Franke, N. Paladini, Intelligente Vernetzung – Notwendigkeit ... op. cit., p. 116. 
230 Energie für Deutschland 2016, Weltenergierat – Deutschland, p. 110. 
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Drivers for efficient efficiency policy
While the success of various policies and initiatives to enhance 
efficiency has to be analyzed in the future, there are more relevant 
drivers of energy efficiency: On one hand is the international promo-
tion of German technological solutions in energy efficiency, enabled 
among others through the “Export Initiative“ of the Ministry of Econ-
omy231; non the other , funding for research and development is another 
driver for efficiency. Around one third of the total sum of 863 mil-
lion Euros allocated by the federal government for energy research 
projects in 2015 went to energy efficiency projects.232 Efficiency is key 
in German energy policy to reach the political targets in 2020 and 
beyond. On the other hand, the development of efficient technologies 
as well as efficient policies are needed to keep costs for the transition 
on a competitive level. 
Energy security
In Germany, energy security (in German: Energiesicherheit) is 
understood as the certainty of energy supplies at a reasonable price.233 
Therefore, continuous, uninterrupted, and stable supply of energy 
resources significant for the development of “Energiewende”234 and 
energy is an important goal of energy policy. The analysis of Germa-
ny’s energy balance structure confirms that the country does not have 
enough energy resources of its own and needs to import them, mostly 
from the Russian Federation, Norway, and the Netherlands. The Rus-
sian Federation is the most important of those suppliers, supplying 
to the Federal Republic of Germany hard coal, crude oil, and natural 
231 http://www.efficiency-from-germany.info/ENEFF/Navigation/DE/Ueber_uns/
ueber_uns.html;jsessionid=4F081EF984712B7858229B3CBA7D877F (accessed: 
10.04.2017). 
232 http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/bundesbericht-
energieforschung-2016,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.
pdf (accessed: 10.04.2017).
233 Streitkräfte. Fähigkeiten und Technologien im 21. Jahrhundert - Umweltdimen-
sionen von Sicherheit - Teilstudie 1: Peak Oil. Sicherheitspolitische Implikationen 
knapper Ressourcen, Zentrum für Transformation der Bundeswehr, Strausberg, 
2010, p. 9. 
234 Mineralische Rohstoffe für die Energiewende, Energie für Deutschland 2016, p. 112.
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gas, i.e., all of the three energy resources imported by Germany. We 
must point out that German energy policy reflects the interests of the 
main entities within the country which determine its form. Stephen F. 
Szabo emphasizes the roles of the German government, political par-
ties, and business.235 Florian Baumann notes that “a solely economic 
understanding of securing the energy supply by means of trade and 
business is not enough”236. Furthermore, Frank Umbach stresses that 
in case of energy market mechanisms functioning improperly, the 
state is expected to take responsibility for ensuring energy security 
to its citizens.237 Nevertheless, German business is strongly oriented 
at exporting products to the Eastern market. The analysis of strate-
gic documents shows that the strategic character of German-Russian 
relations may result in the need to make concessions in foreign policy 
with regard to the Russian Federation in order to maintain the sta-
bility of supplies of Russian natural gas.238 The strategic character of 
German-Russian relations in the energy sector dates back to the agree-
ment for natural gas supplies of February 1, 1970 concluded between 
Ruhrgas AG and Sojuzgazexport, under which Germany provided loans 
for the purchase of 1.2 million tons of pipe from Mannesmann AG for 
the construction of a gas pipeline in the USSR.239 Taking into consid-
eration the completed and planned joint investment projects between 
Russia and Germany, the relations are bound to remain strategic in 
the near future. In 2015, the Russian Federation supplied almost 45 
bcm to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The process of energy transition contributes to reduced depend-
ence on imported energy resources and a higher amount of energy 
produced from renewable sources. This results in improved energy 
self-reliance, especially in the context of the growing proportion of 
235 F. Szabo, Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics, Bloomsbury 2015, p. 35. 
236 F. Baumann, Energy Security as multidimensional concept, Research Group on 
European Affairs, CAP Policy Analysis, no. 1, March 2008, p. 4.
237 F. Umbach, German Debates on Energy Security and Impacts on Germany’s 
2007 EU Presidency, in A. Marquina (ed.), Energy Security. Visions from Asia and 
Europe, New York 2008, pp. 1-21. 
238 Streitkräfte. Fähigkeiten und Technologien im 21. Jahrhundert - Umweltdi-
mensionen von Sicherheit - Teilstudie 1: Peak Oil. Sicherheitspolitische ... op. cit.
239 B. Molo, Polityka bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w XXI wieku, Oficyjna 
Wydawnicza AFM, Kraków 2013, p. 224. 
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renewable energy in the structure of electricity balance and electrifi-
cation of the heating industry and transport. In time, this will cause 
reduced demand for crude oil and natural gas and a growing demand 
for electricity, mostly produced from renewable sources in the Ger-
man model of energy transition. Soon, the surplus of electricity may 
be stored using the power-to-gas technology. This technology also 
enables the production of hydrogen to be mixed with natural gas in 
the appropriate proportion. 
Strengthening Germany’s competitive position
Provided that one of the goals of EU energy policy is to develop 
a common energy market through the extension of natural gas and 
electricity interconnectors between states, Germany clearly has the 
best developed energy infrastructure of all EU countries. The central 
geographical location and numerous interconnectors enable it to serve 
as the center of distribution of natural gas and electricity in Europe. 
Price differences are going to intensify this process. In the case of nat-
ural gas, the pricing policy of the Russian Federation is crucial, since 
Germany buys gas from Russia at a lower price than other countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and thus can resell its surplus gas. As for 
electricity, in Germany it is cheaper on the wholesale market than in 
Central and Eastern European countries. After the extension of elec-
tricity interconnections, this will contribute to the improvement of 
Germany’s position as an energy distribution center. The planned energy 
cooperation with Denmark involving the construction of a 1500 MW 
electricity connection AC Network, and a 1400 MW connection with 
Norway, Nord-Link, will improve the competitiveness of the German 
energy sector.240 In addition, a 1000 MW connection between Germany 
and Belgium, Alegro, is currently being built by Amprion company.241 
The Federal Republic of Germany has a strong industrial potential 
and it seems that in the context of developing low-emission transport 
240 M. Ruszel, The political importance of energy cooperation between Germany 
and Denmark on the European Union energy market, E3S Web of Conferences 10, 
00135 (2016), p. 2. 
241 Alegro, http://www.elia.be/en/projects/grid-projects/alegro/alegro-content 
(accessed: 11.03.2017).
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and electric vehicle networks it will play an important role. On the 
one hand, German automotive concerns will try to create new models 
of electric, hydrogen, or hybrid vehicles, which can be sold in Europe 
and beyond.242 On the other hand, it is a challenge to create relevant 
solutions for the creation of an infrastructure of electric- or hydro-
gen- vehicle charging and batteries able to accumulate high amounts 
of energy. The R&D and technological potential makes the German 
economy play an important role in the process. Taking into account 
the assumptions of the German federal government, which predicts 
that by 2020 almost a million electric vehicles will be used, this pro-
cess will definitely progress.243 The Federal Republic of Germany also 
carries out innovative research concerning the use of power to gas 
(P2G) technology, which could be applied in using surplus electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources.244 The use of this technology 
enables the storage of hydrogen or methane produced from hydrogen, 
and then their retransformation into electricity. This way, P2G tech-
nology will have a significant application in the heating, automotive, 
and chemical industries and may contribute to gradual replacement 
of crude oil and natural gas by renewable energy. Carrying out pilot 
projects in this regard and drawing up pioneer regulatory solutions 
may contribute to the development of this technology in other EU 
countries that have similar gas infrastructure.245
242 http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/autoindustrie/bmw-und-daim-
ler-wollen-das-wasserstoffauto-voranbringen-a-1130491.html (accessed: 10.04.2017)
243 As of January 1, 2017, there are 34,022 electric cars in Germany. See: Anzahl der 
Elektroautos in Deutschland von 2006 bis 2017, https://de.statista.com/statistik/
daten/studie/265995/umfrage/anzahl-der-elektroautos-in-deutschland/ (accessed: 
10.04.2017).
244 Potenzialatlas Power to Gas, DENA, Berlin 2016. 
245 In Germany, 20 pilot power to gas projects are currently carried out: Windgas 
Haßfurt, GrInHy, Leuchtturmprojekt Power-to-Gas Baden-Württemberg, Wasserst-
offtankstelle Stuttgart Talstraße, “Smart Grid Solar“ - ZAE Bayern und Bayerisches 
Speichertestzentrum Arzberg betreiben Plattform für Erneuerbare Energien, Hoch-
schule Ostwestfalen-Lippe forscht im Projekt bioCONNECT, Rieselbettreaktor 
GICON-Großtechnikum, Extyron Zero-Emission-Wohnpark, WindGas Hamburg, 
Exytron Demonstrationsanlage, WindGas Falkenhagen, Windpark RH2-WKA, 
Hybridkraftwerk Prenzlau, Audi e-gas Projekt, Wasserstofftankstelle Hafen City, 
H2Herten, RWE-Demonstrationsanlage Ibbenbüren, Multi-Energie-Tankstelle, 
H2-Forschungszentrum der BTU Cottbus, HYPOS, sunfire, CO2RRECT, Pilotanlage 
Allendorf, Power to Gas Biogasbooster, Power-2-Hydrogen-Tankstelle Hamburg, 
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Strengthening Germany’s competitive position will also be sup-
ported through promoting the solutions of German energy transition. 
According to Karoline Steinbacher, Germany may become an inter-
national leader of energy transition processes and then aim to diffuse 
them. These activities comply with the concept of “leadership by dif-
fusion”.246 The success of the Energiewende is on the one hand defined 
by the accomplishment of its targets, and on the other is the balance 
between environment, security of supply, and competitiveness. The 
situation of the Energiewende and its impact on the three dimensions 
of the “triangle of energy policy” is regularly measured by an official 
monitoring report of the Ministry of Economy.247 The international 
success of the “Energiewende” highly depends on its domestic success. 
At the same time, Germany has developed a number of instruments 
to promote climate policy, which is the catalyst of energy transition. 
Jörn Richert points out that in 2003, BMWi established an export 
initiative of renewable energy sources, and one year later, at the con-
ference “Renewables 2004”, the REN21 network was formed with 
German financial support. Organizations such as IRENA (Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency) and REN21 were also established 
on German initiatives and greatly contributed to supporting national 
interests.248 The policy of imitation implemented by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany provides a channel supporting the export of German 
products, standards, management system, regulatory environment, 
and services connected with renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Germany wants to export high quality surplus products.249 To achieve 
BioPower2Gas, Methanisierung am Eichhof, Energiepark Mainz, Thüga, ZSW, Viess-
mann Power-to-Gas im Eucolino. See Pilotprojekte, http://www.powertogas.info/
power-to-gas/pilotprojekte-im-ueberblick/?no_cache=1 (accessed: 7.03.2017).]. 
246 K. Steinbacher, M. Pahle, Leadership by diffiusion and the German Energiewende, 
PIK, Discussion Paper, February 2015. 
247 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy: Vierter Monitoring-Bericht 
zur Energiewende, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Energie/
vierter-monitoring-bericht-energie-der-zukunft.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=24 
(accessed: 11.04.2017). 
248 J. Richert, Global, gemeinsam, vernetzt. Wie eine deutsche Energiewende-Außen-
politik aussehen müsste, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/
jahrgang-2016/juli-august/global-gemeinsam-vernetzt 
(accessed: 03.03.2017) 
249 K. Solberg Soilen, Geoeconomics, Ventus Publishing ApS 2012, p. 84. 
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competitive advantage, it needs to create functional mechanisms for 
creating sources of technological advantage. 
Conclusion
Energy transition, which originated in the 1980s, accelerated in 
the years 2000-2010, with the peak dynamic of EEG reform in 2005 
and the energy concept in 2010. The goals of the process are climate 
protection, improvement of energy security, and enhancing economic 
competitiveness. After some time, this activity additionally led to 
achieving the ability to influence the political preferences of other coun-
tries and international institutions. The process of energy transition 
also contributes to improving energy security by enhancing energy 
self-reliance and reducing import dependency on energy resources and 
electricity. This means that all the goals of Germany’s energy transi-
tion are external. Since climate protection is supported by German 
foreign policy (e.g., during COP climate summits), energy security may 
be manifested in lowering the import of energy resources, and thus, 
change Germany’s position at the geo-political level. 
Improving competitiveness is of fundamental importance. There-
fore, Germany wants to disseminate the German model of energy 
transition so as to make it an export product and a way of integrating 
renewable energy with the electric system. Politicians may support 
visions of extending renewable energy or standards at the regional 
level, and give the country’s business access to foreign markets. This 
is true, yet policies do not always have a positive economic effect. For 
example, billions of Euros are spent every year to support renewable 
energy, especially on solar panels and windmills, but the key produc-
ers of such technologies are mostly Chinese companies. This means 
that business in other countries can make use of Energiewende. At 
the same time, political conditions in Germany such as technological 
preferences and high energy levies encourage companies to develop 
their production in other countries.
Therefore, activities as part of energy policy should be intelligent 
and flexible. It is increasingly obvious that innovation is a way to 
improve competitiveness. This mostly refers to combining the world 
of energy with digital technology, and in time, thanks to new technol-
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ogies (power-to-x), even with the gas system. Different instruments 
at different levels are being used for this purpose. 
The effectiveness of German energy policy is based on strong 
energy partnerships, the most important of which is political relation 
with the Russian Federation. The diversified structure of directions 
and sources of energy resources, diversified contract structures, and 
complex energy infrastructure provide the basis for building a distri-
bution center of natural gas and electricity (a gas hub and an electricity 
hub). Therefore, Germany has a strong position in the new global race 
connected with the manufacture of electric, hydrogen, and hybrid 
vehicles. The process of developing low emission transport means that 
there will be a global race in the production chain of different goods 
and services to increase export. The catalyst for this process, as well 
as the process of energy transition, is climate policy.
Chapter 10
Energy transition in France: 
towards green development
Tomasz MŁYNARSKI250
Energy transition in France involves different directions of reform, 
such as improving energy efficiency, reducing the emission of green-
house gases and fossil fuels consumption, and the growth of renewable 
energy sources in the energy basket. The goal of energy transition is 
to gradually change from energy generated from hydrocarbons (oil, 
natural gas, coal) and centralized energy sources (nuclear energy) to 
low emission, dispersed energy sources (RES). The scope of the works 
included three main areas of reform: to decentralize the energy system 
(gradual reduction of the share of nuclear energy), to enhance energy 
saving and reduce energy consumption (energy efficiency and perfor-
mance), and to ensure environmental protection and development of 
“green” and energy-saving economy sectors.
Energy balance structure of France 
The programme of nuclear energy introduced over political divi-
sions has led to a significant lowering of energy dependency of the 
country, compensated for the lack of its own fossil resources, and 
allowed a departure from coal. Thanks to nuclear energy, France has 
developed a unique model of energy security. In 2014, nuclear energy 
covered 42% of total energy consumption. France’s energy independ-
250 Tomasz Młynarski, PhD, Associate Professor in Jagiellonian University, 
Faculty of International and Political Studies, Institute of Political Studies and 
International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, e-mail: tomasz.mlynarski@
uj.edu.pl
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ence is relative and mainly refers to the electricity sector, where almost 
75% of energy production comes from nuclear power. Nuclear energy 
has priority economic and strategic importance for France: it balances 
over 1/3 of the costs of fossil fuels import. Nuclear energy meets three 
fundamental goals: it enhances the energy self-sufficiency and security 
of supply in the country, ensures low and stable prices of electricity 
(which increases the competitiveness of the French economy, espe-
cially in sectors with high demand for electricity), and is an instrument 
in the fight against global warming. The nuclear power industry is an 
important asset and link in the country’s economy, and export of elec-
tricity is an important source of extra income. Additional economic 
benefits come from low emissions in the French sector of electricity 
in the face of tightening the European system of quoting the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases (EU Emissions Trading System). Thanks to 
nuclear energy, France has not only reduced the import of fossil fuels, 
but has even become the main supplier of products and services for 
the nuclear industry. 
The share of fossil fuels (oil: – 30%, natural gas – 14%, and coal 
– 4%) in the total amount of primary energy consumed in France 
does not exceed 50%; it is the lowest rate in all EU member states.251 
Thanks to the common use of nuclear energy, France’s import depend-
ency rate is 48%.252 However, the dominance of nuclear energy has 
caused significant backwardness and the lack of a consistent political 
and economic strategy concerning the development of RES.253 France 
has a rich potential of renewable energy sources, but apart from water 
energy, they are rather poorly used. Renewable energy with a share 
of 9.5% is developing, in 2015 employing about 170 thousand people 
(in Germany, 355 thousand).254   
New directions for France’s energy policy were determined by the 
process “Grenelle de l’environnement” initiated in 2007 (with the partici-
251 Commissariat Général Au Développement Durable, Chiffres clés de l’énergie, Édi-
tion 2015, Commissariat Général Au Développement Durable,  Février 2016, http://
www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/reperes-chiffres-cles-energie-2015.
pdf (accessed: 15.12.2016).  
252 EU Energy in Figures, European Commission, Statistical Pocket Book, 2015, p. 194. 
253 The basic drawback is the low diversification of new renewable energy sources, 
because the share of wind and solar energy in energy production is still very low.
254 Renewable Energy and Jobs Annual Review 2016, IRENA, p. 5, p. 11.  
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pation of representatives of regional authorities, trade unions, employers, 
and non-governmental organizations) in order to establish plans of 
action concerning sustainable development. It was a special form of 
consultation and inclusion of the community in the process of political 
debate on the future of the energy sector in France. Public consultations 
involved five parties (trade unions, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members of 
parliament, and the administration). The programme “Grenelle de l’en-
vironnement”, created a future framework for policies and measures, 
setting ambitious goals for individual sectors and sources of energy 
and guidelines to improve research and development for clean energy 
technologies. Priority areas were the reduction of emissions in the con-
struction and transport sectors, as well as the production industry. 
Grenelle also introduced support for heating based on RES.
After the presidential election in spring 2012, public consulta-
tions continued as a form of national debate on energy transition. The 
debate started on November 29, 2012, under the auspices of the Min-
istry of Ecology, included extensive regional consultations focused on 
reducing dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear energy.255 As part of 
the national energy debate there were hundreds of meetings with the 
participation of local communities, non-governmental organizations, 
companies, and universities. Recommendations for the future energy 
law pertained, to the following issues: simplification of administra-
tive procedures necessary for the development of wind, solar, and 
geothermal energy, and increased support for renewable energy. The 
National Debate on Energy Transition (DNTE) provided the basis 
for a governmental draft of the law concerning changes in the energy 
sector. France adopted the assumptions of deep energy transition in 
order to reduce emissions and promote energy efficiency. The French 
act on energy transition (Act on energy transition for green growth/
Transition énergétique pour la croissance verte after Senate amend-
ments of July 15, 2015256) finally adopted on July 22, 2015, includes 
255 Ouverture du débat sur la transition énergétique, http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/
ouverture-du-debat-sur-la-transition-energetique-29-11-2012-1535085_23.php 
(accessed: 15.12.2016).  
256 Loi n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la 
croissance verte (1), JORF n°0189 du 18 août 2015, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000 
31044385&categorieLien=id (accessed: 15.05.2016). 
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a change of the energy model based on fossil fuels through promot-
ing “green growth” and energy efficiency with gradual lowering of 
nuclear energy. The key goals of French energy transition assume the 
reduction of CO2 emission, in part through the development and inte-
gration of renewable energy sources with the energy system, with a 
gradual reduction of nuclear energy. GHG emissions are to be reduced 
by 40% before 2030, and by 75% before 2050 (as compared to 1990). 
The French act on energy transition introduced a high tax on CO2
 
emission (“climate-energy tax” / “contribution climat énergie”, CCE) 
from fossil fuels, depending on the generated emission.257 France has 
also chosen to tax high emission sectors (heavy industry, energy sec-
tor, aluminum, etc.), and even to introduce an international carbon 
tax. Its goal is to effectively encourage industry to reduce emissions 
and invest in low emission energy sources. 
Competitiveness on global and European energy 
markets in light of the assumptions of energy reform 
in France
France is one of the most industrialized countries, and at the same 
time emits one of the lowest amounts of greenhouse gases. Its ratio 
of CO2 emission/GDP is one of the lowest in the world. As a result, 
contemporary France is trying to build its leadership capacities, not 
only in traditional spheres of international relations (e.g., opposition 
to the attack on Iraq in 2002 or its active role in the military inter-
vention in Libya in 2011), but also in new areas, such as counteracting 
climate change. Just like the EU, France displays strong ambitions 
to be a leader in counteracting climate change, which is confirmed 
by its role as a key player in international negotiations (see the role 
of France in the negotiations before the COP21 summit). This is so 
because France has ambitions to be a climate leader, which in practice 
means support for tightening the objectives of GHG emission reduc-
tions, both regionally (EU ETS) and globally. The nuclear programme 
developed on a scale unique in Europe has not only ensured the com-
petitiveness of the French economy, but also enabled its exceptional 
257 The CCE mechanism also occurs independently of the fuel tax (TICPE, la taxe 
intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques).
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success in activities aimed at preventing climate change, i.e., separat-
ing economic growth from pollution emissions. Therefore, France is 
attempting to achieve global climate leadership by influencing inter-
national institutions, which suits the Gaullist ambitions of building 
a multipolar world where it would play the role of a leader. Thanks to 
the significant role of nuclear energy, France is one of the few highly 
industrialized economies with the lowest ratio of CO2 emissions per 
capita and in the sector of energy production, so it is pursuing the 
role of leader in the fight against climate change, promoting the devel-
opment of nuclear technology as a zero emission source of energy. 
As a nuclear world power, France strives to popularize civil nuclear 
technologies at the regional and global level. This provides an oppor-
tunity to develop the industry sector, where it has had the know-how 
advantage for several decades. In this way, climate policy may be an 
instrument for improving the competitiveness of the French economy 
on the global market. In this sense climate policy is becoming first of 
all an instrument of economic strategy. 
Energy efficiency. 
French law supports investments in the sustainable development of 
energy sources e.g.., by interest-free loans for those who buy a house for 
the first time (if the building meets standards higher than those set in 
construction law, i.e., is characterized by energy saving or low energy 
consumption, the so-called  BBC – bâtiments basse consommation) 
and BEPOS – bâtiments à énergiepositive).258 The act also supports 
the conversion of already existing houses, including a system of tax 
deductions. In January 2011, a new system of tariffs was introduced 
for electricity produced from biomass, and in March the same year, 
for electricity produced using solar panels.259 EDF is obliged to pur-
chase all the power produced from solar and wind energy. France is 
258 T. Młynarski, Uwarunkowania transformacji polityki energetycznej Francji. 
Między ekologiczną modernizacją a ekonomiczną kalkulacją [Determinants of 
French energy transition policy: Between ecological modernization and economic 
calculation], Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, no. 9/2015, Wydział Nauk Politycznych 
i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, p. 372. 
259 T. Młynarski,Francja w procesie uwspólnotowienia bezpieczeństwa ener-
getycznego i polityki klimatycznej Unii Europejskiej [France in the process of 
communitizing energy security and climate policy of the European Union], Kraków 
2013, pp. 70-71.
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making up for delays in the development of renewable energy sources 
and supports investment in RES or energy saving technologies.
Energy saving and the growth of the eco-work sector One of the 
main ways of reducing energy consumption by 20% in 2030 and by 50% 
in 2050 in comparison to 2012 is to be energy efficient in the sectors 
of construction and transport. In the housing sector (which accounts 
for almost half of energy consumption in the country), activities will 
include e.g., mandatory thermomodernization of public and private 
buildings, so that they can achieve the standard of “low emission” 
buildings by 2050. For this purpose, subsidizing loans is assumed to 
support the energy efficiency of buildings (interest-free loans, lower 
VAT), especially in the case of households with low incomes.260 A 30% 
tax deduction for labor costs  connected with improving efficiency is 
also planned. The development of the energy saving sector is expected 
to create tens of thousands of extra jobs (in construction, biosectors, 
or projects of reducing energy consumption, e.g., the installation of 
smart meters.
Another issue is the support for innovative energy-saving projects 
and the policy of reducing waste by 50% (e.g., banning the use of dis-
posable plastic bags or dishes). In that country, the age of disposable 
plastic items has finished upon the decree of 31 March 2016: as of 
July 1, 2016, all disposable plastic bags were banned and replaced by 
reusable bags. One anticipated effect of energy transition is the crea-
tion of 100 thousand jobs. 
The development of “green energy”. 
Ségolène Royal, Minister of Ecology, Sustainable Development and 
Energy, discussing the draft of the act on energy transition in April 
2016 said: “The development of renewable energy is at the heart of 
the transition to our energy model of the 21st century, more effi-
cient and more sober, more diversified…”261. The transition assumes 
260 Establishment of a National Guarantee Fund, offering subsidies for less afflu-
ent families or people who buy a house for the first time (if the building meets the 
standards higher than those set in construction law, i.e., is characterized by energy 
saving or low energy consumption, so-called  BBC – bâtiments basse consomma-
tion) and BEPOS – bâtiments à énergiepositive). Other instruments of support are 
e.g., tax deductions for the conversion of already existing houses. 
261 Les objectifs pour le développement des énergies renouvelables. Programma-
tions pluriannuelles des
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dynamic development and integration of renewable sources with the 
energy system: their role is to fill the gap in reducing the share of 
nuclear energy in electricity production. Dynamic development of 
renewable installations is to be stimulated by administrative incen-
tives for local governments, which will receive preferential state loans 
for the achievement of the goals of energy transition. Instruments 
stimulating the development of RES include financial support for 
small-scale energy generation for communes and local communities, 
as well as facilitation of laws and simplification of issuing permits 
for innovative local government projects, such as wind energy, water 
energy, and biogas (1,500 new installations are planned), as well as 
special tariffs for electricity produced from RES. As a result, the 
government assumes an increase in the share of renewable energy 
in gross final energy consumption from 14% in 2012 to 23% in 2020 
and 32% by 2030. 40% of the consumed electricity is to come from 
RES.262 Besides, roofs of all new commercial buildings with a sur-
face area over 1,000 m2 will have to equipped with renewable energy 
sources or vegetation that will ensure thermal insulation and will 
help maintain biodiversity. 
France has set ambitious operational goals to meet by 2023263: 
  growth of generating capacity in electricity production from rene-
wable sources by more than 50% as compared to 2015 (from 43 
GW to 71-78 GW), 
  double the power from land wind power plants, 
  triple the power from new photovoltaic parks, 
  double the generating capacity to produce electricity from timber,
  developing France’s potential in sea renewable energy (including 
3,000 MW from offshore wind installations, 100 MW from sea 
liquid energy, and then expanding the capacities to 6,000 MW 
and 2,000 MW respectively).
  increase by more than 50% of heat production from renewable 
sources in comparison to 2014 (including more than 20% of heat 
investissements de production – PPI, Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Energie et 
de la Mer, 25 avril 2016, http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2016-
04-25_Obj-_Dvp-_Energies_Renouvelables.pdf.  
262 Others: 38% of heat consumption, 10% of gas consumption, and 15% of engine 
fuel consumption.
263 Les objectifs pour le développement des énergies renouvelables..., op.cit. 
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production from biomass, seven-fold increase of heat production 
from biogas (methanization), four-fold increase of heat production 
from geothermal energy, increase by over 75% of heat production 
from heat pumps, and increase by over 80% of heat production 
from solar collectors), 
  improvement of effectiveness and energy recovery from the grid, 
  introducing to the gas network 8 TWh of biogas from anaerobic 
fermentation and support for the development of the sector of 
powering cars with natural gas (bioNGV) up to 20% in transport 
consumption in 2023.
Reducing the share of nuclear energy and conventional fuels. 
The act provides for lowering the share of nuclear energy in elec-
tricity production from 75% to 50% by 2050 as compared to the year 
2012 (unlike Germany, France is not going to give up on it completely) 
under the condition of maintaining a competitive price for electricity 
and a guarantee of no increase in GHG emissions. Electricity pro-
duction will remain at the previous stable level. For this purpose, 
extending the life cycle of reactors is planned, and the reactors will 
be shut down gradually as new renewable sources are launched.264 
Thanks to retaining a stable share of nuclear energy, an uninterrupted 
and evolutionary transition in French energy balance will be possible. 
Simultaneously, the government assumes a reduction in fossil fuels 
(oil, gas, coal) consumption by 30% (as compared to 2012), so as to 
achieve 40% of electricity in France coming from renewable sources 
by 2030 (besides 50% from nuclear energy).  
The transport sector. 
The sector in which a considerable reduction of CO2 emission is 
possible is the sector of transport, being the main source of GHG 
emissions apart from the heating sector. This goal is to be achieved by 
popularizing electric cars and extending the infrastructure of electric 
car charging stations.265 Another instrument is financial incentives 
for the purchase of an electric car or tax deductions for the construc-
264 It must be emphasized that the French nuclear fleet is obsolete, because as many 
as 22 out of 58 reactors will have operated for 40 years in 2022, so EDF intends to 
extend the life cycle of reactors from 40 to 50 or 60 years. 
265 By 2020, 2-3 million electric cars are planned to be going on French roads, pow-
ered at home or from public grids.   
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tion of an electric power station (approximately 7 million of them 
are planned, compared to 10 thousand now functioning).266 Exten-
sion of battery technologies is planned in order to store energy. The 
act on energy transition introduced subsidies for the replacement of 
an old car with a new, ecologically powered one. The development 
of the electric car sector is intended to support the system of “elec-
tric bonuses” applying when replacing an old Diesel car (older than 
13 years) with a new, electric one (emissions up to 20 g CO2/km) or 
purchase or lease of a new hybrid vehicle (emissions from 21 to 60 g 
CO2/km).
267 Both individuals and public entities (enterprises, local 
governments, offices etc.) may use the assistance. The reform of the 
sector is to be supported by promoting bicycles and public transport 
or car sharing. 
Intensive development of clean public transport is a separate branch 
of energy modernization. In addition, public institutions (in 50%) 
and local governments (in 20%) were obliged to renew their trans-
port fleets based on low emission technologies (for vehicles up to 3.5 
tons) before 2025. The replacement will apply to public transportation 
(buses) – 50% from 2020 and 100% after 2025. Energy transition has 
also introduced the requirement of ecologically clean vehicles for car 
rental companies and taxis (at least 10% of the fleet will have to have 
low emission engines by 2020).268 
Plans for competitive advantage / new branches of economy. 
In February 2014, France and Germany announced the develop-
ment and adoption of a common industrial and technological strategy, 
and in the future, the establishment of a common consortium producing 
components for renewable energy devices (photovoltaic panels, wind 
turbines, etc.), oriented toward the export of low emission technolo-
266 T. Młynarski, Uwarunkowania transformacji… [Determinants of energy tran-
sition ...], op. cit., p. 372.    
267 Voitures électriques et hybrides : Comment obtenir le nouveau bonus de 10 000 € ?,
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Voitures-electriques-et-hybrides.
html?var_mode=calcul (accessed: 15.12.2016).
268 Loi no 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la 
croissance verte (1), Chapitre II Efficacité énergétique et énergies renouvelables 
dans les transports, article 37, http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/
pdf/joe_20150818_0189_0001_1_-2.pdf (accessed: 15.12.2016).
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gies and the extension of smart grids.269 France hopes that as a result 
of the agreement it will become (together with Germany) the center of 
the world’s industry of advanced technologies in the “green energy” 
and energy saving sectors. 
Planes of competitive advantage and new branches 
of economy 
Energy transition fosters the creation of new jobs and may become 
a stimulus to technological innovation. Energy eco-modernization is 
an opportunity for re-industrialization in the industry sector. It is con-
nected with the need to patent and implement technological ideas on 
a large scale, and at the same time, develop new, advanced, energy sav-
ing technologies, not only for the internal market but also for export. 
Socio-economic benefits of energy transition that may occur in 
France are: 
  domestic energy and improvement of energy security due to reduc-
ing the importation of energy sources,
  economic development and industrialization in the modern indus-
try sector, 
  new eco jobs,
  energy saving, 
  socio-ecological benefits connected with the improvement of envi-
ronment and air condition, 
  technological leadership and the opportunity to profit from low-e-
mission and energy consumption-reducing technologies. 
Thus, France counts on the development of the biomass and biogas 
sectors, sea renewable energy, small hydropower plants, the develop-
ment of electromobility, projects for heat production from renewable 
sources, and the development of innovation and research support. As 
a result, 40 thousand jobs are to be created in the sector of onshore 
wind energy and photovoltaics (plus 8 thousand in the thermomod-
ernization industry) by 2023. Besides, the construction of 250 PV 
stations, doubling the number of electric cars, and building 59 start-
ups for green energy are assumed. 
269 Conseil des Ministres Franco-Allemand du 19 Fevrier 2014, 16ème Conseil des 
ministres franco-allemand à Paris, https://de.ambafrance.org/16eme-Conseil-des-
ministres-franco (accessed: 15.12.2016). 
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The impact of energy transition on the energy 
security of France and recommendations for other 
countries 
The French transformation of the energy sector involves the devel-
opment of RES, improvement of energy efficiency and energy saving, 
the transition from hydrocarbons to electric cars in the transport sec-
tor, and ecologization of the public domain. All these initiatives are 
to enhance the competitiveness of the country’s economy, to create 
new jobs, and to improve the security of energy supply in the coun-
try. So energy transition is an expression of France’s pragmatism, and 
if stable energy supplies can be ensured, it will be a strong stimulus 
for technological modernization and the country’s economic growth. 
French action on energy transition may be a source of inspiration 
for innovative solutions in designing the “ecological and economic 
modernization” of the energy industry in other countries that want to 
achieve: 1) intensive development of renewable energy sources supple-
mented with governmental support, 2) creating a national programme 
supporting energy efficiency growth, especially connected with the 
construction industry (low-energy construction), 3) development of 
modern forms of light eco industry which offers new jobs, 4) innova-
tion in public transport (systems of municipal electric vehicles and 
charging stations) supported by the creation of special no-traffic eco 
zones in town centers, combined with popularization of park & ride 
mobility, 5) promoting cogeneration and modernization of waste man-
agement, including the use of post-industrial (mining) areas.
Chapter 11
Energy Transition  
in Great Britain
Marta KRAJEWSKA270
The British electricity market is in the middle of a rapid transition. 
In the wholesale electricity market a system which has developed to 
allow, almost exclusively, large scale thermal power stations to supply 
customers who didn’t change their level of consumption, is moving 
into something characterized by large levels of renewable generation, 
huge volumes of distribution connections, extensive interconnection, 
and an active demand side.  
Meanwhile the retail market, long characterized by little switching, 
large numbers of disengaged customers, and concerns about compe-
tition, is seeing a significant new entry. This market will continue to 
face significant change as the findings of the Competition and Mar-
kets Authority (CMA), which recently investigated the market due to 
concerns about insufficient competition, are implemented. And on the 
energy efficiency side there have been recent changes in Government 
policy, prompted by concerns about their effectiveness which may put 
the ability to meet objectives in doubt.
In addition, it seems clear that the decision of the British people to 
leave the European Union could also have a significant, though cur-
rently unknown, impact on all aspects of the energy market. 
270 Marta Krajewska, MSc, is a lawyer, holding an EU law degree from the Robert 
Schuman University in Strasbourg (France) & an employee of National Grid Business 
Development. She has previously been employed by Energy UK (the trade association 
representing the British energy industry) and the European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity (a Brussels based organization representing 
42 Transmission System Operators from 35 countries). The views expressed in this 
article do not represent the views of any of these companies or organizations and 
are entirely her own. E-mail: marta.krajewska@nationalgrid.com
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This report seeks to provide an overview of the British electricity 
market and to provide an explanation of recent changes and current 
issues, and to consider what might be some of the challenges ahead.
The structure of the energy mix
The first important point is that it is a British Market (rather than 
a market covering the entire United Kingdom). The market covers 
England, Wales, and Scotland (following the merger of the two mar-
kets in 2005 as part of the British Electricity Transmission and Trading 
Arrangements (BETTA) project). The market does not cover Northern 
Ireland, which is part of a single “All Island’ market with the Republic of 
Ireland and has a separate TSO271; separate regulatory authority272; and 
a separate governance framework covering the entire Irish market.273
The generation market
Britain has a competitive generation market in which parties com-
pete to supply customers at the lowest price.  The table below shows 
the electricity generation mix over the past decade.  It can be seen 
that nuclear has played a relatively constant role in the energy mix 
(and will continue to do so over the next decade following the recent 
Government approval of a new nuclear reactor at Hinkley Point C274). 
Coal has played an important, but increasingly declining, role in the 
energy mix; providing a much needed source of flexibility.  Interest-
ingly summer 2016 was the first time for a century that there were 
days when no electricity was generated from coal.275 Gas is currently 
the fuel with the greatest share of the fuel mix. It can also be seen 
that imports via interconnectors are playing an increasing role and 
that wind and solar generation have seen a marked increase in the 
past five years or so.
271 System Operator Northern Ireland (SONI) which is wholly owned by Eirgrid, 
the Irish SO. 
272 The Utility Regulator for Northern Ireland (UREGNI).
273 A Single Electricity Market Committee containing both regulators and a number 
of independent experts oversee the operation of the SEM. 
274 See the coverage at: https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-new-build-proj-
ects/hinkley-point-c (accessed: 13.10.2016).
275 See coverage at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/10/britain-gets-
no-power-from-coal-for-first-time-on-record/ (accessed: 13.10.2016).
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Chart 15. Generation mix by quarter and fuel source 2006-2016
Source: Ofgem276.
Chart 16. Shares of electricity generation by fuel for 2015 and 2016
Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES)277 
The generation market is relatively competitive, as shown in chart 
15 below. EDF (28% of the market share) owns the nuclear fl eet, Scot-
tish Power (owned by Iberdrola of Spain) own wind and thermal 
assets, as do SSE278 (with respectively 7% of the market share for each 
of them). German utilities RWE (13% of the market share) and E.ON 
(which recently split the business to form E.ON and Uniper, with Uni-
per holding 6% of the market share) have generation interest, and the 
276 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/wholesale-market-indicators 
(accessed: 13.11.2016).
277 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
fi le/633779/Chapter_5.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2016).
278 SSE stands for Scottish and Southern Energy.
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largest supplier, British Gas, has generation interests via Centrica (9% 
of the market share). Other companies such as Drax or GDF/Engie have 
shares of 8% and 3% respectively. An increasing share of small scale 
and independent generation (19%) has recently entered the market.
Chart 17. Generation ownership by company, 2015
Source: Ofgem279.
Embedded generation
A significant feature of the market in the last few years has been 
the connection of very large volumes of generation at distribution 
voltages. This is typically wind and solar generation with variable 
running patterns. The growth is shown in the diagram below. These 
connections have tended to be concentrated in particular areas of the 
country – particularly the South West of England and Scotland.  This 
new trend also means that there are times when distribution systems 
export onto the transmission network, as opposed to taking power 
from it as would have traditionally been the case. 
The retail market
The British retail market has seen rapid changes in the past few 
years as a situation in which a relatively small number of suppliers, 
termed “the Big Six”280, who also own generation has been challenged 
279 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/wholesale-market-indicators 
(accessed: 13.11.2016).
280 The “Big Six” is a term used to describe the six largest British energy suppliers 
(being at the same time the oldest British electricity companies).  They are made up 
of British Gas, EDF Energy, E.ON UK, npower, Scottish Power and SSE. 
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by signifi cant new entry. This is probably the most dramatic change 
ever seen in a market which was opened up to competition in the late 
1990s. The table below shows the growth in the number of suppliers 
in both the gas and electricity markets over the past decade.
Chart 18. Number of active supply market participants
Source: Ofgem281.
The table below illustrates this phenomenon in more detail and 
shows the market shares per company. The most striking thing is per-
haps the increase in the market share of smaller suppliers from 2013 
and the relative decline in the market share of each of the “Big Six”. 
While appearing as relatively small in the diagram, this is the fi rst 
signifi cant time that independent suppliers have gained any market 
share and that there’s been a sustained decline in the “Big Six” com-
panies’ market shares.
As of March 2016 there are 38 suppliers active in the British elec-
tricity market. Of those, 36 provide both gas and electricity. 86.6% of 
the market is held by large suppliers and 13.4% by small and medium 
sized suppliers. As discussed in the competition chapter, the CMA’s 
recent investigation has scrutinized the level of competition within 
both the wholesale and the retail market and proposed a set of reme-
dies with the aim of further enhancing retail competition. 
281 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/chart/number-active-domestic-suppliers-fu-
el-type-gb. (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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Chart 19. Market share of electricity supply market participants 
(2004 – 2016)
Source: Ofgem282.
Networks and Interconnection
Britain’s electricity networks are owned by a variety of companies. 
There are 12 separate distribution companies (with more than one owned 
by the same party). The transmission network283 onshore is owned by 
3 companies – National Grid Electricity Transmission plc, Scottish 
Hydro Electric Transmission plc and Scottish Power Transmission plc.
In addition, various companies own parts of the offshore network 
which have been awarded by competitive tender.284 The entirety of 
the transmission network is operated by the National Grid – in its 
role as System Operator.285 As renewable volumes increase, the pros-
282 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/chart/electricity-supply-market-shares-compa-
ny-domestic-gb (accessed: 20.04.2017).
283 Comprising the 275kv and 400kv networks in England and Wales and also the 
132kv network in Scotland.
284 For details of the competitive OFTO regime see: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/offshore-transmis-
sion. There are also plans to expand the use of competition to the construction of 
onshore transmission assets.  
285 While not discussed in this report there are suggestions that greater separation 
of the system operation would be desirable. 
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pect of distribution networks needing to be more actively managed 
is becoming a reality.
Interconnection with neighboring countries has been a feature of 
the British market since the Interconnexion France Angleterre was 
commissioned in 1986. Britain is also connected to the Netherlands 
(via the Britned interconnector), Northern Ireland (via Moyle) and the 
Republic of Ireland (via the East West Interconnector).  Plans are in 
place for at least 6 GW of interconnection capacity with connections 
to Denmark (the Viking Link), Belgium (the NEMO link), Norway, 
and further French interconnectors, IFA2, ElecLink, and FAB link 
projects, planned.286  
The decision on whether interconnection should be built is mar-
ket led and driven by the presence of price differences between GB 
and other countries. Historically, the GB price has been above that in 
surrounding markets hence creating a case for interconnection and, 
in general, meaning that interconnectors which do exist have tended 
to import from the continent (though an interconnector can change 
direction several times a day). Interconnector imports and exports 
are shown in the figure below.
Chart 20. Interconnector gross and net imports and exports  
(2013 – 2016)
Source: Ofgem287.
286 The list of existing and future interconnectors projects can be found here:
 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/electricity-intercon-
nectors (accessed: 13.11.2016).
287 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/all-charts (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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Government Policy and Regulation
British Government policy is focused on resolving the so called 
energy trilemma – of secure supplies, affordable energy for custom-
ers, and decarbonization.
The Department for Energy and Climate Change (recently 
changed to the Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial 
Strategy288) is responsible for making policy decisions – includ-
ing decisions about supporting particular technologies and how 
to encourage low carbon generation. The most signifi cant piece of 
energy specifi c government policy has been the Electricity Mar-
ket Reform (EMR) which introduced a Capacity Market, designed 
to ensure suffi cient investment in Generation, and which replaced 
the previous regime for supporting renewables with a new regime 
based on Contracts for Difference. This is covered in more detail 
in Chapter 4 on security of supply.
Chart 21. Electricity price comparison 
for domestic usage in world
Source: BEIS, See https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/interna-
tional-domestic-energy-prices (accessed: 13.11.2016).
The British market is regulated by the Offi ce of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem) responsible for monitoring, enforcing, and improving 
288 As from July 2016.
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wholesale and retail market rules and setting price controls to deter-
mine the revenues which network companies can recover.289
Energy use
The transport sector is currently the biggest final energy user in 
the UK, accounting for 38% of the total in 2012. Households account 
for 30% of final energy use, industry 18%, tertiary 14% and agricul-
ture approximately 1%.  In general, a rule of thumb of 1/3 transport, 
1/3 domestic and 1/3 industrial use tends to be used.290  
Prices and the make-up of a domestic bill
The figure below shows where GB compares in a Europe-wide elec-
tricity price comparison for domestic usage.
The structure of an average domestic energy bill is shown in the 
figure and the explanatory table below.
Chart 22. Structure of an average domestic energy bill
Source: Ofgem291
289 This is done via a model called RIIO, standing for Revenue = Incentives + Inno-
vation + Outputs. 
290 Source: Ofgem- see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/all-charts 
(accessed:13.11.2016).
291 Source: Ofgem- see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/all-charts (accessed: 
13.11.2016).
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Table 6. Explication of the structure of an average  
domestic energy bill
Annual cost Percentage
Wholesale costs 40.09%
Network costs 25.16%
Environmental and social obligation costs 12.99%
Other direct costs 0.65%
Operating costs 15.40%
Supplier pre-tax margin 0.94%
VAT 4.76%
Source: Ofgem292.
Projections for the future
As noted in the introduction, GB is going through a significant 
period of change. There are many projections about how the system 
will develop in the future and considerable uncertainty – including 
the impact of smart meters, the impact of batteries and electricity 
storage, future interconnection development, fuel costs, Brexit; and 
many other factors.  The National Grid produces - on a yearly basis 
- a series of Future Energy Scenarios (FES) which tend to form the 
basis for consideration in the future.293  
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency is frequently described as the most cost effective 
way of reducing carbon emissions. However, Britain’s energy efficiency 
is still lagging behind, partly because of a relatively old housing stock 
which is one of the least energy efficient in Europe.  This section looks 
at the context within which energy efficiency policies are set, their 
content, the evaluation of those policies (including those which have 
recently been removed) and the future.  
Energy efficiency is essential to help consumers reduce their energy 
consumption and improve the comfort of their homes. It is also cen-
tral to achieving the UK’s commitment to reducing its greenhouse 
gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels. It is 
292 Ibidem. (Source: Ofgem- see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/all-charts 
(accessed: 13.11.2016)).
293 See: http://fes.nationalgrid.com/ (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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a key part of the Government’s strategy and is considered central to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy security, and 
mitigating fuel poverty.
There is no doubt that further policy action is required. In June, 
the Fifth Carbon Budget294 was adopted by the Government, setting 
firm carbon targets for the period from 2028 to 2032. Parliament 
approved them in July. Reaching those targets will require bold and 
ambitious policy action across all sectors.
A number of important directives set EU-wide standards and tar-
gets for energy efficiency. First of those is the Ecodesign Directive295 
that requires manufacturers of electrical appliances to increase the 
energy efficiency of their products over time with increasing standards. 
New buildings need to meet energy efficiency standards set by the 
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.296 Recent policy changes 
in the UK such as scrapping the zero carbon homes target show that 
buildings’ energy efficiency is not quite on top of the political agenda 
right now. 
Finally, it’s worth mentioning the Energy Efficiency Directive297 
which requires all Member States to set firm energy saving targets 
covering all sectors to reach the EU’s 20% energy efficiency target by 
2020 (and subsequent targets thereafter).  Article 7 of the Energy Effi-
ciency Directive is central and requires Member States to introduce 
energy efficiency obligation schemes (EEOSs). 
Domestic households
Energy efficiency policy targeted at households in the UK has 
worked through energy supplier obligations, where energy suppli-
ers are required to offer consumers opportunities to be more energy 
efficient. The government has obligated suppliers to improve homes’ 
energy efficiency in this way for more than 20 years.
294 See: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/carbon-budgets (accessed: 13.11.2016).
295 Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
October 2009 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements 
for energy-related product.
296 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010 on the energy performance of buildings. 
297 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Octo-
ber 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU 
and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC.
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In 2013, the Government implemented two schemes with the 
primary aim of improving household energy efficiency to reduce 
CO2 emissions – the Green Deal298 and the Energy Company Obli-
gation (ECO).299  These replaced two previous energy efficiency 
programmes, the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and 
the Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP). The replacement 
was mainly driven by concerns about the impact of the previous 
policies on customer bills. ECO reduced suppliers’ obligatory CO2 
savings and decreased the requirement for them to improve hard-
er-to-treat homes. 
  Through ECO, the Government required energy suppliers with 
more than 250,000 customers to install measures in homes, 
such as loft or wall insulation, that would cumulatively reduce 
CO2 emissions by a certain amount. Suppliers are given targets 
based on their share of the domestic gas and electricity market. 
Suppliers work with a range of suppliers to deliver the measu-
res (such as installers for instance), and face penalties if they 
do not meet the targets set by Government.  The suppliers pass 
on the costs of delivering the ECO to their customers through 
energy bills. 
  The Green Deal is primarily a finance mechanism which enables 
householders to borrow money so they can improve the energy effi-
ciency of their homes. They repay this money through their energy 
bills (“Green Deal finance”). This is complemented by a framework 
of advice, accreditation, and assurance intended to increase home-
owners’ trust in the supply chain for home improvements. 
Government is now designing a policy that will supercede ECO in 
April 2017 and has committed to an annual funding of £640 million 
for the policy, which will focus increasingly on the fuel poor. Under 
the current consultation proposal, a one year transition to the four-
year long scheme would see social housing included under ECO, as 
well as a greater role for Local Authorities to identify customers eli-
gible for ECO. 
298 See: https://www.gov.uk/green-deal-energy-saving-measures/overview (accessed: 
13.11.2016).
299 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/eco (accessed: 
13.11.2016).
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Industrial energy efficiency
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which covers 40% of 
UK emissions, is a key EU measure driving energy efficiency improve-
ments in the industry sector. In addition, the UK introduced the Climate 
Change Levy300 – a tax on the business use of fossil fuel energy – in 
2001. Companies that are part of Climate Change Agreements (CCAs) 
and which successfully meet the conditions of their agreement are eli-
gible for a discount on the levy. 
The Government has also implemented the CRC Energy Efficiency 
Scheme301 which targets large, non-energy intensive businesses and 
public sector organizations and emissions not already covered by the 
EU ETS or Climate Change Agreements.
In July 2015, the Government announced that it would not pro-
vide any further funding for Green Deal loans, effectively bringing 
the scheme to an end. ECO will end on 31 March 2017, and will be 
replaced with a smaller scheme that focuses on mitigating the main 
causes of fuel poverty.
This decision was, in part, motivated by an assessment by Britain’s 
National Audit Office (NAO) – which seeks to ensure that Government 
funds are used effectively. Sir Amyas Morse, Head of the NAO said on 
14 April 2016: “Improving household energy efficiency is central to 
government achieving its aims of providing taxpayers with secure, 
affordable and sustainable energy. The Department of Energy and 
Climate Change’s ambitious aim to encourage households to pay 
for measures looked good on paper, as it would have reduced the 
financial burden of improvements on all energy consumers. But in 
practice, its Green Deal design not only failed to deliver any mean-
ingful benefit, it increased suppliers’ costs – and therefore energy 
bills – in meeting their obligations through the ECO scheme. The 
Department now needs to be more realistic about consumers’ and 
suppliers’ motivations when designing schemes in future to ensure 
it achieves its aims”302.
300 See: https://www.gov.uk/green-taxes-and-reliefs/climate-change-levy (accessed: 
13.11.2016).
301 See: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-qualifica-
tion-and-registration (accessed: 13.11.2016).
302 Full report can be found here: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/green-deal-and-en-
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The report goes on to state:  “The Green Deal has not achieved 
value for money. The scheme, which cost taxpayers £240 million 
including grants to stimulate demand, has not generated additional 
energy savings. This is because DECC’s design and implementation 
did not persuade householders that energy efficiency measures are 
worth paying for”.
Also, following the decision to bring ECO to an end, the Energy 
and Climate Change Committee (ECCC) in the House of Commons 
has made its own investigation into reducing home energy efficiency 
and demand. The Committee examined what lessons could be learnt 
from these and previous energy efficiency schemes. The results of this 
parliamentary inquiry were published in a report in March 2016.303 
In particular the ECCC expressed serious concerns regarding the 
Government’s proposed approach to tackling fuel poverty through com-
mercial energy suppliers, arguing that they might not be the best placed 
to reach those households who need it most. In addition, the Commit-
tee has underlined that the Government should be doing much more 
to reduce consumer energy bills by improving the energy efficiency of 
new and existing homes. Finally, the MPs have also stressed the need 
for the Government to promptly demonstrate a renewed commitment 
to tackling energy efficiency by establishing adequate policies with long-
term, ambitious objectives, which restore confidence to the industry.
Government is now designing a policy that will succeed ECO in 
April 2017, and has committed to an annual funding of £640 million 
for the policy, which will focus increasingly on the fuel poor. Under the 
current consultation proposal304, a one year transition to a four-year 
long scheme would see social housing included under ECO, along with 
a greater role for Local Authorities to identify customers eligible for ECO. 
However, with those recent changes many are asking the ques-
tion how feasible the current targets set in the Fifth Carbon Budget 
are. In its recent statement, the Association for the Conservation of 
Energy has underlined: “The last 18 months have been a major set-
ergy-company-obligation/ (accessed: 13.11.2016).
303 Full report can be found here: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/commons-select/energy-and-climate-change-committee/inquiries/
parliament-2015/home-energy-efficiency/ (accessed: 13.11.2016). 
304For more information see: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ener-
gy-company-obligation-eco-help-to-heat (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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back in the British policy landscape affecting carbon emissions from 
buildings: the trajectory to zero carbon new build has been paused; 
Government support for Green Deal finance was withdrawn with no 
alternative mechanisms in place to encourage and enable investment 
by able-to-pay households; the government announced that funding 
from the Energy Company Obligation will be reduced again; and 
a review of business energy taxes has led to proposals for a new tax 
structure but, as yet, no coherent supporting framework to encour-
age energy efficiency action”.
It goes on to state:  “(…) the Government’s own projections for 
abatement show that the UK will not meet the 5th Carbon Budget 
in buildings. Taken together, policies as they currently stand are the 
Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to 
achieve a 21% cut in direct emissions from buildings by 2030 com-
pared to 1990, just 12% below the ’business as usual’ emissions for 
2030. This means that the UK’s emissions from buildings will exceed 
those recommended by the Committee on Climate Change for the Fifth 
Carbon Budget, in 2030, by 18%”.305
In addition, while BEIS’ work focuses on policies that will succeed 
ECO, there are no measures in place to incentivize the able-to-pay 
market in the UK. Several groups are also calling for energy efficiency 
to become a national infrastructure policy. 
Competitiveness
Building on the data on historic and current market shares pre-
sented in Chapter 1, this section focuses on the CMA’s investigation 
into competition in the energy market and the ’remedies’ which it 
brought forward.   
Following significant pressure, Ofgem referred the market to 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in June 2014.306 
305 Full statement can be found at: http://www.ukace.org/2016/10/the-uk-will-
miss-its-climate-targets-without-a-step-change-in-buildings-energy-efficiency/ 
(accessed: 13.11.2016).
306 Decision to make a market investigation reference in respect of the supply and 
acquisition of energy in Great Britain from 26th June 2014, see https://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/publications-and-updates/decision-make-market-investigation-reference-re-
spect-supply-and-acquisition-energy-great-britain (accessed: 13.11.2016).
161Energy Transition in Great Britain
The CMA, which is the UK’s competition authority and has broader 
powers than a regulator, then undertook an investigation into com-
petition in the market.  This investigation took 2 years and concluded 
in June 2016.307  
It identified a number of features in the wholesale and retail mar-
kets which might constitute an Adverse Effect on Competition (AEC) 
and, where it did so, it proposed remedies, which the regulator will 
need to implement, to address these problems. Perhaps equally inter-
estingly, it also reached some conclusions about the competitiveness 
of wholesale markets and about vertical integration – however with-
out prescribing remedies.
a) Factors that led to the CMA referral
Concerns about the competitiveness of the British energy market 
have existed for some time.  They have included: 
  the presence of vertical integration – i.e. the ownership of supply 
and generation interests by the same companies and the suspicion 
that this could create a barrier to entry in both the wholesale and 
retail markets;
  the low levels of switching by customers and microbusinesses and 
a lack of trust in the market – in particular a concern that up to 
80% of consumers were not willing or able to engage with the 
energy market and that levels of generation were low;
  insufficient generation market competition including a worry that 
excessive profits were being made in one or both of the wholesale 
and retail markets, as well as the idea of prices going up quickly 
and coming down slowly308;  
  a lack of transparency – about trades being undertaken within the 
market as well as about profits.  
Prior to the referral, Ofgem itself undertook several investigations 
into these issues.  However, it was felt that the CMA investigation could 
“offer an important opportunity to clear the air (…) helping rebuild-
ing consumer trust and confidence in the energy market as well as 
provide the certainty investors have called for”309.
307 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-publishes-final-energy-mar-
ket-reforms (accessed: 13.11.2016).
308 Being now collectively referred to as “rockets and feathers”.
309 Extract from Dermot Nolan’s, Ofgem Chief Executive’s statement made on 24th 
June 2014 to be found at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/
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b) The CMA’s diagnosis of competition in the British wholesale power 
market
The CMA’s conclusions suggest that competition is working well 
in the wholesale gas and electricity market, despite the presence of 
vertically integrated firms.
Excessive profits
CMA concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that the main 
energy firms earned excessive profits from their generation business or 
that wholesale market prices were above competitive levels. The CMA 
conclusions states: “We have considered a range of aspects of electric-
ity wholesale market design and operation. Generally we have found 
that the wholesale electricity market appears to be working well. In 
particular: (…) our view is that our analysis of profitability does not 
provide evidence that, overall, the Six Large Energy Firms earned 
excessive profits from their generation business over the period or 
that wholesale market prices were above competitive levels”310. 
Vertically integrated electricity companies
With respect to vertical integration, the CMA found that vertical 
integration of energy generators and suppliers is not problematic for 
competition. In particular it found311:
  no evidence that independent  generators were unable to compete 
effectively because of the prevalence of vertically integrated sup-
pliers;
  that a lack of unilateral market power made it implausible that 
vertically integrated generators would be able to discriminate by 
refusing to supply independent suppliers, or by supplying them 
on worse terms. In concluding this, CMA pointed to the recent 
increase in the number of suppliers discussed in Chapter 1; and
  that vertically integrated firms carried out extensive external tra-
ding, and that the liquidity in the product that vertically integrated 
firms used to hedge their exposure to wholesale market risk was 
decision-make-market-investigation-reference-respect-supply-and-acquisition-en-
ergy-great-britain (accessed: 13.11.2016).
310 CMA, Energy market investigation - final report, 24th June 2016, point 6.2 
(b) pp. 262-263, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5773de34e-
5274a0da3000113/final-report-energy-market-investigation.pdf (accessed: 
13.11.2016). 
311 CMA, Energy market investigation- final report, op. cit. pp. 312-340.
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sufficient for independent firms to hedge in a similar way. There-
fore, vertical integration didn’t seem to raise barriers to entry and 
growth by new suppliers due to difficulties in securing sufficient 
wholesale supply.
Other features creating AECs
The CMA didn’t give electricity wholesale markets a totally clean 
bill of health and suggested that the absence of locational charging 
for transmission losses (where charges vary to reflect the distance 
power needs to travel to reach customers and vice versa) constitutes 
an AEC. This is because it sees a cross subsidy which distorts short 
term energy dispatch decisions.  
It is also interesting that the CMA was critical of the method the 
Government had used to allocate Contracts for Difference (long term 
contracts intended to provide stable revenues to low carbon genera-
tors) and argued that it was insufficiently competitive.312
c) The CMA’s diagnosis of competition in the British retail power 
market
However, the CMA did find a number of features of the retail market 
that did distort or prevent competition.313 Most of these were focused 
on the concern that a significant proportion of customers were not 
aware of opportunities to switch.  The CMA’s work in this area was 
also critical of previous regulatory interventions by Ofgem.  
The CMA concluded that:
  there was a weak customer response and lack of engagement with 
domestic retail energy markets;
  the “Big Six” companies enjoyed unilateral market power over 
their inactive customer base (i.e. those who do not switch), which 
they had been able to exploit through their pricing policies; and
  the regulatory framework governing domestic retail market com-
petition had contributed to the issues – particularly through 
restrictions on regional price discrimination and by limiting the 
number of available tariffs. 
Overall the CMA found that customers who were on a tariff with 
the cheapest of the “Big Six” energy firms were paying around £95 less 
than a customer on a tariff with the most expensive of the “Big Six” 
312 CMA, Energy market investigation- final report, op. cit. pp. 263-311.
313 Ibidem, p. 342.
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energy firms.314 The CMA also found that possible savings are often 
ignored by customers. These customers tend to have certain charac-
teristics, such as low incomes, lack of internet access, relatively old 
meters, and find it hard to engage with the market,  tending to stick 
with the same supplier. 
However, CMA found no evidence of tacit co-ordination between 
retail suppliers in relation to price announcements.
d) Proposed retail remedies
The CMA came up with a series of remedies to try and deal with 
these issues315:
  disengagement by domestic and microbusiness customers – a num-
ber of remedies are proposed to tackle the CMA’s central finding 
– lack of customer engagement – including the roll-out of smart 
meters; a penalty for firms that fail to switch customers within 
the mandated period; the introduction of specific measures to 
facilitate switching for customers living in rented accommodation; 
Ofgem to provide an independent price comparison service. A key 
proposal is the introduction of a “default” regulated tariff for those 
disengaged customers who do not switch
  the “simpler choice” component of the so-called Retail Market 
Review (RMR316) rules –remove from domestic energy suppliers’ 
licenses the “simpler choices” component of the RMR rules, which 
would seek to enhance competition amongst domestic retail energy 
suppliers by allowing them to offer customers as many tariffs and/
or tariff structures as they wished. This would give domestic retail 
energy suppliers an incentive to tailor tariffs to the needs and/
or preferences of different customers, allowing them to compete 
vigorously for these customers.
  regulatory framework - the CMA proposes giving Ofgem more 
enforcement powers by measures including: revising its statutory 
objectives and duties to increase its ability to promote effective 
314 Ibidem, p. 1026.
315 Ibidem, pp. 634-675.
316 The Retail Market Review (RMR) was launched by Ofgem in late 2010 due to con-
cerns that the energy market was not working effectively for consumers. One of the 
components of the RMR was based around “simpler choices”, which included in par-
ticular: four core tariffs for gas and electricity from each supplier, a single standing 
charge, advanced notice of when the customer’s deal ends etc. 
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competition; introducing a formal mechanism to address disa-
greements with the Government over policy decisions; improving 
the accounting framework so that Ofgem has a better, more con-
sistent set of data from suppliers to work with; and giving Ofgem 
more powers to develop and implement industry code changes.
e) Conclusions
The CMA investigation has been an important driver for reviewing 
the functioning of the GB energy market and enhancing its compet-
itiveness.
Government, Ofgem, and industry have expressed their strong 
commitment to give full effect to the remedies suggested by the CMA. 
This will be an important yet challenging task. In particular, imple-
menting the remedies related to the disengagement by domestic and 
microbusiness customers (e.g. the database of all the “sticky” custom-
ers) will require a significant effort from all the parties involved. Also, 
the future will show how the full success of the measures proposed 
by CMA will be measured.
As once again demonstrated by the CMA investigation, the UK has 
tended to follow a market based approach to energy policy. This will-
ingness to foster the development of competitive markets for both gas 
and power has been a key factor for the UK to strengthen its position 
on the European (if not global) energy market. This has been a rela-
tively successful approach with new investment, for example in LNG 
facilities, being developed in GB.  It is the combination of prices deter-
mined by supply and demand and a stable regulatory regime which 
the UK relies on to ensure competitiveness.  That said, political dis-
cussion is currently focussed on creating an industrial strategy which 
may see particular technologies supported.
Security of Supply
This section considers the circumstances which saw Britain, tra-
ditionally seen as a good example for energy only market design, 
implement a capacity market and other policies driven by security of 
supply concerns. It also considers the potential impact of future tech-
nologies and of Brexit on electricity security of supply. 
Since the introduction of competition in the England and Wales 
market in 1990 Britain has had an energy only market. That is, it was 
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expected that prices would rise when generation capacity was scarce 
until a point when new investment would be encouraged.  This mar-
ket design, some have argued, was particularly well suited to a market 
with, at least initially, excess capacity and which was broadly per-
ceived as stable. Hence, when the GB Pool was changed to the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements in 2001 (a bilaterally traded mar-
ket replacing a pool design) no explicit means of rewarding capacity 
outside the market was introduced.  
a) The advent of the capacity market
In the early 2010s there started to be concerns about security of 
supply and a worry about a “missing money” problem.  That is, that 
prices would never rise high enough (or perhaps be allowed to rise 
high enough) to allow new investment to be financed.  Some have also 
argued that this problem was compounded by a more interventionist 
approach from policy makers and a greater political prominence for 
energy within the mainstream media.  
As such, the Government launched its “Electricity Market Reform 
(EMR)”317 program.  The key components of EMR were the introduction 
of a capacity mechanism, with the aim of bringing forward sufficient 
new generation capacity, and a change in renewable subsidies from 
a certificate based scheme (Renewable Obligation Certificates) to 
a system of Contracts for Difference, with the aim of providing more 
stable returns to investors in low carbon technologies.
Explanation
The EMR capacity market (CM) works by offering the opportunity 
to all capacity providers (new and existing power stations, electricity 
storage, capacity provided by demand side response and the intercon-
nectors318) of a steady, predictable revenue stream termed capacity 
payments. The cost of the CM will be met by consumers via the sup-
plier levy on electricity suppliers. Those costs should be minimized 
due to the competitive nature of the auction process which aims at 
ensuring the lowest cost provision of capacity to meet the level of secu-
317 See: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140405112802/https:/www.
gov.uk/government/policies/maintaining-uk-energy-security--2/supporting-pages/
electricity-market-reform (accessed: 13.11.2016).
318 Although the interconnectors were allowed to participate in the capacity market 
auction as from 2015.
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rity of supply determined by the Secretary of State. In return for this 
revenue, providers must deliver energy when needed or face penal-
ties. The auction is organized on a yearly basis.
Results of the first auction
The first CM auction took place in December 2014 (the 2014 T-4 
auction), for delivery in 2018/19. 49.3 GW of capacity was procured in 
the 2014 T-4 auction at a clearing price of £19.40/kW/year.
These results were interesting in many ways.319 First, the price was 
far lower than predicted.  Second, and linked, a much larger volume 
of small, diesel generation participated – raising significant concerns 
within the government about carbon emissions. Third, no new gen-
eration plant received a contract.  
Results of the second auction and the third capacity market
The second CM auction took place a year later (i.e. in December 
2015), for delivery in 2019/20. This was also the first auction where 
the interconnectors – both existing and prospective – were allowed 
to participate.
A total of 46.4 GW of capacity was awarded in the T-4 Auction at 
a clearing price of £18.00/kW/year. This resulted in 1.689 GW of extra 
capacity being awarded over the target level. The majority of cleared 
capacity was existing generating capacity (42.0 GW). New build gener-
ating capacity accounted for around 1.94 GW of total acquired capacity, 
whilst the interconnector capacity accounted for another 1.86 GW.320
The auction cleared at slightly lower than in 2014. While low prices 
are good for consumers, some experts are raising concerns that plants 
failing to clear in the 2019/20 auction may choose to close, putting 
pressure on security of supply between now and 2018/19. Some also 
highlight that due to closures and possible delays in the commission-
ing of a new plant, a larger than expected amount of capacity will now 
need to be procured in the T-1 auction for 2018/19 raising concerns 
about a lack of supply in that auction.321 
319 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/06/annual_report_
on_the_operation_of_the_cm_final_0.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2016).
320 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016/06/annual_report_
on_the_operation_of_the_capacity_market_6_june_2016_final.pdf (accessed: 
13.11.2016). 
321 See: https://www.frontier-economics.com/de/documents/2015/12/lcp-brief-
ing-review-of-the-second-capacity-auction_dec-2015.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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Once again we can see a large amount of newconstruction small-
scale diesel and gas generation clear in the auction. However, no new 
gas power stations have been contracted. The third capacity market 
auction will take place on 6th December 2016.322
The most front-page security of supply related news of 2016 was the 
new Prime Minister, Theresa May’s, decision to re-examine the decision 
of the former coalition323 to grant financial support to a nuclear project 
at Hinkley Point C.  The project, a joint venture by EDF of France and 
General Nuclear Power Corporation of China, will see a new nuclear 
plant commissioned in 2025. The plant will receive financial support 
of £92.50/MW guaranteed for 35 years.
Whether the project was examined for reasons of the countries 
of ownership, its value for the money, or due to concerns about the 
need for nuclear generation in 2025, is unclear. However, following 
deliberations the project was granted approval on the original terms. 
As shown in figure 5 above, Britain has historically been a net 
importer of electricity from continental Europe, and interconnectors 
can make a substantial contribution to security of supply. However 
there has been a reluctance to treat them on an equivalent footing to 
domestic generation in the capacity mechanism, where they’re only 
eligible for one year contracts, and there has been a tendency to apply 
relatively conservative de-rating factors. With a number of projects 
currently in the pipeline, one can predict they are likely to play a much 
greater role in future.  
In Britain security of supply has tended to be seen as an issue of 
capacity – are there enough MWs to meet demand at winter peak? 
However, as the energy transition gathers pace many are question-
ing whether it is flexibility that is important. Britain is already seeing 
prolonged periods of low prices, principally when the wind blows and 
the sun is shining, and has seen negative prices on wholesale markets. 
It has also seen very high prices (up to £800/MWh in the balancing 
market in recent months324) on summer days where wind and solar 
322 See: https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/Lists/Latest%20News/Attachments/69/
Capacity%20Market%20Auction%20Guidelines%204th%20Nov%202016.pdf 
(accessed: 13.11.2016).
323 Coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats with Ed Davey (a lib-
eral democrat) as energy minister. 
324 See: https://www.elexon.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/22_Panel246_02_
BSC_Ops_Headline_Report.pdf- pp. 2 (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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haven’t been available. In these circumstances it is generation tech-
nologies or customers who can alter their consumption very quickly 
which are of the greatest value to the system.  
The capacity mechanism, as designed, does not take a plant’s 
capabilities into account and, as such, could struggle to incentivize 
the construction of this sort of plant, particularly if environmentally 
motivated measures are introduced to reduce the advantages of die-
sel generators.  This seems to suggest that ancillary service markets325 
are going to need to be a greater source of value for these generators. 
Indeed, recently the National Grid signed contracts for Black Start 
totaling £113m326 which may be the start of this trend. 
The decision of the British people to leave the European Union may 
well raise questions for security of supply. Britain requires considerable 
investment in new generation, in network infrastructure, and in new 
technology in the coming decades.  The regulatory and policy regimes 
in Britain are heavily influenced by European Regulation (which Britain 
has heavily influenced). At present it is unclear on what basis, if any, Brit-
ain will interact with the European Energy Market; whether barriers to 
trade could be introduced; and whether companies, many of which oper-
ate across Europe, will be able to access the skills and workforces they 
need.  As such, there is the danger of an investment hiatus – which may 
lead to higher prices due to the increased return investors will demand.
While not the key issue of this report, it is also interesting to con-
sider how Brexit could impact on the single market in Ireland. The Irish 
market has recently been redesigned to comply with European rules 
and to be ready to “market couple” with the rest of Europe.  In the event 
that the United Kingdom does not apply the same rules as the rest of 
Europe, it is difficult to see how the single market in Ireland could con-
tinue.  In this case, the Republic of Ireland would lose access to the wider 
European market and costs in Northern Ireland might be expected to 
increase and the security of supply could potentially deteriorate. 
Security of supply is by far the most important of the three trilemma 
outcomes for Britain and Britain’s policy makers.  Concerns about it 
have driven the vast majority of recent energy sector policy changes 
and have seen a capacity mechanism introduced and the Government 
325 Markets for system services.
326 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016/08/decision_letter_iae_
notice_17_08_2016final.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2016).
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taking a much more active role in energy mix decisions.  While it is 
possible that the capacity mechanism, energy market, and ancillary 
service markets may interact to bring forward a fuel mix (including 
the demand side) with sufficient capacity and flexibility, there appears 
to be a risk, aggravated by Brexit, of future market interventions. It 
will be interesting to see what the Government’s Industrial Strategy 
will involve in energy.
Final remarks 
This report has provided a very brief snapshot of the very signifi-
cant energy transition taking place in the British market. We examined 
the important changes in market structure and shares in the last few 
years. We also reflected on the recent changes in energy efficiency pol-
icy, highlighting that it remains to be seen whether it would become 
a national infrastructure policy. In the context of competitiveness, 
we talked in detail about the CMA’s energy market investigation and 
the relatively clean bill of health that has been given to the wholesale 
market and vertical integration, as well as the suite of changes pro-
posed to promote further switching and greater trust in retail markets. 
Finally, to address the recent security of supply concerns we provided 
an in-depth description of the capacity market and discussed how new 
concerns about having sufficient flexible capacity to operate the sys-
tem are emerging. In this context, our analysis also briefly speculated 
on what the impact of Brexit on the  British energy sector might be.
As an island system with relatively low current levels of intercon-
nection and high volumes of intermittent and distributed generation, 
Britain may experience issues before countries in the continental 
European synchronous area. If so, then it is possible that there are 
lessons to learn, both in terms of how and how not to do it. What is 
clear is that the last decade has seen an unprecedented amount of 
change in the GB energy sector and that the change does not show 
signs of slowing.327 
327 As a closing thought, I will mention what has not been included in the report. 
On the technology side - the impact of batteries and storage; a new smaller nuclear 
plant, or the role of aggregation. On the market design and regulation side - market 
splitting; North Sea Grids; or the creation of a more independent system operator. 
Chapter 12
Energy transition in Poland
Lidia GAWLIK328
The aim of the energy and climate policy being promoted and grad-
ually implemented in the European Union is to thoroughly change the 
economies of EU countries so as to dramatically reduce emissions in 
accordance with the principles of sustainable development. In some 
EU countries (e.g., Denmark, Germany or France) energy transition 
is being carried out through the elimination of fossil fuels in favor 
of renewable energy sources. In practice, for a number of countries, 
it simply means the replacement of conventional energy with RES, 
promotion of energy saving, and improvement of energy efficiency.
Transforming the economy so as to reduce emissions is one of 
the most serious economic and environmental challenges faced by 
Poland as a member state. Within the past 25 years, despite difficulties 
and substantial social costs, Poland has shortened its developmental 
distance from Western Europe, going from an ineffective centrally 
planned economy to the market model, European integration, and 
competition on the globalized market of goods, services, and capital. 
Modernization of industry has played an important role in the pro-
cess. The modernization involved: liquidation of ineffective heavy 
industry plants, investment in mechanization of other enterprises, 
development of new areas of industrial processing, and producing 
for both the developing internal market and for export.329 However, 
328 Lidia Gawlik, DSc, Eng., Associate Professor in Mineral and Energy Economy 
Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Mineral and Energy Economy 
Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, 31-261 Kraków, ul. Wybickiego 7, 
e-mail: lidia.gawlik@min-pan.krakow.pl  
329 M. Bukowski, A. Kassenberg, A. Śniegocki, Perspektywy niskoemisyjnej trans-
formacji w Polsce [Prospects of low-emission transition in Poland], Redakcja 
Pol-int, https://www.pol-int.org/pl/salon/perspektywy-niskoemisyjnej-transfor-
macji-w-polsce-pl (accessed: 27.07.2016).
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there is still a lot to do, especially in the broadly understood power 
system, characterized by high dependence on fossil fuels. Emissions 
and high concentrations of harmful pollutants are becoming a devel-
opmental problem. The emissions come from different sources, but 
the dominant role is played by emissions connected with fossil fuels 
consumption in the economy. 78% of all emission in Poland is emis-
sion from fossil fuels combustion.330 Broadly understood the system of 
energy use is one significant area in which Poland still needs serious 
modernization. The most important sectors that need to be modern-
ized are the energy sector, transport, and the use of fuels in buildings. 
Due to extensive use of coal, the energy sector is associated with 
high emissions. Besides, despite partial modernization performed 
so far, most functioning production capacities are obsolete and have 
low efficiency. 
For several decades, the model of development of road transport 
was based (in many cases, for financial reasons) on the import of old 
cars from Western European countries, in poor technical condition 
and causing high emissions. As in Poland the consumption of fuels per 
capita is lower than the EU average, we need to face further growth 
of fuel consumption in transport, which will mean higher emissions, 
even if the number of new means of transport grows.
Against the background of the European Union, Poland has quite 
a high share of coal in the final use of energy in residential buildings 
(30%) and non-residential buildings (10%).331 Heating and hot water in 
households is coal-based to a much greater extent than other EU coun-
tries, as it is more price-competitive than gas or electricity. Often, low 
quality coal is combusted in old, low efficiency furnaces, and rooms 
have low thermal insulation. New houses have better thermal param-
eters, but the number of houses is growing all the time, and although 
the rate of energy use for heating purposes per surface area unit is 
improving, it is still much lower than the EU average. All this makes 
the problem of low emission more and more serious.
Therefore, the country’s challenges do not only result from the 
directions of the EU climate policy. Actually, they need to be met to 
330 National Programme of Low-Emission Economy, draft, version of August 4, 2015, 
Ministry of Economy, Warsaw, 2015. 
331 Ibidem. 
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ensure the long-term welfare of the state and its citizens. The spec-
ificity of the country (the only one in the EU to have considerable 
deposits of hard coal and lignite and a well developed system for using 
them) combined with economic and geopolitical determinants means 
that Poland has to find its individual way of further development. 
Although the governmental document directing Poland’s energy pol-
icy until 2050 is not ready yet, we can see more and more clearly that 
the emphasis is put on issues connected with energy and geopolitical 
security. It means that Poland is going to keep its coal-based energy 
sector, at the same time looking for competitive advantages and new 
possibilities for the industry. The costs of transition, which will ulti-
mately need to be covered by the citizens, also play a role. 
The structure of electricity production in Poland is considerably 
determined by historical decisions concerning the sources of energy 
production, mostly based on the available resources. The Polish sector 
of commercial heat and power plants is mainly based on production 
capacities using hard coal or lignite as the fuel. 
Table 7. Electricity production in Poland in selected years by energy 
carriers, TWh
Energy carrier Year
2004 2006 2008 2010 2014 2015
Hard coal 90.5 93.4 85.7 87.8 76.2 77.7
Lignite 52.2 53.4 53.2 48.7 53.4 52.8
Natural gas 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.3 6.4
Other non-renewable 
carriers
3.5 6.0 5.3 5.6 4.4 5.3
Renewable energy 
sources
3.1 4.3 6.6 10.9 19.8 22.7
Source: Statystyka Elektroenergetyki Polskiej [Polish electricity statistics], Agencja 
Rynku Energii SA, Warsaw (2005-2016), Energia ze źródeł odnawialnych [Renew-
able energy], Central Statistical Office, Warsaw (2005-2016)
In 2004, when Poland accessed the European Community, even 
92.5% of electricity was produced from solid fuels (Table 7). This unique 
situation of the country and the level of economy, differing from other 
EU countries (e.g., high energy intensity and low energy efficiency), has 
contributed to introducing activities aimed at energy transition. Polish 
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energy policy formulated in successive governmental documents332,333 
has declared for the diversification of production structure, at the same 
time stressing an increase in the energy efficiency of the economy. 
The direction of changes necessary in the Polish economy corre-
sponds to the directions set by the energy and climate policy of the 
European Union, and potential nuisances connected with the early 
stages of ETS have been eliminated thanks to derogations. Poland 
adopted the conditions of the 3 x 20 package, which in the energy sys-
tem translates into the development of renewable energy. At the same 
time, the share of solid fuels has dropped (Chart 23).
In the years 2004-2015, the share of hard coal decreased from 
58.7% to 47.1%. The reduction of lignite use was slightly lower (from 
33.9 to 32%), and in some years, due to the competitive price of the 
fuel and available production capacities, generation of electricity from 
lignite even grew: in 2013, up to 56.2 TWh, which was 34.1% of the 
share of the fuel in electricity production in that year.
Chart 23. Fuel structure of electricity production in Poland  
in the years 2004-2015, [%]
Source: Statystyka Elektroenergetyki Polskiej [Polish electricity statistics], Agencja 
Rynku Energii SA, Warsaw (2005-2016), Energia ze źródeł odnawialnych [Renew-
able energy], Central Statistical Office, Warsaw (2005-2016)
332 Polityka Energetyczna Polski do 2025 r. [Polish Energy Policy until 2025] Doc-
ument adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4.08.2005.
333 Polityka Energetyczna Polski do 2030 r. [Polish Energy Policy until 2030] Doc-
ument adopted by the Council of Ministers on 10.11.2009.
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In the 2004-2015 period, electricity production from RES was reg-
ularly growing. The share of energy carriers in that production was 
changing. Chart 24 shows the amount of electricity generated using 
the dominant energy carriers, such as solid biofuels, wind, water and 
biogas.
Chart 24. Electricity produced from renewable energy carriers
Source: Energia ze źródeł odnawialnych [Renewable energy], Central Statistical 
Offi ce, Warsaw (2005-2016)
Generation of electricity in wind power plants was dynamically 
growing then. In 2004, approximately 140 GWh came from wind 
energy, while in 2015, it was 10.9 TWh, which means a 77-fold increase. 
Wind has become the dominant renewable energy carrier in the energy 
sector, and with a 47.9% share in energy production from renewable 
sources in 2015 it outstripped solid biofuels (39.5%). In 2004, produc-
tion of electricity from renewable sources was only 2% of the produced 
electricity (nearly 3.1 TWh), more than 2 TWh of which (almost (68%) 
came from hydropower plants. Production in hydropower plants 
remains at a stable level. But we can see dynamic growth of electricity 
production in power plants and heat and power plants using solid bio-
fuels, although recently the co-combustion has slowed down, and the 
use of biomass in energy industry has become dominant (in 2012, over 
three fourths of biomass used to produce electricity was combusted 
together with coal). In terms of installations using biogas, there has 
also been an increase in electricity production, with small but regular 
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increments. In 2015, twice as much such energy was produced as in 
2011. Apart from these four dominant renewable energy carriers, in 
recent years electricity has also been produced from photovoltaic cells.
At the end of 2015, the generating capacity of the national elec-
tricity system was 40.4 GW. The generating capacity of commercial 
heat and power plants was 79% of the whole system capacity, 19.3 GW 
of which was based on hard coal, and 9.3 GW, on lignite (Chart 25).
Chart 25. Percentage structure of generating capacity in the national 
electricity system in 2015
Source: Struktura mocy zainstalowanej w KSE [Structure of generating capacity 
in National Electricity System], [in:] Raport 2015 KSE [2015 report of the National 
Electricity System], Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne SA. http://www.pse.pl/index.
php?did=2870 (accessed: 27.07.2016). 
The current condition of Poland’s energy system needs to be seri-
ously modernized. This results, fi rst of all, from the considerable 
degree of decapitalization of the majority of the existing production 
capacities in the sector. Over thirty-year-old units account for more 
than 53% of all power plants and more than 66% of the total capacities.
Because of the advanced age structure and high wear level of pro-
duction infrastructure, medium- and long-term maintaining of the 
existing capacities will be very diffi cult. Expenditure on renovation 
and modernization of existing units and on investment in new capac-
ities will be necessary. The shutting off of units may additionally be 
because of environmental standards imposed on the sector by imple-
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menting the directive on industrial emissions (IED)334 in national law, 
and further limitations resulting from the detailed conclusions of BAT 
(Best Available Techniques).335
Currently, more than a dozen projects for constructing new pro-
duction capacity units are being carried out in Poland. The initiated 
investments in hard coal power plants in Kozienice, Opole, and Jawor-
zno will ultimately (by 2019) increase the generating capacity by 
3.785 GW. More distant developmental plans include the construc-
tion of a power plant in Ostrołęka based on hard coal. Launching 
a 450 MW lignite block is planned for 2020 in the Turów power plant. 
In several heat and power stations there are also new investments, 
with hard coal (sometimes including the possibility of burning bio-
mass or RDF) or gas as the basic fuel.
Governmental plans include the development of the energy industry 
towards hard coal use to ensure the continued functioning of Polish 
mines. It is also emphasized that new capacities will be highly efficient 
(even 46% performance). Revitalization and restoration of power on 
the basis of 200 MW blocks336 is a change in the previous approach 
to the issue of ensuring the required volume of production capacities 
in Poland. In the next decades, the existing 200 MW blocks may be 
used thanks to lengthening their exploitation periods by thorough 
modernization. This solution is cheaper than the construction of new 
blocks. The proposed scope of work includes:
  identifying blocks where modernization is most profitable (the 
other blocks should be assigned to strategic reserve),
  reconsidering support for co-combustion as the means of lowering 
blocks’ emissions,
  analyzing which solution will give the most measurable techno-
logical benefits, such as enhancing the system’s efficiency. The 
following solutions can be chosen for this purpose:
334 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Novem-
ber 2010 on industrial emissions (Official Journal L 334/17, 17.12.2010).
335 Best Available Techniques (BAT) Reference Document for Large Combustion 
Plants, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies and Sustainable Production 
and Consumption Unit European IPPC. Bureau. Final Draft 2016.
336 Program ramowy Energetyka 200+ rewitalizacja i odbudowa mocy na bazie 
bloków 200 MW [Framework Programme 200+ revitalization and power resto-
ration using 200 MW blocks], Ministry of Energy, 2016. 
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 ● building duoblocks – by combining two modernized boilers 
with one turbine set it is possible to make a 500 MW block 
with higher efficiency and lower technical minimum (about 
20 % of the rated power),
 ● hybrid systems, allowing the use of substandard fuels, e.g., 
coal slurry or industrial and municipal waste. In the coal 
mining industry the annual production of slurry is estimated 
at approximately 2 million tons. There is high potential to use 
these resources. The technology would be based on pre-com-
bustion of slurries or municipal waste, which would give extra 
environmental benefits as otherwise they should be disposed,
  transformation of some of the blocks into exclusively biomass 
blocks,
  the use of oxy-combustion technology with CO2 capture e.g., to 
support the extraction of oil and gas. This would allow reduction 
of emissions by as much as 80%. 
Another important area is cogeneration. Here, the emphasis is 
put on restoration of cogeneration capacities on hard coal, including 
a partial shift of capacity to commercial power plants from commer-
cial and local (municipal) heating plants. This solution will allow 
using coal very efficiently, which will translate into reducing emis-
sions. At the same time, providing district heat to a higher number 
of users will allow partial elimination of low-stack emissions in the 
area of households. This is important since 73% of the heat produced 
in 2015 by licensed heating enterprises came from hard coal, and in 
the case of cogeneration, the share of heat produced from hard coal 
was 81%. The use of coal to produce heat on the licensed market was 
13,491.29 thousand tons.337 
The act on RES amended in 2016338 changed the auction system 
towards greater support for the production of energy from biomass 
and co-combustion. As a result, together with the act on wind invest-
ments339, conditions were created to promote, mainly,  stable generation 
from renewable energy sources. The reduction of support for unstable 
337 Energetyka cieplna w liczbach – 2015 [Heat power sector in numbers – 2015], 
Energy Regulatory Office (ERO), Warsaw 2016.
338 Act of 22 June 2016 amending the act on renewable energy sources and certain 
other acts (Journal of Laws 925.2016).
339 Act of 20 May 2016 on wind power plants investments. (Journal of Laws 961.2016).
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production capacities in the energy sector will definitely slow fur-
ther development of wind energy, but despite that, and despite the 
reduction of support for some prosumers, it seems that the indicated 
targets concerning RES for 2020 will be achieved. Later, Poland will 
face more strict targets set by the European Union340, which means 
the need to further reduce CO2 emissions and increase the share of 
energy from renewable sources.
The Polish Nuclear Power Programme adopted in 2014341, assum-
ing the construction of 6 GW capacity of nuclear energy, has had 
a number of technical, social, and first of all financial barriers, and 
its future is unknown.
For these reasons, anticipating the future energy mix in Poland 
is not easy. We may only be sure that coal will remain the dominant 
fuel in the energy sector of Poland for more than ten years. It should 
be supported by already developed capacities based on renewable 
energy, and new capacities that will display economic efficiency and 
be financed in the changed conditions of support. Among them, gas 
sources have a chance to do so, especially if used for cogeneration.
It is also crucial for natural gas supplies to be more diversified, 
which has been partially achieved by opening the LNG terminal in 
Świnoujście. The purpose of building the Baltic Pipe, with the aim to 
supply natural gas from Norwegian deposits, also involves reducing 
the dependency on its supplies from the East, and thus, improving 
the security of gas supply.
Poland’s priority goals are: to improve energy security, reduce 
the dependence on imported energy raw materials, increase energy 
self-sufficiency, and achieve sustainable development based on inno-
vative technologies.
Basing development of the energy industry on coal with the support 
of stable renewable energy and diversification of the direction of gas 
import enhances the country’s energy security. Sustainable develop-
ment of the energy system, apart from the security of fuels and energy 
340 A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. Green paper. European Com-
mission (EC). COM(2013) 169 final. http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/stakeholders/
Documents/comm169-2013final.pdf (accessed: 27.07.2016).
341 Resolution No. 15/2014 of the Council of Ministers of 28 January 2014 on the mul-
ti-year project “Polish Nuclear Power Program” (Official Gazette of 2014, item 502).
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supply, should ensure electricity at prices acceptable for the commu-
nity and the industry. The adopted direction of the energy transition 
means that electricity production will be relatively cheap. This is an 
important aspect of competition on the European market, but first of 
all, it may ensure cheaper economic development and introduce the 
element of competitiveness in international trade. 
Having considerable resources of hard coal and lignite, it is impor-
tant to develop new economic areas based on this potential. The 
desirable direction is development of energy technologies that are 
highly efficient in energy processing and environment-friendly. Another 
vital aspect is to ensure the stability of operation of the energy system, 
thus, such properties as high operational flexibility or fuel flexibili-
ty.342 Technologies based on supercritical parameters and Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plants potentially meet 
these criteria to a higher or lesser degree and can be applied on an 
industrial scale. 
Innovative solutions in the area of clean coal technologies are 
the key to sustainable development. The economic priorities in R&D 
and innovations include national smart specializations concerning 
sustainable energy, the development of which is supported and sub-
sidized (from national and Union funds), in order for new solutions 
to accelerate the transformation of the national economy through its 
modernization and structural transformation. The emphasis is on:
  highly-efficient, low-emission, and integrated systems of produc-
tion, storage, transmission, and distribution of energy, 
  smart and energy-saving construction,
  environmentally friendly transport solutions.
These three areas of activity are determining the direction of Polish 
energy transition. In order to make the country’s economic develop-
ment follow sustainable development, the stress is on transforming 
the economy towards low emissions. The basic assumption is energy 
saving and improved energy efficiency, which can be achieved thanks 
to innovations and adapting them to the existing system, leading to 
342 D. Kryzia, L. Gawlik, M. Pepłowska, Uwarunkowania rozwoju czystych tech-
nologii wytwarzania energii z paliw kopalnych [Determinants of the development 
of clean technologies of energy production from fossil fuels], “Polityka Energetyczna 
- Energy Policy Journal”, 19, 4/2016, pp. 63-74.
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economic growth with a relatively low increase in demand for energy 
and to minimal costs of energy production. The aim of such transi-
tion is to develop the competitiveness of industry, to strengthen gross 
domestic product, to create new jobs, and to improve energy security. 
This way of thinking is reflected in launching the national electro-
mobility programme, which is expected to popularize electric, hybrid, 
and hydrogen cars. Research and development connected with this 
and the final implementation of the results may contribute to reduc-
ing emissions from transport and increasing demand for electricity, 
which may be based on coal coming from Polish mines. As a result, 
many new jobs will be created, and the country may achieve compet-
itive advantage on the international market. 
The essence of sustainable development is to ensure economic, 
social, and environmental benefits from activities that reduce emis-
sions. Energy transition should make electricity available for citizens 
and develop enterprises now and in the future, i.e., to make it suffi-
cient and not too expensive. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether such changes will be sufficient 
in the long run due to the expected growth in electricity consumption, 
despite activities taken to improve energy efficiency and support for 
them in the form of new regulations.343 System changes concerning 
energy efficiency management and improvement should contribute 
to concretization and intensification of pro-efficiency activities in 
Poland, but long-term economic growth will be impossible without 
higher energy consumption.
The need for development of prosumer energy, energy storage tech-
nologies, and production of fuels from energy surpluses (e.g. P2G) is 
emphasized; further investment will also be necessary in the energy 
industry, preferably in low-emission technologies. So perhaps nuclear 
energy will finally find its place in the Polish energy mix, though later 
than anticipated. The construction of a nuclear power plant in Poland 
is associated with huge financial expenditure, and big nuclear power 
plants are inflexible and cannot be regulated. On the other hand, they 
do not cause emissions, and technological development in this area is 
evident. Currently, pilot works are being carried out under the name 
SMR (Small Modular Reactors), which involve low power units from 
343 Act of 20 May 2016 on energy efficiency (Journal of Laws 851.2016).
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35 to 350 MW, with a simplified and reproducible structure, which 
might be used in the future.
Assuming that the use of Polish coal in the Polish energy sector 
remains one of the priorities, we need to realize that even after suc-
cessful restructuring of the coal mining sector, the possibilities for 
using coal will be limited by the competitiveness of other energy carri-
ers, which must be taken into consideration when planning long-term 
development of the electricity sector. 
The situation is made even more complicated by the EU proposal 
for further changes on the energy market, presented by the European 
Commission in the so-called Winter package of 30.11.2016.344 The pro-
posal includes changes in the functioning of the capacity market and 
modifications in directives concerning renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. Apart from the targets for 2030, i.e., a 40% reduction of 
CO2 and 27% share of RES in the energy mix, it proposes the intro-
duction of an emissions limit below 550 g/kWh for power plants which 
will be allowed to be a part of the capacity market, which in practice 
excludes the coal energy industry.
In its future transformation activities, Poland must stick to coal, at 
least for the time being, at the same time improving the performance 
of energy blocks, investing in the technological process of coal com-
bustion, and in this way reducing emissions. There is also a need to 
develop new sources of low-emission energy, green industry, and dis-
persed energy. Poland must move towards a low-emission economy, 
because the development of advanced technologies reducing emis-
sions and raising energy efficiency  potentially means new jobs, and 
innovative solutions may be an export product.
Poland needs to build its long-term energy policy and strategy of 
energy transition going beyond the energy sector, taking into consider-
ation the internal and external determinants and priorities, and then 
negotiate its own path of development within the Union, consistent 
with the direction of proposed changes but also with its capabilities.
344 Czysta energia dla wszystkich Europejczyków, czyli jak wyzwolić potencjał 
wzrostu Europy [Clean Energy for All Europeans – unlocking Europe’s growth 
potential], European Commission – press release, Brussels, November 30, 2016. 
Chapter 13
Energy transition in Austria
Anna KUCHARSKA345
Energy balance structure
The character of Austria’s energy sector is significantly influenced 
by its location. It lies inside the continent, has no deposits of energy 
resources, and is relatively small. For these reasons, it obviously needs 
to import conventional fuels, which account for approx. 64% of the 
Austrian energy mix.346 Imported energy carriers are predominantly 
natural gas (29.5%), coal (10.8%) and oil (48.1%).347 In Austria, import 
of energy from fossil sources costs approx. 12 billion euros a year, 
which equals about 42% of GDP of the country.348 
Despite the high import level, Austria has a quite well balanced 
energy mix, in which about 37% of the primary energy demand (as 
of 2014) is covered by domestic production.349 Renewable energy 
sources have a share of 77.2% in  national primary energy produc-
tion, including 38.2% of water energy and 29.7% of wood fuel.350 
345 Anna Kucharska, MSc, PhD Candidate, Faculty of International and Political 
Studies, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: anna.maria.kucharska@doctoral.uj.edu.pl
346 C. Morris, M. Pehnt, Niemiecka transformacja energetyczna. Przyszłość oparta 
na odnawialnych źródłach energii [German energy transition. Future based on 
renewable energy sources], Heinrich Böll Foundation, 28.11.2012, pp. 80-81.
347 Data as of 2014: Energiestatus 2016. Abteilung III/2 – Energiebilanz und Ener-
gieeffizienz, Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Wirtschaft, 
Vienna, May 2016, p. 9.
348 C. Morris, M. Pehnt., Niemiecka transformacja… [German energy transition...] 
op. cit., pp. 80-81.
349 Fossil Fuel Support Country Note, OECD, September 2016, http://www.oecd.
org/site/tadffss/data/ (12.11.2016).
350 Data as of 2014: Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen. Die Entwicklung Erneuerbarer 
Energie in Österreich Datenbasis 2014, BMLFUW, Vienna, December 2015, pp. 15-17.
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Large-scale use of hydropower stations was mostly possible thanks 
to the mountainous landform features. Hydroelectric power plants 
have been operated and developed in Austria since the 1950s. Until 
the 1990s, Austrian electricity supply had been almost exclusively 
based on the combination of hydropower plants and heat supply 
industry. 
Chart 26. Structure of energy import in Austria for 2016 [%]
Source: Energie in Österreich. Zahlen, Daten, Fakten, BMWFW, Vienna 2017, p. 6.
Gross national energy consumption is 1,381 PJ (about 383 TWh), 
including only 513 PJ (ok. 142.5 TWh) from domestic production.351 
Transport had the highest share in Austria’s fi nal energy consumption 
in 2015: 33.9%, followed by industry: 29.3%, and households: 23.4%; 
services: 11.2%, and agriculture: 2.1% consumed less.352 Currently, 
351 Data as of 2014: Energiestatistik. Energiebilanzen Österreich 1970 bis 2014, 
Statistik Austria, 29.02.2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/energie_
umwelt_innovation_mobilitaet/energie_und_umwelt/energie/energiebilanzen/
index.html (accessed: 12.11.2016).
352 Energieverbrauch in Österreich 2015 zugelegt, DiePresse.com 04.05.2016,
http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/energie/4981825/Energieverbrauch-in-Os-
terreich-2015-zugelegt (accessed: 12.11.2016).
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the existing studies and scenarios for Austria allow us to expect that 
national consumption of electricity by 2030, even with moderate eco-
nomic growth, may rise by approx. 50 PJ (14 TWh).353
Chart 27. Total fi nal energy consumption in Austria for 2016
Source: Energie in Österreich. Zahlen, Daten, Fakten, BMWFW, Vienna 2017, p. 6.
Since 2000, there has been intensive integration of electricity pro-
duction from wind, photovoltaics, biomass, gas from waste and sewage 
treatment plants, and geothermal energy. In Austria the use of wind 
energy and photovoltaics is relatively low. The share of wind energy 
is 3.7% (3,827 GWh), and photovoltaics, 0.7% (785 GWh) in the total 
fi nal energy consumption.354 This results directly from unfavorable 
weather conditions in the country and the small and mountainous 
territory, leaving little area to be used to construct such installations. 
Still, the use of wind energy and photovoltaics has risen considerably 
within the last ten years, under the infl uence of the policy of support 
introduced along with the Act on electricity production from renew-
able energy sources (Ökostromgesetz). In general, it was an increase 
353 Land am Strom. Jahresbericht Oesterreichs Energie 2016, Oesterreichs Energie, 
July 2016, http://oesterreichsenergie.at/medien/publikationen-452/land-am-strom.
html?fi le=fi les/oesterreichsenergie.at/Downloads%20Publikationen/Land%20
am%20Storm/Jahresbericht%20OE%202016.pdf (accessed: 12.11.2016), p. 15.
354 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., pp. 15-18.
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by 242%, i.e., almost 15% a year. In the case of wind, the growth was 
approximately 189%, and photovoltaics, 3,600%. In comparison to the 
year 2013, in 2014 the growth was 22% and 34,9% for wind and pho-
tovoltaics, respectively.355 In 2015, the production of those renewable 
sources was almost 12 TWh.356 
Chart 28. Domestic energy production in Austria for 2016 [PJ]
Source: Energie in Österreich. Zahlen, Daten, Fakten, BMWFW, Vienna 2017, p. 6.
The Austrian Energy Strategy adopted in 2009 (EnergieStrategie 
Österreich) describes the dominant challenges to the state’s energy 
sector and economic sectors related to it, as well as the main assump-
tions of the national energy policy. The Strategy stresses the extension 
of renewable energy sources, especially water energy, wind power 
plants, biomass, and photovoltaics. The increase of renewable energy 
carriers in gross fi nal energy consumption is expected to reach 34% 
by the year 2020.357 In accordance with the plan from the Strategy, 
355 Energiestatus 2016. Abteilung III/2 – Energiebilanz und Energieeffi zienz, 
BMWFW, Vienna, May 2016, p. 48.
356 Land am Strom… op. cit.,  p. 15.
357 EnergieStrategie Österreich, BMWFW, BMLFUW, Vienna 2010, pp. 7-8.
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the use of RES is anticipated to reach 395.6 PJ, and the total gross 
final energy consumption is to be 1,114.9 PJ. The Austrian Strategy 
also assumes that by 2020, the use of oil and oil derivatives will drop 
to 362.3 PJ, and natural gas, to 191.2 PJ. Hence,  growth in the share 
of biofuels up to 34 PJ is anticipated.358
Strategy of energy efficiency growth 
The three pillars of energy policy being implemented by the Austrian 
Energy Strategy are, apart from the development of RES, consist-
ent growth of energy efficiency in all the main sectors. In December 
2013, a governmental programme was established for another 5 years, 
describing the goals, challenges, and a wide range of means to carry 
out Austria’s energy policy. Ensuring long-term supplies of energy and 
the related costs, as well as the environmental impact, largely affect 
the economic efficiency and performance of the country. Thus, it is 
necessary to keep energy consumption at the lowest possible level, 
to conservatively use the country’s resources of natural resources, to 
develop RES, diversify the necessary import, and in this way ensure 
and protect the energy transport infrastructure and sufficient stor-
age capacity.359 
By raising its energy efficiency, Austria is striving to overcome the 
tendency of ever-growing energy demand. Stabilizing final energy 
consumption by 2020 at the level of consumption in 2005 (1,118 PJ) is 
the target of this priority set in the Austrian Energy Strategy. Reduc-
ing final energy consumption is to occur through certain measures 
to enhance energy efficiency which refer to many areas. Effective 
implementation of these measures is to be a guarantee that the goals 
set in the Strategy will really be achieved by 2020. Activities in this 
regard involve the consideration of energy and climate objectives in 
the spatial development policy, reform of the ecological tax, a wide 
review of instruments of support, and subsidies for the development 
of research, technology, and innovation.360 The effects of previous 
activities in Austria are already visible: in the area of heat engineer-
358 Ibidem,  p. 11.
359 Ibidem, pp. 7-8.
360 Ibidem, p. 9.
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ing, emissions have been reduced by 34% in comparison to the level 
of 1990.361 The newest data shows that in 2014, Austria reduced its 
final energy consumption by 4.3% in relation to the year 2013.362 The 
increasing growth of energy efficiency in the country is also visible 
in the example of natural gas. In 2015, the demand for this resource 
grew by 6% up t almost 7.9 bcm (89 TWh). At the same time,  national 
production dropped by 5%, reaching 1.2 bcm, and net import of gas 
was reduced by 1.6 bcm (-22%).363 
Chart 29. Energy intensity of the economy in Austria 2005-2015 
– Gross inland consumption of energy divided by GDP (kg of oil 
equivalent per 1 000 EUR)
Source: Eurostat, Energy intensity of the economy, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/
table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec360 (accessed: 25.08.2017).
In the Austrian Energy Strategy it is anticipated that in 2020, the 
area of heat engineering and transport will play the biggest role in 
final energy consumption in Austria, so significant attention is being 
concentrated on these sectors. The share of the construction sector 
361 C. Morris, M. Pehnt, Niemiecka transformacja energetyczna... [German energy 
transition ...] op. cit., pp. 80-81.
362 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., p. 10.
363 OMV Geschäftsbericht 2015, OMV AG, Vienna, https://www.omv.com/SecurityServ-
let/secure?cid=1255769898259&lang=de&swa_id=1117068374618.7583&swa_site= 
(accessed: 12.11.2016), p. 6.
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currently accounts for approx. 1/3 of Austrian final energy demand.364 
Plans for enhancing energy efficiency in this area assume the improve-
ment of building standards to the level of minimum energy demand. 
The package of activities to be implemented in raising energy efficiency 
in construction includes e.g., a 3% rate of building renovation by 2020, 
aimed at gradual optimization of heating in buildings, conforming to 
regional concepts of spatial development. This means the choice of 
the source of energy should be appropriate to the potential existing 
in the region and in conformity with it; should assume central heat-
ing with the use of waste, cogeneration, or biomass; and individual 
heating with the use of solar energy, biomass, or heat obtained from 
the environment (e.g., heat pumps).365 It must be noted that Austria 
is already the European pioneer in terms of the proportion of passive 
houses. The main stimulus for development in this field is state sub-
sidies, being an incentive to renovate buildings.366 
Equally important is electricity and heat consumption in house-
holds, smaller production facilities, and enterprises, especially 
energy-intensive ones. Here, special attention is given to energy coun-
selling and educating the community in energy awareness, i.e., more 
effective consumption of primary energy and heat.367
Transport is also significant in the energy sector. In this field, Aus-
tria is planning to develop alternative drives, especially electric, but 
also hydrogen. Furthermore, public transport and car sharing, as well 
as mobility management services, are being extended and promoted. 
The package of activities for mobility also includes lowering emissions 
by greater use of RES, understood primarily as a higher share of bio-
fuels (10% in accordance with the EU Directive).368 The total share of 
energy consumption in road transport is expected to drop from 87.7% 
(in 2010) to 74.3% in 2050.369 
364 C. Morris, M. Pehnt., Niemiecka transformacja… [German energy transition...] 
op. cit., pp. 80-81.
365 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., pp. 7-10.
366 C. Morris, M. Pehnt., Niemiecka transformacja… [German energy transition...] 
op. cit., pp. 80-81.
367 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., p. 7.
368 Ibidem, p. 7.
369 S. Schleicher, A. Köppl, Energieperspektiven für Österreich. Zielorientierte Struk-
turen und Strategien für 2020 und 2030, published by WIFO, October 2013, p. 37.
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Apart from activities in the above-mentioned areas, it is also nec-
essary to develop transmission and distribution networks and energy 
storage facilities. The existing network infrastructure must be adapted 
in the future to strong, decentralized energy production and higher 
levels of energy flow combined with the lowest loss of energy during 
transmission.370
Development of competition  
on international markets
Austria, as a small and rather poorly populated country, mostly 
bases its economic model on quality categories and thus predomi-
nantly counts on improving research, technological development, and 
innovations. In this way, it wants to create highly specialized jobs and 
support long-term economic growth and its labor market. Austria’s 
objective is to leave the group of countries importing innovative tech-
nological solutions and to join the leaders of innovation and exporters 
of new knowledge.371 The energy sector is especially attractive for 
Austria in this regard, as it is driven by stimuli from environmental 
and climate policy. Therefore, Austria wants to create new technolo-
gies marked Made in Austria, recognizable abroad. Austria intends 
to become the most innovative region in Europe in terms of energy. 
This is to be achieved through support for enterprises and research 
institutions so as to strengthen their competitive position.372 The 
scope of priorities in this area is presented in the Austrian Strategy 
for Research, Technology and Innovation (Strategie der Bundesre-
gierung für Forschung, Technologie und Innovation – hereinafter: 
FTI Strategy) of 2011.
RES technologies have a long tradition in some regions of Aus-
tria, originating from the high level of national economy and a well 
developed community with high expectations referring to the quality 
of life, but also awareness concerning protection of the natural envi-
ronment. Many patents and research competences guarantee Austria 
370 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., p. 8.
371 Der Weg zum Innovation Leader. Strategie der Bundesregierung für Forschung, 
Technologie und Innovation, Vienna, March 2011, p. 4.
372 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., p. 14.
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a good economic position in Europe, which in turn gives domestic com-
panies great opportunities to join export markets, and later ensure 
substantial profits for the national economy.373 Within the latest 20 
years, the number of RES patent applications has grown six-fold in 
Austria, and 42% of patents before 2010 were connected with thermal 
energy374. For the last 4 years in a row, Austrian economy has seen 
steady growth, 0.8% annually (2015).375 
In Austria, energy-saving construction, geothermal energy, smart 
electric grids, and electromobility development are all areas of special 
potential. Austria has ambitions to become a technological pioneer in 
the global trend of departure from fossil fuels in energy production 
and CCS – Carbon Dioxide Capture & Storage.376 Elements such as 
new products on the market and innovation, an increase in export of 
advanced technologies, high tech products, and knowledge-based ser-
vices are expected to make Austrian enterprises recognizable world 
leaders in high tech industry. Public procurement and political infra-
structure oriented toward innovation is to contribute to the increase of 
demand for high technology products and knowledge-based services.377 
Austria has the potential to develop the use of biomass energy, 
especially connected with wood and wooden products. Nowadays, 
two out of three biomass boilers installed in Germany come from Aus-
tria.378 Apart from Germany, the main export countries are France, 
Italy, and Spain. Great Britain may become a potential market in the 
future because of ongoing work on an act concerning subsidies for heat-
ing from renewable sources.379 The upward trend is also visible in the 
373 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., p. 26.
374 R. Bointner, P. Biermayr, et al., Wirtschaftskraft Erneuerbarer Energie in Öster-
reich und Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen, “Blue Globe Report. Erneuerbare Energien”, 
no. 1/2013, Vienna, p. 57.
375 OMV Geschäftsbericht…, op. cit., p. 16.
376 Energietechnologie, BMWFW, Abteilung Energie/Technik und Sicherheit, 
http://www.bmwfw.gv.at/EnergieUndBergbau/Energieeffizienz/Seiten/Energie-
technologie.aspx (accessed: 12.11.2016).
377 Der Weg zum Innovation…, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
378 Umwelt und Energie im Überblick, Österreichische Forschungsförderungs-
gesellschaft,
https://www.ffg.at/content/umwelt-und-energie-im-berblick (accessed: 12.11.2016).
379 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
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sector of liquid biofuels, in the case of which Austria is one of the EU 
pioneers. Bioethanol is produced on a large scale, and the produced 
191,000 tons exceeds more than twice the country’s demand.380 A lot 
of potential also lies in Austrian experience acquired in biogas produc-
tion. Wide competencies in this area are visible in the purification of 
raw gas and processing it to biomethane with quality corresponding 
to natural gas, then  allowing it to enter into the network. In the con-
struction of bio gasworks and cogeneration installations, the knowledge 
and experience of Austrian enterprises is at a particularly high level 
in the EU.381 Austria’s experience in water energy is also considera-
ble. For this country, the technology of building hydropower plants 
and their necessary components has become an export service. Aus-
tria produces photovoltaic modules, too, 47% of which are exported, 
mostly to other EU countries. As regards photovoltaic components, 
Austria manufactures inverters, in which case global export accounts 
for approx. 89%. The total sale of Austrian heat pumps to foreign 
markets was 9,858 in 2014, which accounts for 33.7% of the export 
quota.382 The share of Austrian export of solar collectors is 82%. As 
for components for wind power plants, the level of export is 96%.383
Planes of competitive advantages in the economy 
The goals set in Austrian plans for economic development from 
the perspective of energy transition are based on three basic priori-
ties: decarbonization, decentralization, and digitalization. One of the 
elements decisive for the future of the Austrian energy system is the 
development of technology and solutions for optimum system inte-
gration of the high share of RES combined with an increase in the 
efficiency of distribution (transmission) and consumption of energy. 
Thanks to improved technologies, a comprehensive approach to sys-
tem integration, and innovative ICT technologies, system efficiency can 
be considerably enhanced and the quality of energy services can be 
improved. Because of difficulties with electricity storage and the specific 
380 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
381 R. Bointner , P. Biermayr, et al., Wirtschaftskraft Erneuerbarer…, op. cit., p. 30.
382 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., pp. 35-37.
383 Umwelt und Energie…, op. cit.
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character of electricity networks with the need to ensure appropriate 
stabilization of frequency and voltage, but also because (in accordance 
with present tendencies) the significance of energy carriers is going to 
increase considerably in the future, the need for research in this area 
is particularly high.384 Thanks to the use of innovative technologies, 
more than 50 TWh energy was produced from RES in 2014, reducing 
emissions harmful to the climate by 10.8 million tons of CO2 equiva-
lent.385 On the basis of previous achievements and taking into account 
the government’s specific support for improving the innovativeness 
of domestic enterprises, Austrian industry has the chance to achieve 
great success in energy and environmental technologies.
The newly developed field of electric transport provides great 
potential for Austria. First of all, this is because the country is already 
a pioneer in the sector of liquid biofuels in the EU, although it still 
needs to import a lot. It is a relatively new economic area in Austria, 
developed intensively since 2004, and especially attractive for its 
environmental benefits. Biofuels may contribute to a considerable 
reduction in greenhouse gases in the transport sector. For the same 
reasons, biogas produced from waste is attractive for the industry. In 
2014, the combined capacity of 384 bio gasworks was 113.9 MW.386 
Moreover, Austria is working on the development of power-to-gas 
technology, which will ultimately also be applied in transport. It is 
carrying out a pilot project wind2hydrogen to develop the technol-
ogy of obtaining hydrogen from surpluses of electricity produced by 
RES installations. The wind2hydrogen project is being implemented 
mainly by the energy concern OMV as part of a programme including 
broader research on electricity.387
Climate changes combined with insufficient energy resources and 
the need to ensure a proper quality of life in the face of demographic 
transformations are definitely global challenges of our times which 
384 Intelligente Energiesysteme der Zukunft. Smart Grids Pioniere in Österreich. 
Strategien – Projekte – Pionierregionen, BMVIT, Vienna 2010,
 https://nachhaltigwirtschaften.at/resources/edz_pdf/broschuere_smart_grids_
pioniere.pdf (accessed: 12.11.2016), p. 5.
385 Umwelt und Energie…, op. cit.
386 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
387 Factsheet: Research project wind2hydrogen, OMV Aktiengesellschaft, August 
2015.
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need appropriate solutions. The Austrian FTI Strategy includes “Cli-
mate change and limited resources” as one of the country’s priority 
challenges. In this regard, the Strategy points to the need to develop 
new technologies as a means to fighting those threats.388 Another activ-
ity in the field was reform of the Austrian Act on renewable energy 
(Ökostromgesetz) in 2011, allowing introduction to the network of more 
wind and solar energy. The work on the act may be considered as an 
attempt to make Austrian energy transition more dynamic. According 
to estimates connected with the reform of the act, by 2020, Austria 
will probably reach an 80% share of electricity from RES, which could 
give it the position of EU leader.389
The FTI strategy also implements an interesting concept of so-called 
Smart Cities (Stadt der Zukunft), which are to be model urban centers 
with a modern energy system. One central aspect of such cities is the 
role of modern technological solutions in smart urban infrastructure 
involving ICT. Another priority is to maintain and try to improve the 
quality of the environment and life in cities. The primary element is 
still the use of RES, including integration of photovoltaics and solar 
panels into construction, and an increase in energy efficiency, not only 
of buildings, but also energy industry and mobility.390
Energy security
Energy transition in Austria faces important challenges connected 
with future social, economic, and climate aspects and threats to which 
solutions need to be found. What is important is that national energy 
production is not sufficient for consumers’ needs, hence the necessary 
import of energy and resources plays an important role in the coun-
try’s energy balance. It is necessary to fight the problem of diminishing 
energy and environmental resources, which includes the transition 
388 Österreichischer Forschungs- und Technologiebericht 2016. Lagebericht gem. 
§ 8 (1) FOG über die aus Bundesmitteln geförderte Forschung, Technologie und 
Innovation in Österreich, BMWFW, BMVIT, Vienna 2016, p. 3, p. 81.
389 C. Morris, M. Pehnt, Niemiecka transformacja energetyczna... [German energy 
transition ...] op. cit., pp. 80-81.
390 Österreichischer Forschungs- und…, op. cit., p. 83.
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to new and renewable energy sources.391 Intensification of activities 
aimed at developing RES is very important for securing national energy 
supplies and thus, strengthening national energy security. Addition-
ally, this means the creation of highly specialized jobs, strengthening 
the competitiveness of the Austrian economy, and the achievement of 
EU climate objectives. 
The Austrian governmental programme concerning the future 
of the energy industry in the country emphasizes that an efficient, 
affordable and socially acceptable energy system should guarantee 
the security of supplies, affluence of the society, competitiveness of 
the economy, and environmental protection.392 Thus, the energy and 
political goals of Austrian Energy Strategy assume the following ele-
ments: security of supply, the environment-friendly character of the 
system, social acceptability, economic competitiveness, and financial 
efficiency.393
The task of energy policy is to ensure the security of energy supplies 
in two ways. On one hand, by guaranteeing sufficient infrastructure 
for energy transmission and distribution, both in domestic produc-
tion and in imported energy. The requirements for ensuring supply 
security must be formulated especially in the area of network trans-
mission and distribution. In the future, network infrastructure must 
meet the needs of stronger, decentralized production, higher volumes 
of energy flow, and higher requirements in supply security. An appro-
priate set of measures includes the extension and modernization of 
Austrian transmission and distribution networks, development of 
systems of central heating and cooling, extension of the energy stor-
age system, as well as smart grids and counters. On the other hand, 
the state should strive to lower its energy demand. Attempts to ensure 
secure and long-term supply of energy are a necessary factor due to 
Austria’s location and society. The level of diversification of energy 
resources and sources, whose import is still unavoidable, should be 
enhanced all the time. Therefore, European and global energy mar-
kets are of strategic importance for Austria.394
391 Der Weg zum Innovation…, op. cit., p. 9.
392 Energiestatus 2016. Abteilung III/2…, op. cit., p. 74.
393 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., p. 14.
394 Ibidem, p. 25.
196 Anna KUCHARSKA
Activities connected with the liberalization of the energy mar-
ket, which are expected to strengthen the national economy, are also 
important. Consumers should benefit from it too, as by assumption 
they can expect a higher quality of the services provided by competi-
tive energy providers. Generally, energy users are becoming more and 
more important because, thanks to new market rules and products, 
they receive the possibility of active participation in the energy mar-
ket and can optimize their own energy demand. This way, they also 
make an important contribution to the security of the whole energy 
system.395
The progressive liberalization of European energy markets has 
also made the Austrian energy system more and more connected with 
the systems of neighboring countries. So in addition, there is interna-
tional energy trade, and it has become necessary to balance the supply 
and demand, not only internally, but also supranationally.396 In the 
case of Austria, good conditions for the development of importation 
are ensured by its central location in Europe, which is conducive to 
crossing trans-border networks within it, and to exchanging energy 
with the neighboring countries. This leads to the country’s respon-
sibility for European energy transmission and supplies, as well as 
a chance for the development of the Austrian economy.397 But it also 
means that, regarding the transit of energy resources, Austria is still 
dependent on other countries.
395 Empowering Austria. Die Strategie von Oesterreichs Energie bis zum Jahr 2030, 
Österreichs E-Wirtschaft, Vienna 2015, p. 5.
396 Erneuerbare Energie in Zahlen…, op. cit., p. 18.
397 EnergieStrategie Österreich..., op. cit., p. 8.
Chapter 14
Energy transition in Switzerland
Anna KUCHARSKA398
Energy balance structure
As a result of a combination of several factors, Switzerland is unique 
among European countries. First, it is located in the middle of Europe, 
so it has naturally become a trans-border corridor of energy trans-
mission. Second, it is not a member of the EU or EEA, which gives 
it a unique legal status in the face of advancing physical integration 
with neighboring countries belonging to the EU. Besides, Switzerland 
is 100% dependent on the import of oil, natural gas, and uranium. 
Because of the high level of civil development, the country has a great 
demand for energy despite its small surface area and population. And 
finally, the decentralized character of the political system and the 
tradition of citizens’ direct participation in political life through ref-
erenda make changes in the country occur slowly and gradually, and 
they cannot affect citizens too much, since otherwise they simply do 
not agree to the reforms.
In Switzerland their full dependence on fossil fuels is connected 
with the high demand for energy. In 2014, the total final energy con-
sumption in Switzerland was 825,770 TJ, in which 21.4% was energy 
from RES. In 2014, the share of RES in final energy consumption 
was 176,902 TJ, which means a decrease by 6.4% in comparison to 
2013 (189,001 TJ). The share of so-called new RES (i.e., without water 
energy) was 9,415 TJ in 2014 (in 2013: 7,913 TJ; i.e., growth by 19%), 
which in 2014 made it possible to produce 3.9% of electricity. Total 
398 Anna Kucharska, MSc, PhD Candidate, Faculty of International and Political 
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production of electricity from RES was 142,446 TJ (2012: 142,697 
TJ, i.e., a decrease by 0.2%). In 2014, 47,768 TJ of heat from RES was 
consumed (2013: 52,447 TJ; a reduction of 8.9%).399
The share of non-renewable energy carriers in  total consumption 
is 78.58%. Oil is mostly imported from Africa. In Switzerland, there 
are huge refineries, so it is a significant importer of oil derivatives 
for Europe (e.g., gasoline). Most natural gas imported to Switzer-
land comes from EU countries and Norway, and 1/4 from Russia. 
Switzerland has no direct agreements with Russia. For the import 
of natural gas, Switzerland is totally dependent on the transmis-
sion network of EU countries. Switzerland’s problem is the lack of 
its own gas storage facilities. For geological and technical reasons, 
Switzerland was unable to develop great gas storage facilities, so it 
only has transmission networks and small containers to balance 
daily gas demand. 
Currently, 5 nuclear power plants in Switzerland ensure 40-45% 
of its electricity. A higher share in energy production occurs in win-
ter due to the lower use of RES. Uranium is supplied from politically 
stable regions such as e.g., the USA, Canada, or Australia, so depend-
ence on this resource is not considered in terms of any threat to the 
country’s security. It is also emphasized that Switzerland has learnt 
to store radioactive waste in a safe way, and the amount of needed 
nuclear fuel is many times lower than other fossil fuels. Besides, it is 
a zero emission source of energy with a stable volume of production, 
which is important for the mostly obsolete Swiss transmission net-
works.400 Despite substantial social support for nuclear energy, after 
the Fukushima disaster Switzerland began work on Energy Strategy 
until 2050 (Energiestrategie 2050) assuming a gradual resignation 
from nuclear energy, which was to begin by not building new blocks 
or extending the use of existing ones unless necessary for safety rea-
sons.401
399 Schweizerische Statistik der Erneuerbaren Energien. Ausgabe 2014, UVEK, 
BFE, Bern, September 2015, pp. 40-41.
400 J. Lundsgaard-Hansen, Energiestrategie 2050 – das Eis ist dünn. Die Schweiz 
und Deutschland auf neuen Wegen, published by NZZ, Zürich 2013, p. 82.
401 Energiespeicher in der Schweiz. Bedarf, Wirtschaftlichkeit und Rahmenbedin-
gungen im Kontext der Energiestrategie 2050, Schlussbericht 12. December 2013, 
UVEK, BFE, Bern 2013, p. 30.
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Chart 30. Domestic energy production in Switzerland for 2016 [%]
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik 2016, BFE, Bern, p. 3.
Swiss model of energy strategy
Energy Strategy Until 2050 is an extension of the document of 
2007, which applies to the period until 2035: Energy perspectives 
(Energieperspektiven 2035). The document that refers to Switzerland’s 
energy strategy until 2050 updates socio-economic data, technical 
requirements and energy policy, and presents goals assuming gradual 
transformation of the Swiss energy system until 2050. The Strat-
egy includes 3 scenarios for the development of energy supply and 
demand in Switzerland and 7 priorities for Swiss energy policy. The 
key ones raise the share of RES in electricity production, strengthen 
research on the energy industry, and extend and transform energy 
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networks and storage facilities.402 The increase in electricity produc-
tion from RES assumed until 2050 involves, according to different 
sources, an annual increase in the share of water energy by 3.2 TWh 
up to 38.6 TWh; wind energy should reach the production capacity 
of 4.3 TWh; photovoltaics, 11.2 TWh. It is also necessary to guaran-
tee enough available capacity through appropriate storage capacities 
and suffi cient network capacity,  already emphasized by the Ministry 
of Energy in the Strategy Until 2035.403
Chart 31. Energy consumption in Switzerland in 2016 [%]
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik 2016, BFE, Bern, p. 4.
The Swiss Energy Strategy presents 3 possible scenarios of devel-
opment for Swiss energy policy before 2050. Thus, Switzerland not 
402 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 1.
403 Energiespeicher in der Schweiz.., op. cit., p. 34.
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only has aplan, but it is flexibly developing its energy policy to allow 
the adoption of whatever variation is the most beneficial socially and 
economically. The introduction of scenarios depends i.a., on tech-
nological advancement allowing the application of specific system 
activities.404 The general priorities of energy policy set in the Strategy 
refer to all three scenarios, but differ in the ways and degree of their 
achievement. All scenarios assume a decrease in importation of fossil 
energy carriers, reduction of CO2 emissions, an increase in the use of 
RES, and rising energy efficiency.405
All the scenarios assume a decrease in the import of fossil energy 
carriers from the current 80% of total energy consumption to 29-62% 
depending on the scenario.406 The increase in the share of RES in 
electricity production assumed for 2050 is by 11 TWh for photovol-
taics, 4 TWh for wind power plants, 4 TWh for geothermal energy, 
and 16 TWh for run-of-river hydroelectricity. The Swiss energy net-
works adopting the anticipated volumes of electricity from wind, 
solar, and geothermal power plants will be possible for all three sce-
narios thanks to the high flexibility of pumped storage power plants 
and power plants at water reservoirs.407 They are of key importance 
in securing Swiss electricity supply. With their huge energy potential, 
they are currently able to cover in critical situations the majority of 
Swiss electricity demand. 
The least demanding scenario in terms of achievement of general 
energy priorities is the  Weiter wie bisher – WWB scenario (The same 
as before), whose name clearly shows the policy direction. WWB is 
oriented to the existing situation and the possibilities of developing 
energy policy on the basis of currently available instruments and 
tools.408 This variant is most often referred to when planning current 
activities and the near future.
404 Ist das geplante Stromsystem der Schweiz für die Umsetzung der Energie-
strategie 2050 aus technischer Sicht geeignet? Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 and 
the Consequences for Electricity Grid Operation – Full Report , SATW, Zürich, 
Mai/Juli 2014, http://www.satw.ch/publikationen/SATW_Energiestudie_def.pdf 
(accessed: 6.11.2016), p. 82.
405 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 617.
406 Ibidem.
407 Ist das geplante Stromsystem…, op. cit., p. 11.
408 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 3.
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a) Development of renewable energy sources
The scenario titled Neue Energiepolitik – NEP (New energy 
policy) is the scenario of the federal government of May 2011. It 
presents a probable path for changing electricity consumption and 
production in Switzerland until 2050, providing the basis for the 
assumption of reducing CO2 by 1.0-1.5 tons per capita. This would 
mean that the goal of reducing CO2 emissions before 2020 by 20% 
in comparison to 2000 is met. An important aspect of this scenario 
assumes that constantly available biomass resources are limited, 
both within the country and globally. Therefore, the NEP scenario 
excludes the possibility of basing itself on the unlimited import of 
biogenous energy carriers. It points to the need for international 
cooperation, especially in terms of research and development, in 
order to have a uniform policy of CO2 reduction and energy efficiency 
improvement. In particular, it emphasizes the need to develop and 
implement new technologies on the basis of division of tasks on the 
international scale.409
The Swiss Ministry of Energy anticipates extending the power of 
pumped storage power plants from 1.8 GW to approx. 6 GW before 
2025. At the same time, the storage capacity of the water tanks is 
to be increased up to 200 GWh.410 In 2015, 37 hydropower plants 
operated. 15 of them were newly built, 12 were restructured, and 
10, adjusted. The Russein power plant has the highest energy pro-
duction: 66.8 GWh. At the end of 2015, more hydropower plants 
that were being built will ensure the level of electricity production 
of 321 GWh. As much as 18% of that will be provided by the exten-
sion of the Krafthaus Prutz/Ried hydropower plant.411 Despite their 
high potential and importance for the Swiss energy industry, hydro-
power plants have losses. The classic economic model in which water 
is released at the maximum load has lost its profitability since the 
differences in wholesale electricity prices (so-called spreads) began 
decreasing during the day. This is the result of factors such as low 
prices of fossil fuels and rights to CO2 emissions in previous years. 
An important factor was also the extension of installations using 
409 Ibidem, p. 4.
410 Ist das geplante Stromsystem…, op. cit., p. 7.
411 Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik 2015, BFE, Bern, p. 39.
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solar radiation, which have priority for entering higher amounts of 
energy into the network in the afternoon.412
Achieving 11.2 TWh electricity from photovoltaics a year, which is 
the Ministry’s target, means the necessity to extend solar installations 
by 9 GW a year. With the technology available now, 17% of the surface 
area (about 80 km2) allocated for development (industry, residential 
areas) will be used for this purpose, which conforms to Swiss spatial 
requirements. The problem is, however, that the assumptions of the 
Swiss Ministry of Energy are based on optimum solar exposure, i.e., 
1,250 full hours of load a year. However, data reported by companies 
applying for subsidies from the instrument of support for RES shows 
that actual solar exposure is approx. 900 full hours a year. Taking 
this data into consideration, the value of necessary capacity of 12 GW 
should be used instead of 9 GW, so that the target of annual electric-
ity production could be 11.2 TWh. In this case, the above-mentioned 
data concerning spatial demand must be raised by 1/3.413 Forecasts 
of growth in the use of photovoltaics in Switzerland connected with 
the development of the expected potential of this source of energy 
are estimated at between 0.1 and 2.7 TWh by 2035, and by 2050, the 
values will be 0.2-9.7 TWh.414 This increase means the multiplication 
of current electricity production, i.e., 0.02 TWh, 6- or even 100-fold 
by 2035. Before 2050, growth by 10 to even 500 times is expected 
in comparison to contemporary production. In terms of production 
costs, photovoltaics is currently the most expensive technology of 
electricity production in Switzerland; the price of produced energy 
is 40-100 Rp./kWh.415
A wind power plant already functions as a mature and economically 
competitive technology with high developmental potential. The costs 
of production are lower than in the case of a small hydro power plant, 
but largely depend on location. This kind of energy source, however, 
is not usually approved by the local community. In Switzerland, the 
development of wind energy is very limited by territorial conditions, 
412 Energiespeicher in der Schweiz.., op. cit., p. 34.
413 Ist das geplante Stromsystem…, op. cit., p. 51.
414 Span depending on the adopted scenario from the Energy Strategy Until 2050.
415 Energie-Strategie 2050. Impulse für die schweizerische Energiepolitik. Grund-
lagenbericht, Energie Trialog Schweiz, Zürich 2010,  pp. 50-59.
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because there are few available locations appropriate for the devel-
opment of such installations. Currently, in Switzerland there are 13 
wind installations, which produce 0.02 TWh annually. Approximately 
90 more installations are planned. To achieve the target of produc-
ing 2 TWh, set in the Energy Strategy, it would be necessary to install 
approximately 1,200 wind turbines. According to many studies car-
ried out by research centers at the request of the Ministry of Energy, 
the increase in the use of such an energy source could reach 0.6 to 2.2 
TWh a year by 2035. This way, today’s production would be increased 
by 40 or even 100 times. It is estimated that the level of wind energy 
use will grow considerably by 2035, but before 2050, this progress 
will no longer take place. However, the development of wind energy 
is strongly dependent on the demand and location possibilities.416
b) Increase in energy efficiency and international competitiveness
The “Political Measures” scenario (Politische Massnahmen – POM) 
assumes a politically coordinated set of instruments used to achieve the 
goals of energy transition. The priority in this scenario lies in raising 
energy efficiency and results from the intention to secure in the future 
sufficient electricity supplies because of giving up on nuclear energy. 
For these reasons, different variants of covering electricity demand are 
taken into consideration. For example, a number of in-depth analyses 
were prepared, concerning the effects of the growing share of fluctu-
ating energy production from RES in the energy mix, cogeneration, 
electromobility, and biomass potential.417
The emphasis on raising energy efficiency is considered to be much 
more beneficial than extending energy production. What is important 
in this aspect is such energy sources as photovoltaics, wind energy, 
and biomass, which are not a valuable and freely available resource 
because of the established density of energy and power per surface 
area unit.418 In other words, due to spatial limitations, in Switzerland 
there are not many opportunities to extend wind or solar farms. There-
fore, the goal is to maximize energy efficiency in energy production 
using the available locations.
416 Ibidem.
417 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 1.
418 Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
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Chart 32. Energy efficiency in Switzerland (1990-2015)
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik, Umweltindikator – Energieeffizienz, Bern 2016 
[Internet:] https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/raum-umwelt/res-
sourcen/umweltindikatorensystem/nutzung-natuerliche-ressourcen/energieeffizienz.
html (accessed: 27.08.2017).
The aspect of raising energy efficiency is connected with the issue of 
capturing and storing energy surpluses. Further, energy storage facil-
ities are connected with the area of industrial networks, because they 
have to be integrated with them. It is necessary to raise efficiency, not 
only in the sphere of production, but also the whole energy infrastruc-
ture. The classic tasks of energy storage facilities involve compensating 
annual changes in consumption and fluctuations of daily peaks, so 
the significance of RES grows along with their development. The 
strong need to store energy occurs when energy production from RES 
dependent on external conditions is periodically insufficient to meet 
the demand. On the one hand, the development of research concern-
ing new technologies plays a big role in the development of storage 
facilities. On the other hand, changes in the system of remunerations 
for controlled RES, i.e., hydro power plants, are also important.419
The goal of the implementing political instruments proposed by 
the POM scenario is to activate the potential of energy efficiency. As 
a result of the activities, the final consumption of energy may drop by 
33% before 2050 in relation to present consumption. It is anticipated 
419 Energiespeicher in der Schweiz.., op. cit., pp. 35-37.
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that this may stabilize the consumption of electricity, and growth will 
begin again after 2035 because of stronger electrification of traffic by 
approx. 3.4%.420
Unlike in the NEP scenario, the assumptions of POM include pursu-
ing the nation’s autonomy and independence in satisfying the demand 
for energy at the cost of lowering the degree of achievement of energy 
policy priorities. Activities proposed in POM may be implemented in 
Switzerland independently of international energy policy, except the 
boundary values of emissions in traffic. Dependence on measures 
implemented internationally occurs in industries which are not very 
well developed in Switzerland, e.g., the automotive industry, because 
Switzerland does not produce vehicles. Hence, the growth of vehicle 
efficiency in this country is closely connected with the activities of 
countries that are producers of cars.421
The increase of energy efficiency in all kinds of fuel, including alter-
native (biogenous) fuels, is still significant. In the end, electromobility 
is expected to be competitive to conventional combustion engines 
in terms of efficiency. A technological leap in solutions for batteries 
may make the market share of electric vehicles grow, but increasing 
the performance of combustion engines may temporarily inhibit the 
expansion of electric cars. Hybrid vehicles make use of the develop-
ment of technology in both areas and may be regarded as an element 
of the transition phase to electric mobility together with so-called 
range extenders. Electromobility must develop as part of a collabo-
ration of world actors and responsible regional development, and be 
properly carried out in this sense.422 In the case of Switzerland, the 
automotive parts industry, with a turnover of approx. CHF 14 billion, 
is an important branch of industry. Thanks to investments in R&D 
and the production of highly specialized parts it has good recognition 
all over the world.423 Hence, the potential existing in this area can be 
used in the field of electromobility along with technologies developed 
in Switzerland, such as power-to-gas. 
420 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 615.
421 Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
422 Elektromobilität 2012. Bericht des Bundesamts für Strassen ASTRA,UVEK, 
ASTRA, October 2012, p. 3.
423 Ibidem, p. 5.
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c) New technological solutions 
The increase of fluctuating production of energy combined with the 
increase of national share of RES in electricity production is associ-
ated with some challenges. What is necessary is both higher shares of 
regulatory production (pumped storage and reservoir power stations, 
gas-steam systems, or cogeneration installations), but also the exten-
sion of extra seasonal storage capacities. It is still not stated clearly 
in Swiss documents what the combination of changeable energy pro-
duction with the needed storage capacities or control through market 
stimuli will look like. Yet, the need for change in the present market 
structure is forecast. This also involves the improvement of distribu-
tion networks and the distribution system.424 So far, the emphasis is 
on the development of technology for storing energy surpluses.
Hydrogen produced in the process of electrolysis from electricity 
generated from wind or solar energy, but also from a temporary energy 
surplus from conventional power plants, can be used for storage of 
energy surpluses produced by RES. Hydrogen obtained this way can 
then be reused to charge vehicles or in power plants. Hydrogen can also 
be used like current hydropower plants in emergency situations. The 
potential of this technology is attractive because it enables both short-
term (e.g., a week) and seasonal energy storage.425 For these reasons, 
research is being carried out in Switzerland to work out concepts appro-
priate for small photovoltaic power plants combined with hydrogen 
production and the use of fuel cells.426 In 2015, Switzerland launched 
a pilot programme of a power plant generating electricity from RES, 
where installations using power-to-gas were installed. As planned, gas 
produced this way is to be used as eco fuel for vehicles. The companies 
involved in the project assume that the concept will be used on a large 
scale in the future in the area of environment-friendly mobility.427
Making up for the lack of possibilities of gas storage, Switzerland 
decided to develop modern technologies and supplement the energy 
reserves system with storage facilities in the form of batteries, com-
424 Die Energieperspektiven für die Schweiz…, op. cit., p. 617.
425 Energiespeicher in der Schweiz.., op. cit., p. 42.
426 Elektromobilität 2012…, op. cit., p. 3.
427 ETOGAS constructs the First Power-to-Gas plant in Switzerland, Press 
Information, 22.01.2015, , http://etogas.com/fileadmin/documents/news/Pressemit-
teilung_EN/2015-01-22_EtG_PI_final_EN_first_PtG_plant_Switzerland.pdf 
(accessed: 6.11.2016).
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pressed air containers, or electrothermal tanks. These, however, are 
technologies that are still being tested and only have the potential to be 
used short-term. The Vehicle to Grid (V2G) programme is one such con-
cept. It assumes vehicles can be used as buffers for irregular, unplanned 
surpluses of energy from RES. At the moment, the life cycle of batteries 
is too low for a vehicle, and additionally shortens after each charging. 
Therefore, the aim of this concept is also to develop a technology that 
would solve problems typical of batteries, such as an insufficient life 
cycle for the vehicle, additionally decreasing at each charging.428
The problem is, however, that at present, the process of electroly-
sis in order to obtain hydrogen and its re-conversion to electricity is 
still not very effective and involves substantial loss of energy. Despite 
intensive research in this regard, the approach of the government to 
this solution and to batteries is rather conservative, because we can-
not be fully sure yet that it will be possible to really apply the solutions 
to store electricity.429
Energy security
Geopolitical location and relationships with the European Union 
are very important for the energy security of Switzerland. The location 
of Switzerland in the center of Europe gives the country a strategic 
character in terms of international energy trade, as more than 40 
cross-border connections cross there430, ensuring it a considerable 
share in the international exchange of energy: 10% of all European 
transmission of electricity. Switzerland is practically an integral part 
of the European energy system, which causes mutual dependence of 
Switzerland and the European Union. Access to the internal Euro-
pean energy market is attractive to Switzerland due to its economic 
attractiveness and the security of supply guaranteed by the Union.431 
428 Elektromobilität 2012…, op. cit., p. 3.
429 Ibidem.
430 W. Kwinta, Rynek energii: Szwajcaria [Energy Market: Switzerland] [in:] Pol-
ska Energia, no. 6/2011.
431 Europäischer Markt für die Schweiz wichtig, Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Bern,
https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=de&print_style= 
yes&msgid=55212 (accessed: 6.11.2016).
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For the EU, Switzerland is a corridor of electricity transmission. 
The country is located on the north-south axis of energy transmis-
sion, especially useful for Italy, which imports its electricity this way. 
Import of natural gas from a gas pipeline running through the Swiss 
Alps is equally important for Italy, accounting for 20% of the Italian 
demand for gas. Switzerland has more than a dozen interconnections 
with gas pipelines running from Germany and France. Besides, Swiss 
storage capacities of hydropower stations in the Alps, which are avail-
able much quicker than those of traditional fossil fuel power stations, 
play an important role.432 Thus, Switzerland is a hub of cross-border 
connections of European energy trade. 
Switzerland is a member of the European Network of electricity 
transmission system operators (ENTSO-E) and shares with neigh-
boring EU countries numerous points of entry to and exit from the 
transmission network. From that system of high voltage transmission 
networks, electricity is distributed to supra-regional, regional, and 
local end customers.433 For decades, Swiss energy enterprises have 
been participants of the European energy market as sellers, distrib-
utors, shareholders, and network or power plant operators. With the 
environment-friendly production of electricity dominant in its energy 
mix, and because of being the center of European energy exchange 
due to its location, Switzerland is very important for the EU.434
The basic energy-related goals of the EU are the security of energy 
supplies in three categories: reliable and sufficient, competitive and 
economically profitable, and environment- and climate-friendly. This 
understanding of energy supply security results in certain tasks and 
obligations. The development of the energy market in the EU also has 
an influence on Swiss energy legislation, supply security, electricity 
flows, and thus, requirements of the transmission network. It is essen-
tial for Switzerland to become part of the future European system of 
high voltage transmission networks (the Super grid).435
432 Analyse der Schweizer Energieversorgungssicherheit. Eine Abschätzung der 
Verwundbarkeit des Energiesystems, ETH-UNS Projekt-Schlussbericht, Zürich 
2013, p. 12.
433 Ibidem.
434 Stromabkommen mit der EU, UVEK, https://www.uvek.admin.ch/uvek/de/
home/energie/stromabkommen-mit-eu.html (accessed: 6.11.2016).
435 Zukunft Stromversorgung Schweiz, Akademien der Wissenschaften Schweiz, 
Bern, July 2012, p. 34.
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But Switzerland is neither a member of the EU or of the EEA. Indi-
vidual agreements and contracts necessary for fluent collaboration or 
facilitating it, including bilateral electricity agreements, have been 
negotiated with the EU. The electricity agreement, which is an element 
of the third package of regulations concerning internal energy market, 
allows Switzerland free exchange of electricity with other countries 
and thus, equal chances on the European energy market. The goal of 
this agreement between Switzerland and the EU is a common, com-
petitive, and consumer-friendly electricity market with high security 
of supplies for Europe.436
Using its negotiating position, during negotiations on the electric-
ity agreement, Switzerland rejected the issue of extending renewable 
energy sources and improving energy efficiency. It was regarded as 
unnecessary because of considerable financial encumbrances for the 
society that cannot be fully forecast, especially in the area of heat 
engineering and transport.437
Both entities, Switzerland and the EU, have some interest in cooper-
ation. The bilateral agreement should allow the Swiss energy industry 
and offices to further develop as part of the European connections 
system. But individual bilateral agreements are not enough to ensure 
Switzerland energy security, especially since adopting the Lisbon 
Treaty. In this document, the EU established its own and its mem-
ber states’ competence regarding energy policy and made a division 
between them; moreover, it was set out that third party states, such 
as Switzerland, would be treated as secondary in the case of emer-
gencies or import needs.
The delayed liberalization of the Swiss energy market is also a prob-
lematic issue. Its goal is to strengthen competition on the energy 
market and to reduce the role of previously dominant energy produc-
ers and energy system operators, and thus, to allow consumers free 
choice of energy providers. As expected by the EU, liberalization will 
be one element of guaranteeing energy supply security and sustaina-
436 Stromabkommen EU – CH. Hintergrundnotiz, swisselectric, UVEK, Bern, http://
www.stromversorgungsrecht.ch/Internationales.html?file=tl_files/media/Themen/
Internationales/20100519_swisselectric_Hintergrundnotiz_Stromabkommen.pdf 
(accessed: 6.11.2016).
437 Stromabkommen EU – CH.., op. cit.
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ble prices of energy for end customers. Liberalization will involve the 
ensuring of stable general conditions for the functioning of the energy 
market on the basis of transparent legal regulations; it will also help 
achieve climate and environmental goals.
Cooperation between Switzerland and the EU definitely gives bene-
fits for both entities in the area of energy security. Mutual dependence, 
which results from the geographical location, is also a fact. However, 
the tradition of isolationism and substantial direct influence of citi-
zens on Swiss policy means that the legal and institutional integration 
of the energy system with the EU is rather slow.
Chapter 15
Energy transition in the USA
Rafał JAROSZ438
Since 1943, when the USA was first affected by a lack of access to 
energy resources, ensuring the energy security of the country and 
influencing the direction of American energy transition have been the 
priority of each cabinet of the federal government and state authorities. 
The main reason is the fact that for many years, the economic devel-
opment of the US has been closely connected with access to energy 
sources. As a result, the direction of changes in the energy sector are 
discussed in the US both in terms of internal policy and as part of 
the debate on the character and goals of international involvement of 
the United States.439
Currently, energy security is closely connected with the country’s 
national security, hence ensuring the security is part of the compe-
tence of many entities of the administration responsible for foreign, 
defense, and internal policy. The direction of the transition in the 
energy sector is established both by the President  himself and by 
a number of governmental institutions, such as: the Department of 
State, Department of Defense, Department of the Interior, National 
Security Council, and the Congress (especially the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and House Committee on International Relations).
Since the 1970s, in order to alleviate public moods, all American 
Presidents have pointed to the need to reduce the consumption of 
energy resources, mainly oil, and the need to make the United States 
438 Rafał Jarosz, PhD, First Counselor, Trade and Investment Section of the Embassy 
of the Republic of Poland in Washington, DC, e-mail: washington@trade.gov.pl 
439 This was manifested by the establishment of a separate Bureau for Energy 
Resources in the Department of State in 2011. The goals of activity of the new 
bureau were to solve global energy conflicts, to fight “energy poverty” and to pro-
mote energy transition in the USA and on the global market.
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independent from its importation. During his Presidential campaign 
in 2012, when the price of a barrel of oil reached or exceeded a record 
USD 140 and the high cost of military involvement in the Gulf region 
evoked growing opposition of the American community, B. Obama 
called to increase the extraction of American energy resources. He 
presented the solution to this problem as a national challenge and 
one of the key goals of his presidency.440 At the same time, he was the 
first US president to try to combine the issue of reduction in fuel con-
sumption with the need to implement renewable and energy-efficient 
technologies that would not only lower American dependence on the 
import of oil and gas, but also have a beneficial effect on the environ-
ment and reduce the negative effects of climate changes.
The future presidency of Donald Trump seriously questions the 
maintenance of the direction of the “green” energy transition in the 
USA initiated by his predecessor.441 But on the other hand, it is hard 
to imagine that the transition carried out now by both the American 
and global private sectors, based on the development and implementa-
tion of clean technologies reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, 
could be easily and quickly reversed. Still, the core of the present 
energy transition is the so-called shale revolution. It may be assumed 
that the newly elected Republican Congress led by a Republican Pres-
ident will continue the implementation of the national energy strategy 
“all of the above”, which assumes the use and promotion of different 
sources of energy in the USA. In the near future, unlike during the 
rule of the Democratic Party and President Obama, we may expect 
greater support by the federal government for the American sector of 
fossil fuels, especially oil and gas, at the expense of reducing previous 
governmental subsidies and grants for the development of renewable 
energy sources. However, the future structure and speed of changes 
440 Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America,
 http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pdf 
(accessed: 20.04.2017). 
441 Some candidates for the function of administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) are strongly sceptical about the issues of climate change, such as 
Myron Ebell from the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Robert Grady, or Joe Aielllo. 
The function of the Secretary of Energy will probably be served by a current advisor 
to Donald Trump, billionaire Harold Hamm, being the president of an oil and natu-
ral gas exploration and production company Continental Resources.
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in the US energy balance will not only depend on the energy policy of 
the federal government, but largely on the competitive power of differ-
ent sources of energy. Access to cheap sources of energy will ensure 
America the possibility to reindustrialize its national economy using 
the advantages of technical advancement. The newly formed state 
administration of the USA is planning to shape both the improvement 
of American affluence and the competitive position of the American 
economy on that basis. 
Energy balance structure
Analyzing the changes in the historical and future structure of 
the USA’s energy basket, it is worth stressing that for more than 100 
years, three sources of fossil fuels – oil, natural gas, and coal – have 
accounted for more than 80% of the energy consumed in the USA. In 
2015, the share of fossil fuels in energy consumption exceeded 81.5%, 
and according to the statistics of the U.S. Energy Information Agency442, 
their share is going to drop to 76.6% by 2040 (Chart 32). Consumption 
of energy produced from renewable sources oscillates around 10-15%, 
and the highest increases occur in solar and wind energy. Considera-
ble decreases can be observed in the coal sector, where production is 
falling year by year: in 2015, coal extraction dropped by 13%, which 
was the greatest decrease in production of the resource in the US 
within the last 50 years.
Changes in the American energy market are mostly connected 
with technological advancement in each of the analyzed sources of 
energy. It is technological progress that has become the main factor 
determining the competitive position of different energy sources in 
the US. Commercial use of the technologies for hydraulic fracturing 
and horizontal drilling in the extraction of natural gas and oil has 
dominated the American energy market, lowering the competitive 
position and the development of other technologies like small, modu-
lar reactors in the sector of nuclear energy, clean coal technologies, or 
the cost competitiveness of producing solar panels or wind turbines.
442 But it is worth remembering that EIA forecasts do not take into account either 
future changes in the directions of the country’s governmental policy, or techno-
logical progress.
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Chart 33. Energy consumption in the USA in the years 1776-2040 
(in quadrillions of Btu)
Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Monthly Energy Review, U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration,  https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26912 
(accessed: 19.03.2017).
The United States is still one of the world’s biggest producers of oil 
and natural gas. In 2015, oil production exceeded the record level of 
9.4 million barrels a day, and more than 90% of the extra production 
came from the exploitation of shale rocks. It source was the enormous 
deposits of unconventional gas from formations in the north-eastern 
(Marcellus), north (Bakken), middle (Woodford, Fayetteville) and 
southern (Barnett, Eagle Ford) part of the country. Now, more than 
65% of the oil consumed in the US comes from domestic production. 
As for natural gas, the data of EIA suggests that the United States, 
by continuing its current consumption of 650-700 bcm, may ensure 
the supply of natural gas from domestic sources for 25 to 80 years. 
EIA forecasts that the extraction of natural gas from conventional and 
unconventional sources will grow from approx. 700 bcm in 2011 to 
over 900 bcm in 2040. Nearly all the forecast growth in national gas 
production is connected with the development of the shale gas sector 
(increasing from 220 bcm in 2011 to 470 bcm, respectively). The year 
2015 proved to be record-breaking in terms of natural gas produc-
tion, as its extraction amounted to 767 bcm (by comparison Russia 
produced 635 bcm). As a result, within less than a decade, the United 
States did not only solve the serious problem of its growing demand 
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for imported natural gas, but also faced an opportunity to export the 
resource to foreign markets.
Thus, the shale revolution and relatively high growth of production 
of renewable energy sources, connected with the unprecedented scale 
and speed of technological advancement, show that the direction of 
energy transition of the American economy based on the development 
of technologically guaranteeing the competitiveness of the country’s 
resources will ensure a varied structure of the USA’s energy basket in 
the nearest decades. A big question is the real potential for developing 
technology in the American nuclear energy and coal sectors, ensuring 
competitiveness on the domestic market. It seems certain that a long-
term effect of gas production from unconventional sources in the USA 
is the gradual departure from the use of coal in energy production 
(this phenomenon is mostly observed in the south-eastern part of the 
USA). It also has an indirect impact on American energy and climate 
policy and the potential possibilities for reducing CO2 emission.
Energy efficiency443
Doubtless, recently, activities in the area of climate policy have 
become a new element of the USA’s energy policy, including economic 
issues, defense, and the very energy security. The risk of climate change 
is nowadays one of the biggest threats to the security of the US as 
defined in the National Security Strategy.444 In the case of the US, the 
443 The DOE emphasizes that the American energy sector (2.6 million miles of pipe-
lines, 414 natural gas storage facilities, 330 ports and oil refineries, and over 140 
thousand miles of railroad transporting oil, gas and coal) is still one of “the most 
developed and effective“ energy sectors in the world. It also points out, using the 
example of gas infrastructure, that most investments were in the 1950s and 1960s 
(23% and 24%, respectively; only about 9% new gas pipelines were built in the latest 
decade). Currently the United States supplies approximately 3.875 terawatt hours 
of electricity to more than 159 million customers, with the use of 7 thousand power 
plants and 19 thousand individual generators of electricity.
444 The US Department of Defense has appointed within its organizational structure 
a special climate change working group. In October 2013, Pentagon published the 
first report analyzing the impact of climate change on the security of the USA. The 
Department of Defense has also announced a new strategy concerning the Arctic, 
in which climate change is defined as one of the main threats to the area. An exam-
ple of activities of the American army is the roadmap for US marines concerning 
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improvement of energy efficiency aimed at reducing the level of GHG 
emissions is one of the key elements of the country’s energy transition. 
This year in June, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient 
Economy (ACEE) analyzed the energy efficiency of the world’s 16 big-
gest economies, which account for more than 70% of global energy 
consumption.445
Chart 34. Energy efficiency of the US economy  
(on a scale from 0 to 25 points)
Source: The 2016 International Energy Efficiency Scorecard, The American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEE), http://aceee.org/portal/national-policy/
international-scorecard.
The analysis included a number of different factors, such as 
programmes for reducing energy consumption, standards of fuel 
consumption, or standards of energy efficiency for devices. Although 
the USA improved its ranking position from 13 in 2014 to 8 in 2016 
(Chart 34), energy efficiency in the American economy is still rela-
tively low. It primarily refers to areas such as construction law, the 
level of efficiency of devices, or standards of fuel consumption and 
fume emissions for cars and trucks.
This year in April, the White House published at the request of the 
Presidenta Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) prepared by the experts 
of the American Department of Energy (DOE). The aim of QER was 
to identify areas in the American energy sector that needed extra 
investment, and to work out specific activities and recommendations 
to streamline its functioning by 2030. The DOE446 pointed out in the 
climate change, which points to climate change as a potential factor that may cause 
armed conflicts in the world.
445 http://aceee.org/portal/national-policy/international-scorecard (accessed: 
19.03.2017). 
446 The US Department of Energy is going to allocate 70 million dollars to improv-
ing the energy efficiency of production processes alone.
218 Rafał JAROSZ
report that by 2030, in order to improve the energy efficiency of the 
American economy, the United States would have to invest more than 
USD 1.5 trillion in modernizing and developing the American energy 
sector, including over 900 billion in distribution. One  key element of 
building a new energy system in the US will be the modernization and 
extension of the natural gas transmission infrastructure. The costs 
of investment estimated for the years 2015-2030 will be approx. USD 
2.6-3.5 billion a year (depending on future demand). Thus, the US on 
the one hand intends to increase the extraction and share of natural 
gas at the expense of hard coal, and on the other hand to maintain 
the dynamic growth of energy production from renewable sources. 
But is this strategy a guarantee for improving the energy efficiency 
of the country? 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the higher 
extraction of shale gas, which is increasingly replacing coal as an energy 
resource in the US, has led to the greatest decrease in CO2 emission. 
The Agency’s data shows that annual emissions of CO2 in the US have 
fallen within the last five years by 450 million tons; this is the great-
est drop in emissions observed in all countries surveyed by the IEA. 
Fatih Birol, IEA chief economist, attributed this fall to improvements 
in fuel efficiency in the transport sector and a “major shift” from coal 
to gas in the power sector. “This is a success story based on a com-
bination of policy and technology – policy driving greater efficiency 
and technology making shale gas production viable,” Mr Birol told 
the Financial Times.
Economists Travor Houser and Shashank Mohan from the Rhodium 
Group, however, are of a different opinion. Promoting the book Fue-
ling Up: The Economic Implications of America’s Oil and Gas Boom 
published in January 2016, they explain that the benefits of transi-
tion to a cheap energy resource will eventually increase the demand 
from households, the transport sector, and industry. This, in turn, will 
mean that by 2035, the effects of reducing GHG emissions as a result 
of the transition to natural gas will not be very significant, i.e., from 
5.5 billion tons a year in 2013 to 5.4 billion in 2035. In their opinion, 
if there had been no “shale revolution”, and thus the price of natural 
gas remained relatively high, in 2035 coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, 
and renewable energy sources would maintain a similar, approx. 25%, 
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share in the energy mix. The authors calculate that the shale revolution 
will cause a 60% share of natural gas in the American energy basket 
in 2035 (in addition, the share of coal will dwindle from 44% to 7%).
Competition on the global energy market
The growing domestic production of energy resources improves 
the security of access to energy, but on the other hand, it dramatically 
changes the global balance of power in the oil and natural gas trade. 
In terms of analyzing the direction and further speed of energy tran-
sition in the US, changes on the global energy market are currently 
the greatest challenge to the United States.
It seems, then, that the technological revolution in American energy 
irreversibly changes the global energy market. Technological advance-
ment has not only occured in the area of extracting energy resources 
and producing energy from renewable sources, but also on the markets 
of energy sellers and customers. It is a chain of changes whose aim 
is to totally modernize the way of using energy. Hence, it is a whole 
process of technological changes, where energy security will not only 
require access to energy resources but also their effective use, at the 
same time meeting the challenges of reducing CO2 emissions. In this 
context, fossil fuels will maintain priority importance in the US. It is 
on the global market of natural gas and oil the greatest changes are 
occurring at the moment, involving the fight for a share in the global 
energy market.
Even 10 years ago, the United States faced the challenge of the lack 
of a sufficient amount of natural gas and a growing dependence on 
the import of oil, as well as a considerable decrease in domestic pro-
duction of those resources. In 1999, the EIA forecast some growth in 
the import of natural gas to the US by 12.9% before 2020. The situa-
tion appeared so serious that the American government took decisive 
action to ensure the appropriate supply of gas. One of them was sup-
port for the private sector in the construction of terminals importing 
LNG. In the years 2000-2005, American energy companies built 5 
regasification terminals, greatly increasing the capacity of the units.447
447 At the moment, there are 12 terminals in the USA with total import capacity of 
396 million m3 a day (i.e., about 141 bcm a year).
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In 2005, the situation changed dramatically. Thanks to the use of 
hydraulic fracturing technology on an industrial scale, the American 
natural gas sector experienced a historical revolution. Its source was 
the enormous deposits of unconventional gas from formations in the 
north-eastern (Marcellus), north (Bakken), middle (Woodford, Fay-
etteville) and southern (Barnett, Eagle Ford) part of the country. As 
a result, within less than a decade, the United States not only solved 
the serious problem of growing demand for imported natural gas, but 
also faced an opportunity to export the resource to foreign markets. 
So far, the export of gas from the US has not been significant and 
has been limited to transmission through gas pipelines to Canada and 
Mexico (95% of the export in 2011; between 1999 and 2011, the level 
of export grew 11-fold). In 1969, with the construction of the export 
terminal Kenai LNG in Nikiski in Alaska, the United States trans-
mitted a small amount of LNG to Japan. Not so long ago, there was 
a public debate in the US concerning the effects of launching natural 
gas export from the country. It involved representatives of the private 
sector and government administration and research and development 
circles. On one side, the existing strong lobby of energy companies 
demanded that the Department of Energy issue more permits for the 
export of LNG from the US. Their main argument was the fear that 
low prices of natural gas on the American market would block further 
research and extraction of shale gas in the US. Another argument was 
that the export of LNG would accelerate development of the American 
gas sector, improve the country’s position on the global energy mar-
ket, and ensure extra revenue in the budget. Opponents of launching 
LNG exports pointed out that the relatively low prices of natural gas 
on the American market ensured the US economy a global competi-
tive advantage, and thus its stable development and new jobs. 
Now we know that the United States is simplifying the process of 
issuing government licenses for gas export, and the federal government 
strongly supports American companies in their attempts to conclude 
commercial agreements. It must be emphasized, yet, that the scale of 
future economic benefits for the US will be the product of: (1) the pos-
sibility of maintaining high production of shale gas at a relatively low 
price; (2) dynamic growth of global demand for natural gas, and (3) 
limited production capacity of gas exporters from other regions. The 
first American LNG load for a foreign recipient left the Sabine Pass 
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terminal on February 24, this year. Next year, the Cove Point terminal 
in Maryland is going to be launched. In the years 2018-2019, another 
four installations should be launched. All of them will be located in 
the Gulf of Mexico (Table 8).
Table 8. List of selected applications submitted to the Department 
of Energy concerning LNG export
Company Quantity (bcf/day)
 Sabine Pass Liquefaction 2.2
Freeport LNG Expansion 1.4 
Lake Charles Exports 2.0 
Carib Energy 0.04 
Dominion Cove Point LNG 1.0
Jordan Cove Energy Project 2.0 
Cameron LNG 1.7 
Freeport LNG Expansion 1.4 
Gulf Coast LNG Export 2.8 
Cambridge Energy 0.27 
Gulf LNG Liquefaction 1.5
LNG Development Company 1.25 
SB Power Solutions Inc. 0.07 
Southern LNG Company 0.5
Excelerate Liquefaction Solutions I 1.38 
Golden Pass Products 2.6
Cheniere Marketing 2.1 
Main Pass Energy Hub 3.22 
Total: 45.3
Source: U.S. Department of Energy
The rapid growth of the supply of gas on the global market com-
bined with decreasing demand in Asia has led to increasing competition 
between LNG suppliers. The growing supply of LNG may, however, 
become a serious challenge to traditional suppliers such as Russia. 
Gazprom is becoming more and more flexible nowadays: it is increas-
ing its engagement in European markets, and adapting to the rules of 
price competition. The conditions for commercial agreements being 
signed for the purchase of LNG are also changing with the growing 
role of spot transactions and short-term agreements.
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In the case of oil, the years 2014-2015 brought the unique phenom-
enon of a three-fold drop in the price of oil within just 17 months. The 
main factor leading to that was the decrease in demand for the resource 
resulting from the economic crisis. Another was the doubled extrac-
tion of oil in the US.  In 2008, the US produced 4.5 million barrels of 
oil a day, and in 2016 the extraction amounted to 8.84 million bar-
rels of oil a day. The overproduction was mostly caused by extracting 
oil from the deposits of shale rocks. It aroused national debate on the 
potential effects of abolishing the ban on export of the resource from 
the USA, applicable for more than 40 years. Finally, on December 18, 
2015, the Congress decided, by virtue of an act setting out budgetary 
expenses for 2016, to abolish the ban, thus releasing the possibility 
of export of the resource and enlivening the competition in areas so 
far monopolized by the group of resource producers. The reluctance 
to reduce the production of oil, especially by OPEC member states, 
combined with the US reducing its import, have caused the instabil-
ity and low prices of oil recently.
Within a short period of time, due to the currently persistent low 
prices of oil and thus the decreasing price difference between Brent 
and WTI oil, the possibility of the US quickly entering the market 
as an exporter seems to be limited. Equalizing the benchmarks of 
American and European oil means that a large group of American 
refineries will return to importing heavy oil from the markets of Nige-
ria or Algeria, maintaining an advantage in the costs of transport of 
the resource.448 It seems, however, that in the long run, starting to 
export American oil will strengthen the USA’s global position and 
improve its competitiveness on the global energy market. As a result, 
export of American oil may in the future reduce the susceptibility to 
disturbances in supplies of countries importing from American pro-
ducers, strengthening the negotiating position of the USA in political 
relationships with the main actors on the energy market (i.e., Russia, 
and the Middle East). With the present fight of exporters for maintain-
448 In order to compensate for the losses of American refineries that were against 
abolishing the ban on oil export because of benefiting from the low price of the 
resource, Congress has granted them tax deductions, thanks to which they will be 
able to deduct more costs of transport of the resource, which will cost the budget 
approx. USD 1.8 billion within the next 10 years.
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ing their market shares, the potential of extra supply of the resource 
from the USA on the global market may be the factor preventing the 
increase in oil prices in the following years. The winners in this sce-
nario will be great importers such as India, China, Japan, or many 
developing countries. Low prices of oil will foster economic growth and 
lead to a reduction in the prices of basic products. On the other hand, 
there will be the fear that the lack of market reasons for the growth 
of oil prices in the near future may initiate even seismic changes in 
the global balance of power, especially including the growth of crime 
and fear of insolvency of many former export powers such as Russia, 
Venezuela, Algeria, or Nigeria.
So natural gas and oil, which even 10 years ago contributed the most 
to the growing commercial deficit of the USA, weakening its position 
on the global market, now are the source of the greatest potential in 
the USA’s geopolitical fight on the international arena. One expression 
of the growing importance of the energy sector in US foreign policy 
was appointing in 2011 as part of the Department of State a separate 
Bureau for Energy Resources, today made up of over 70 specialists. 
The goals of activity of the new bureau are to solve global energy con-
flicts, to fight “energy poverty”, and to promote energy transition on 
the global market. Another task of the bureau is to lobby American 
diplomacy to include domestic companies in energy investments all 
over the world.
Planes of competitive advantages / new branches 
of the economy
Energy transition in the US caused by the release of cheap resources 
of natural gas and oil has significantly improved the attractiveness of 
the American economy, especially industrial producers. In combina-
tion with the power of creating innovations, protecting intellectual 
property, and developing the “made in America” brand, the Amer-
ican economy is experiencing an unexpected increase of interest 
from foreign companies and domestic business in investment in the 
US. According to IEA data, the US currently has the lowest cost for a 
megawatt of all the countries that provide data on energy production. 
Besides, the prices of natural gas and diesel oil will remain relatively 
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low. As a result, companies from industrial sectors (e.g., German BASF, 
Canadian Methanex Corp, Austrian Voestalpine, or Dutch Royal Dutch 
Shell) are choosing to move their production to the United States. As 
estimated by the American Chemistry Council, until 2020, over USD 
70 billion of new investment will take place in the USA in the chemical 
sector alone. In its report of 2012, PwC points out that employment in 
this sector will grow from the current 2.1 million to 3.9 million jobs 
by 2025. Energy transition involves dynamic growth of employment 
and production also in other energy-intensive sectors, such as the 
production of fertilizers, synthetic resins, iron, or steel. The energy 
sector itself is becoming an important source of economic develop-
ment and new jobs. The U.S. National Association of Manufacturers 
estimates that the extraction of natural gas and oil from shale rocks 
will cause an increase in employment from current 900 thousand to 
2 million new jobs in 2035.449
Energy security
Energy security of the United States has continuously affected 
the general security of the country for many years. Although the US 
has the world’s largest stocks of energy resources (total documented 
resources of coal, oil, and natural gas are 973 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent)450, at the same time it imports nearly 10 million barrels of 
oil daily, thus ensuring the functioning of a global oil market financed 
with American dollars and controlled by the USA. Therefore, despite 
its “energy independence” caused by the “shale revolution”, it still has 
some obligations towards its previous suppliers, mainly those from 
the Persian Gulf. For the strategic role of the US, it is the crucial area 
of control of global fossil fuels resources, currently being sent to the 
economically developing region of Asia. Thus, reduced dependence 
of the US on oil from Arab countries is causing new opportunities to 
“manage” the balance of power in the region. 
A practical aspect of the US becoming independent from import of 
449 IHS released America’s New Energy Future: The Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Revolution and the US Economy, October 2012.
450 The others are: Russia – 955 billion barrels, China – 480 billion barrels, Iran – 
291 barrels.
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energy resources is the reduction in oil prices on global markets, whose 
effects are geopolitical. Actually, considerable reduction of income from 
trade in oil in Arab countries may cause a further expansion of Mus-
lim fundamentalism. The other energy power, Russia, must face the 
challenge of budgetary imbalance and changes on the demand side. 
China is quickly increasing its presence on the energy market, at the 
moment being the biggest oil importer in the world. China is currently 
most dependent on oil supplies from the Middle East: almost 15 mil-
lion barrels a day (the USA imports around 2 million of barrels, and 
Europe, almost 3 million barrels). 
In addition, the security of the US is largely dependent on the 
American military  stationed both in the country’s territory and more 
than 63 bases located in countries all over the world. The American 
military is the world’s biggest single consumer of energy. In 2015, it 
spent nearly USD 20 billion, consuming more than 90 million barrels 
of oil, 60% of which was imported. 
A new element of US security policy, applying to economic, defense, 
and energy security issues, is climate policy. One of the most meas-
urable successes of American diplomacy in recent times, certainly, 
is the climate agreement with China, setting GHG emission limits, 
and the global climate agreement in Paris. Future engagement of the 
USA in global activities aimed at climate change lies in the hands of 
the developing new administration of president Trump, who has so 
far expressed scepticism concerning the need for further US leader-
ship in this matter. This is manifested in his appointment of former 
Texas governor Rick Perry – a heated denier  of climate change – as 
Secretary of Energy. 
Conclusion
Energy transition in the US, moving towards growing extraction 
of natural gas and oil, has dramatically changed the position of the 
American energy sector recently, making the country one of the key 
actors in the global energy sector, competing with such powers as 
Russia or Saudi Arabia.
Thus, the United States is changing its status on the global energy 
market completely, from the role of the biggest importer of energy 
resources to the role of energy exporter. The achieved independence 
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in the energy sector will translate into the direction of US interna-
tional policy.
The success of energy transition has also become the source of hun-
dreds of thousands of new jobs, not only necessary for the construction 
of pipelines, railroad systems, drilling machines, and equipment, but 
also in other energy-intensive sectors such as the chemical, metal, 
machinery, metallurgic, glass, or even textile industries. Access to 
cheap shale gas and the low price of energy also fosters export and is 
attract more and more foreign investors to the USA.
The important role of the federal government in setting the direc-
tion of US energy transition means that the change of power and the 
election of D. Trump as President will cause an adjustment in the 
assumptions of the vision of US energy transition. However, it is not 
only deregulation in the fossil fuels sectors, but predominantly the 
future role of the United States in the fight against the negative effects 
of climate change. The current administration has taken the US out 
of the Paris climate agreement. The President has signed numerous 
directives eliminating environmental standards and requirements.451 
The budgets of government agencies that carry out climate policy 
are being slashed (e.g., the President’s proposal to reduce the budget 
of EPA for 2018 by 1/3, to USD 5.6 billion). The key environmental 
reform by B. Obama, the so-called Clean Power Plan, limiting GHG 
emissions in different states, has been reviewed.452 And the positions 
in key environmental institutions are now manned by heated scep-
tics of climate change.  
451 On August 15, 2017, the President signed the directive Executive Order on Estab-
lishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting 
Process for Infrastructure, which cancelled the environmental standards intro-
duced in 2015 by President Barack Obama (Executive Order 13690), which imposed 
restrictive environmental requirements on infrastructure projects. President Trump’s 
directive establishes the limit of 90 days as the maximum period for issuing deci-
sions for the implementation of infrastructure projects.
452 President Trump’s directive The Energy Independence Executive Order of March 
28, 2017.
Chapter 16
Energy transition in Denmark
Yingkui YANG453, Jingzheng REN454
Introduction
Denmark is one of the world pioneers in wind energy technology. 
Wind supplies about 40% of the electricity in Denmark today. Denmark 
is also a pioneer in the green energy system transition (in Danish grøn 
omstilling) such as widespread use of district heating and encourag-
ing energy efficiency codes in buildings, etc. Over the past decades, 
the proportion of fossil fuel energy production has declined dramat-
ically, but the share of renewable energy has increased considerably, 
as seen in Chart 35. Wind power was given the highest priority in 
promoting renewable energy sources. From the mid-70s to the mid-
90s, Denmark was endowed with a number of strategic efforts for 
promoting wind power.455 The rationales for focusing on wind power 
are: (1) Denmark’s long tradition of exploiting wind power, and (2) its 
limited energy resource base. The national energy policy for support-
ing wind energy is a basket of a number of policies that are concerned 
with securing energy supply and protecting the environment. This 
basket is based on three key pillars: (1) research and technologically 
oriented support, (2) market oriented support, and (3) regulation 
453 Yingkui Yang, PhD, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Eco-
nomics, University of Southern Denmark, Address: Niels Bohrs Vej 9, DK-6700 
Esbjerg, Denmark, tel.: +45 65501527, e-mail: yya@sam.sdu.dk 
454 Jingzheng Ren, PhD, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The 
Hong Kong Polytechnic University k, Address: Department of Industrial and Sys-
tems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR, China, 
tel.: +852 27666596, e-mail: jzhren@polyu.edu.hk
455 For detail, please refer to Meyer, N. (2004). Renewable energy policy in Denmark. 
Energy for Sustainable Development, 8 (1), pp. 25-35.
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oriented support.456 Each support pillar contains a number of instru-
ments. For instance, the market oriented support consists of subsidies 
to renewable energy technology producers and also to investors; green 
certificates, and fees for other alternative technologies, etc. The reg-
ulation oriented support pillar consists of requirements for physical 
plants and conditions for connecting to the grid. Indeed, the basket 
embraces all six types of energy policy approaches.457 The advantage 
of such a basket of policy is that every single policy can complement 
each other and generate a synergic effect in terms of effectiveness to 
achieve environmental targets, economic efficiency, administrative fea-
sibility, and political acceptability. The key disadvantage is the heavy 
financial cost. In fact, approximately two-thirds of electric bills paid 
by Danish consumers are different forms of taxes such as a CO2 tax, 
value added taxes, etc. Nonetheless, Danish energy policymakers have 
established a successful feed-in model for stimulating the expansion 
of wind power. Under this model, Danish utilities were required to 
buy wind power at 85% (at 1992 levels) of the electricity retail price. 
Meanwhile, a tax reimbursement was paid to the producers to stim-
ulate environmentally friendly production.458 Table 9 presents the 
historical feed-in tariff. The high level of feed-in tariff makes it highly 
profitable to set up new wind turbines, reflecting a rapid increase in 
wind power share. Combining with the increasing cost effectiveness 
of wind power, the wind industry has become more and more com-
petitive.459 Today, Denmark is the most wind intensive country in the 
world, meaning that Denmark has the highest rate per capita of wind 
installations. The share of wind power production in 2014 was over 
20 times that of 1990, see Chart 35.
456 K. Skytte, S.G. Jensen, p/ E. Morthorts, & O. J. Olsen, Støtte til vedvarende 
energi? (Support for renewable energy?). København/Copenhagen, Denmark: 
Jurist- og Økonomforundets Forlag/The Danish Association of Lawyers and Eco-
nomists Press 2014.
457 M. Jaccard, Sustainable Fossil Fuel: the unusual suspect in the quest for clean 
and enduring energy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press 2005.
458 N. Meyer, Renewable energy policy in Denmark, “Energy for Sustainable Devel-
opment” 2004, 8 (1), 25-35.
459 R. Redlinger, & P. M. Andersen, Report on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, 
Wind Energy, for the UN Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and 
On Energy for Development. United Nations, Report of the secretary General 1998. 
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Table 9. The feed-in tariff for wind turbines in Denmark
Time of installation Feed-in Tariff 
Before the end of 1999 about DKK0.60/kWh for specific full-load hours or 
until the turbine is 10 years old.
After 2001 and before 
2003
about DKK 0.43/kWh for specific full-load hours 
or until the turbine is 10 years old; green certificate 
income failed to reach the date for liberalization.
After 2003 all new renewable installation will be through a free 
green certificate market; the market has a minimum 
price of DKK0.10/kWh and a maximum price of DKK 
0.27/kWh.
Source: Meyer& Koefoed, 2003.460
However, wind is the most variable energy source, thus it is diffi-
cult to predict its output. Moreover, the grid has almost zero tolerance 
of outages and significant voltage or frequency fluctuations.461 Due to 
the industrial structure in Denmark, domestic demand is rather lim-
ited. The large volume of wind power feed-in is problematic. To solve 
this issue, therefore, interconnection with its neighboring countries 
is needed. 
In addition to wind power, bio-mass also plays a significant role 
in renewable energy power production, shown in Chart 35. Indeed, 
biomass energy accounts for about half of the total renewable energy 
output. Renewable energy waste, wood waste, and firewood are the 
top three contributors of biomass energy generation, see Chart 36. 
The major pitfall of biomass energy generation is greenhouse gas 
emission. Although biomass can function as an alternative for coal- 
and gas-fueled power plants in order to achieve the goal of fossil fuel 
independence, the effect of greenhouse gas reduction, especially the 
emission of carbon dioxidize, is limited. Chart 37 presents CO2 emis-
sions from energy consumption across four sectors. The transport 
sector is the largest contributor of CO2 emissions, accounting for 
approximately 60% of total CO2 emissions from energy consumption.
CO2 emissions reached a peak in 2005 and afterwards began to fall 
slightly. CO2 emissions have remained almost constant from 2012. 
460 N. I. Meyer, A. L. Koefoed, Danish energy reform: policy implications for renew-
ables. “Energy Policy”, 2003, 31(7), 597-607.
461 B. Hively, J. Ferrare, Understanding today’s electricity business. San Francisco, 
CA: Enerdynamics LLC, 2005.
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Commercial and industrial services and the household sectors are the 
two next largest contributors in terms of CO2 emissions. Unlike the 
transport sector, CO2 emissions in these sectors has fallen consider-
ably over the past decades. 
Chart 35. Development of energy production in Denmark
Source: Danish Energy Agency 
Chart 36. Development of renewable production in Denmark
Source: Danish Energy Agency 
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Chart 37. Development of biomass energy in Denmark
Source: Danish Energy Agency 
Chart 38. CO2 emission of energy consumption by sector
Source: Danish Energy Agency 
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The long term goal is to become a fossil fuel independent nation by 
2050.462 Increasing the share of renewable energy supply plus possible 
carbon capture storage (CCS) and taking energy efficiency measures 
so as to minimize energy consumption across all sectors are the two 
primary tools for achieving the goal of being a fossil fuel independent 
nation, as shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. The two pillars of the Danish energy transition:  
energy efficiency and increasing renewable energy (RE) according  
to Energy Strategy 2050.
Source: Energy Strategy 2050 - from coal, oil and gas to green energy, Danish 
Government, 2011.
462 Energy Strategy 2050 - from coal, oil and gas to green energy, Danish Gov-
ernment, 2011. 
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According to Energy Strategy 2050, gross energy consumption 
in 2020 should be reduced by 4% as compared to the 2006 level463, 
and net energy consumption in 2020 should be decreased by 12% as 
compare to the 2006 level.464 The penetration of renewable energy dif-
fers across sectors.465 For the electricity sector, half of the electricity 
consumption should come from wind energy in 2020. All coal-fired 
power plants should be phased out by 2030, and all electricity should 
come from renewable energy by 2035. For the heat sector, all oil boil-
ers should be phased out by 2030. The entire heat sector should be 
powered by 100% renewable energy by 2035. For the transport sector, 
biofuels should be used in the transport sector by 10% by 2020 and 
100% by 2050. Meanwhile, several milestones have been set by the 
government in order to achieve the goal of a fossil fuel independent 
nation by 2050, see Table 9. Furthermore, it is also expected that green-
house gases should be reduced by 40% by 2020 in relation to 1990. 
Table 10. Milestones for a fossil independent nation
Year Energy Policy Milestones 
2020. 50% of electricity consumption should come from wind energy by 50%
2030. 100% renewables in electricity and heat supply
2035. all coal fired power plants and oil burners should be phased out by renewables
2050. 100% renewable energy supply across all sectors, including transport sector
Source: Energy Strategy 2050 - from coal, oil and gas to green energy, Danish 
Government, 2011. 
This chapter provides an overview of the energy transition in Den-
mark. It describes how Denmark is going to modernize its structure 
463 Aftale mellem regeringen (Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialis-
tisk Folkeparti) og Venstre, Dansk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten og Det Konservative 
Folkeparti om den danske energipolitik 2012-2020, den. 22 marts 2012 (The Energy 
Agreement of 2012). Copenhagen: The Government of Denmark.
464 Aftale mellem regeringen (Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialis-
tisk Folkeparti) og Venstre, Dansk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten og Det Konservative 
Folkeparti om om strategi for solcelleanlæg og øvrige små vedvarende energi 
(VE)-anlæg, den 15 november 2012 (Agreement on the Strategy for Solar PV of 
2012). Copenhagen: The Government of Denmark.
465 Energy Strategy 2050…, op.cit.
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of energy balance and strengthen its energy efficiency using instru-
ments resulting from energy transition. Moreover, it also discusses 
how Denmark is going to strengthen its competitiveness on the inte-
grated European energy market through its energy transition. Finally, 
this chapter will also discuss how energy transition contributes to its 
energy security. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.3 pro-
vides the current status and future trend of energy balance structure 
in Denmark. Section 8.4 presents how Denmark used the energy 
efficiency instrument for energy transition. Section 8.5 presents how 
Denmark is going to strengthen its market competitiveness on the 
market through its energy transition. Section 8.6 describes its com-
petitiveness in the power market. Finally, energy security issues are 
discussed. 
Energy balance structure: current state  
and future scenarios
Cross-border interconnection 
Denmark has one of the highest degrees of regional interconnection 
in the world. The Danish electricity market is part of the integrated 
Nordic electricity market. The wholesale market is the common Nor-
dic market. On a voluntary basis, all electricity generators and traders 
are trading freely on the Nordic electricity exchange, Nord Pool. Nord 
Pool is Europe’s leading electricity market and provides services across 
nine European countries. To become a wholesaler one does not need 
to own either generators or end-users/consumers. In the physical 
market at Nord Pool, electricity can either be traded on a spot market 
for the next 24 hours, namely Elspot, or on the forthcoming day after 
the day-ahead market, namely the Elbas.466 Power grids from Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, and Demark are the major owners in the Nordpool 
spot market. The wholesale price is determined on the basis of the 
marginal production cost. The wholesale prices in Denmark fluctuate 
with market conditions both domestically and internationally (pri-
marily its neighboring countries)467, e.g., in case of a rainy season, 
466 Nordic market report 2014 - Development in the Nordic electricity market, Nor-
dREG, Helsinki 2014.
467 Lessons from Liberalised Electricity Markets, OECD/IEA, Paris, France(2005).
235Energy transition in Denmark
electricity from the hydroelectric stations in Norway and Sweden is 
likely to be cheap, and in case of a windy season, electricity from wind 
farms in Denmark is likely to be cheap. Figure 11 illustrates real time 
cross-border electricity transmission in Denmark from Energinet.dk. 
As shown in Figure 12, western Denmark is synchronized with the 
power system in Norway, Sweden, and Germany while Eastern Den-
mark is synchronized with the Swedish power system. Thus, Denmark 
functions as a bridge for interconnection between the Scandinavian 
power systems and the German power system and, thereby, the con-
tinental European power system. 
Figure 12. Cross-border Electricity Transmission in Denmark
Source: Energinet.dk 
The total interconnection capacity from Denmark to its neighbor-
ing countries is about 6.4 GW, of which the interaction capacity from 
Demark to Sweden and Norway is 4072 MW and to Germany is 2380 
MW. The total cross-border interconnection capacity is slightly higher 
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than the peak demand of 6 GW in Denmark. Thus, the cross-border 
interconnection countries are important for power balancing because 
they allow Denmark to send power abroad on windy days and to import 
power in times of low wind. 
Promoting flexible consumption 
As the share of renewable energy, especially wind power, increases 
in energy production, the current energy system will face important 
challenges. Energy production will fluctuate more than currently. To 
achieve a balanced and yet sustainable energy supply will require sig-
nificant changes in the structure of both the supply and the demand of 
energy. On the one hand energy producers will need to coordinate the 
interaction between different ways of producing electricity, such as wind 
power, natural gas, and thermal power, so as to minimize the emission 
of CO2 and production costs. On the other hand, energy end-users will 
have to change their current energy behavior in order to synchronize their 
demand with the inherent fluctuations in the sustainable energy supply.
During the energy transition stage, rather than supply being 
expected to meet the growth and variation of energy demand over 
time, demand will need to be actively managed to fit the energy supply 
over time. Whereas renewable energy technology innovation is certainly 
important, technology alone will probably not be able to manage the 
demand side and change consumption habits to synchronize demand 
with the inherent variations in supply from a 100% renewable energy 
system in which wind and solar energy are important factors.468 Thus, 
the transition to a sustainable society will have to involve consumers, 
as well as insight into their consumption behavior and lifestyle and 
also into how changes in consumption behavior and habits such as 
daily routines with respect to energy can be triggered.469
By motivating flexible energy consumption, consumers can con-
tribute to optimizing the operations of a 100% renewable energy 
system, particularly when the 100% renewable energy system con-
tains a dominant share of wind power. This can eventually bring 
468 S. G. Hauser, K. Crandall, Chapter 1 - Smart Grid is a Lot More than Just “Tech-
nology”, P. S. Fereidoon (Ed.), Smart Grid, Boston: Academic Press, 2012, pp. 3-28.
469 J. Axsen, J. TyreeHageman, A. Lentz, Lifestyle practices and pro-environmental 
technology, Ecological Economics, 2012, 82(0), pp. 64-74, C. P. Stern, Individual 
and household interactions with energy systems: Toward integrated understand-
ing, Energy Research & Social Science, 2014, 1(0), pp. 41-48.
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important economic and environmental benefits to the society. In 
line with current environmental and energy research we will focus on 
the theories of consumer behavior that place emphasis on ’interper-
sonal influence’, and draw from multiple perspectives (i.e., diffusion, 
conformity, dissemination, translation, and reflexivity) on consumer 
behavior to develop a model of energy consumption habits.
To build a 100% renewable energy system, significant changes in 
the structure of both supply and demand of energy will be needed.470 
Rather than supply being expected to meet the growth and variation of 
energy demand over time, demand will need to be actively managed to 
fit the energy supply over time. Whereas renewable energy technology 
innovation is certainly important, technology alone will probably not 
be able to manage the demand side and change consumption habits to 
synchronize the demand with the inherent variations in supply from 
a 100% renewable energy system in which wind and solar energy will 
be important factors.471 Although there is a paucity of energy research 
incorporating social science methodology and insights compared to 
energy research rooted in the technological sciences and economics472, 
several studies clearly indicate the need for understanding consumer 
energy consumption habits, especially their daily routines of energy 
usage and lifestyle, what drives or triggers their consumption behav-
ior, and the necessity for engaging consumers in energy technology 
innovations in order to be able to realize the potential of such proj-
ects.473 Thus, research has shown that human behavior/responses to 
new energy improving technologies often offset the beneficial effects 
of the new technology, which is also known as the “rebound effect”474. 
470 P. F. Sioshansi, Smart grid : integrating renewable, distributed & efficient energy, 
Boston: Elsevier/Academic Press, Amsterdam 2012.
471 S. G. Hauser, K. Crandall, Chapter 1 - Smart Grid, op.cit.
472 J. Axsen, J. TyreeHageman, A. Lentz, Lifestyle practices…, op.cit., pp. 64-74, 
B. K. Sovacool, What are we doing here? Analyzing fifteen years of energy schol-
arship and proposing a social science research agenda, Energy Research & Social 
Science, 2012, 1(0), pp. 1-29.
473 F. Gangale, A. Mengolini, I. Onyeji, Consumer engagement: An insight from smart 
grid projects in Europe, Energy Policy, 2013, 60(0), pp. 621-628, P. C. Honebein, 
F. R. Cammarano, C. Boice, Building a Social Roadmap for the Smart Grid, The 
electricity journal, 2011, 24(4), pp. 78-85.
474 G. H. P. Berkhout, C. J. Muskens, J. W. Velthuijsen, Defining the rebound effect, 
Energy Policy, 2000, 28(6–7), 425-432, M. Binswanger, Technological progress 
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Besides, even with detailed feedback information about an individu-
al’s energy consumption, actual energy savings can be very different 
from the expected savings.475 Moreover, although most people seem to 
accept that climate change fundamentally will alter living conditions 
on earth unless the amount of CO2 emissions is reduced drastically
476, 
most individuals also fail to react to this problem by switching to green 
energy, and/or by changing usage habits so as to reduce their energy 
consumption.477 Since energy is a necessity and a low involvement 
good, it may be a great challenge to change energy behavior, which 
may become a non-technical barrier for achieving the national goal 
of being a fossil fuel independent nation.
The future energy structure: grid expansion 
The current grid in Denmark has sufficient capability to accom-
modate the increasing share of wind power flow into the system.478 
Depending on the level of voltage of the transmission line, the grid 
network consists of three levels: 400-kilovolt transmission lines for 
connections between central power stations and interconnection with 
neighboring countries, 150-kilovolt regional transmission lines for west 
of the Big Belt, 132-kilovolt regional transmission lines for east of the 
Big Belt, and a 60-100 kilovolt line for distributing electricity from 
and sustainable development: what about the rebound effect? Ecological Econom-
ics, 2001, 36(1), pp. 119-132, R. Brännlund, T. Ghalwash, J. Nordström, Increased 
energy efficiency and the rebound effect: Effects on consumption and emissions, 
Energy Economics, 2007, 29(1), pp. 1-17, H. Herring, R. Roy, Technological inno-
vation, energy efficient design and the rebound effect, Technovation, 2007, 27(4), 
pp. 194-203.
475 W. Abrahamse, L. Steg, C. Vlek, T. Rothengatter, The effect of tailored informa-
tion, goal setting, and tailored feedback on household energy use, energy-related 
behaviors, and behavioral antecedents, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 
2007, 27(4), pp. 265-276, K. Buchanan, R. Russo, B. Anderson, Feeding back about 
eco-feedback: How do consumers use and respond to energy monitors?, Energy 
Policy, 2014, 73(0), pp. 138-146.
476 Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
IPCC, 2014, Privat engagement skal drive klimakampen videre, Mandag Morgen, 
2014, 36, pp. 4-5.
477 Ibidem.
478 S. Ropenus, H. Jacobsen, A Snapshot of the Danish Energy Transition: Objectives, 
Markets, Grid, Support Schemes and Acceptance, Agora Energiewende & DTU, 2015.
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high voltage electricity to end-users.479 Energinet.dk owns the trans-
mission lines over 100 kilovolts. The planning of the grid in Denmark 
includes biannual grid development plan, the Kabelhadlingsplan, and 
the cross-sectoral system plan.480 Energinet.dk publishes a plan for 
grid development every second year. Following the Energy Agreement 
from 2008, the entire grid lines of 132-150 kilovolts should be laid 
as underground cables completely by 2030, and the new 400 kilovolt 
lines should also be laid as underground cables.481 
Energy efficiency
Improving energy efficiency is an important part of Danish energy 
policy. It is also a crucial element in the transition towards a fos-
sil-fuel-independent society. According to its energy plan in 2050, 
final energy consumption (excluding consumption for non-energy 
purposes) should be reduced by 7.2% in 2020 compared with 2006.482 
Primary energy consumption should be reduced by 12.6% in 2020 
compared with 2006. To ensure accomplishment of the goal of being 
a fossil-fuel-independent nation, the gird and distribution compa-
nies in Denmark (which includes about 70 electricity operators, 3 
natural gas distributors, about 400 district heating companies, and 
6 oil companies) have set a target of annual energy savings of 3% 
in energy end use excluding transport between 2015 and 2020.483 
Energy savings are supposed to be achieved through improved 
energy efficiency. Examples could be improved insulation of build-
ings, and replacing oil boiler heating systems with district heating 
or a heat pump. 
Energy efficiency measures in Denmark
Energy efficiency is an important measurement for achieving 
the 2050 goal, see Figure 13. Denmark has a relatively high share of 
479 Ibidem.
480 Ibidem.
481 Ibidem.
482 Aftale mellem regeringen (Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialis-
tisk Folkeparti) og Venstre, Dansk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten og Det Konservative 
Folkeparti om den danske energipolitik 2012-2020, den. 22 marts 2012 (The Energy 
Agreement of 2012). Copenhagen: The Government of Denmark.
483 Ibidem.
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combined heat and power plants (CHPs), which brings on challenges 
for maintaining a high level of energy efficiency.484 Energy efficiency 
measures consist of two major parts: energy efficiency obligations are 
assigned to energy companies, and requirements to the commercial 
and building sectors. In 2020, a decrease in net energy consumption 
of 12% as compared to 2006485 is expected.
Figure 13. Measurements for achieving the goal of fossil fuel 
independent by 2050
Source: Energy Strategy 2050 - from coal, oil and gas to green energy, Danish 
Government, 2011.
484 H. Lund, A. P. Østergaard, I. Stadler, Towards 100% renewable energy systems, 
Applied Energy, 2011, 88(2), pp. 419-421.
485 Energy Strategy 2050 - from coal, oil and gas to green energy, Danish Gov-
ernment, 2011.
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Competitiveness in the power market
The Danish electricity market is structured around generators, 
retailers (also known as “electricity suppliers”), wholesalers, distri-
bution system operators, and system operators.486 Energinet.dk has 
the primary task of regulating and controlling the electricity mar-
ket. After the market liberalization, the supply function on both the 
generation and the retail sales side was removed from the earlier 
monopolies. Wholesalers and retailers acquire electricity from the 
generators and sell to each other and to the end-users. Electricity is 
delivered from generators to end-users and money flows from end-us-
ers back to generators. In the entire transaction process, electricity 
suppliers function as intermediaries who buy and sell electricity in the 
market. An important role for the electricity suppliers is to sell more 
green electricity in the energy transition, thereby pushing generators 
to build more renewable plants to increase the renewable capacity. The 
end-users can be divided into three segments: residential customers, 
commercial customers, and industrial customers. 
Retail competition and product offerings
As of 2011, there are around 60 electricity retailers in the Danish 
market competing against one another, among which 33 are default 
suppliers and 10 in the electricity retailing market.487 The retailers’ 
terms of retail sales and prices are publicly available on www.elpristav-
len.dk, a website for comparing all available electricity products and 
prices in Denmark. The wholesale price is the underlying price for 
retail market products.488 Although the retail market is fully open 
to households, the majority of the electricity suppliers are actually 
regionalized or local monopolies with market shares of 94% in their 
region.489 Because of this, these 33 default suppliers take up approx-
imately 90-95% of the total market share.490
Price is the primary competitive factor in the retail market. The 
electricity price is a sum of (1) the electricity price paid to the elec-
tricity suppliers, (2) transportation related costs, (3) electricity taxes, 
486 www.energinet.dk 
487 Nordic market report 2012, NordREG, Helsinki 2012.
488 Ibidem.
489 Konkurrencen på detailmarkedet for el (The competition in the electricity retail 
market), Konkurrencestyrelsen, Copenhagen 2009.
490 Ibidem.
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and (4) VAT (i.e., value-added tax, moms in Danish). About half of the 
total price is derived from fixed taxes, and the electricity price is only 
about one-fourth of the total price.
In addition to price, the environmental quality of the electricity is 
another important competitive factor. Products known as green electricity 
(or grøn strøm in Danish) have a variety of forms. Currently, only a few 
electricity suppliers are offering green electricity. Due to the nature of 
environmental-friendless nature, green electricity has a price premium. 
Although the retail market is well-established, the supplier switch-
ing rate in Denmark remains surprisingly low, see Chart 39. Factors for 
the low switching rate can be explained by the small economic benefit 
from switching, psychological lock-in with the current supplier, and 
good relationship management from the supplier.491 
Chart 39. Supplier switching in the deregulated electricity  
market in Denmark
Source: Nordic market report 2012, NordREG, Helsinki 2012, Nordic market report 
2014 - Development in the Nordic electricity market, NordREG, Helsinki 2014.
Conclusion
Denmark is one of the first movers in implementing a renewable 
energy transition. The long-term national goal is to become a fossil-fu-
491 Y. Yang, Understanding household switching behavior in the retail electricity 
market, Energy Policy, 2014, 69, pp. 406-414.
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el-independent nation by 2050. This chapter presented an overview of 
the energy transition in Denmark from three main aspects: the energy 
balance structure, energy efficiency, and competitiveness in the power 
market. Due to its geographic location and historical energy experi-
ence, wind power is a very important role in the future energy mix. 
The intermittent wind power output will bring challenges on balancing 
the grid. Cross-border interconnection, increasing the share of renew-
able energy consumption, and promoting flexible energy competition 
are three important tools for utilizing the increasing share of wind 
power in the future. The Danish power market is quite competitive 
and well-established, but the switching rate for consumer remains at 
a very low level. There is a need for establishing a new pricing struc-
ture and market mechanism to encourage consumer involvement in 
their energy consumption.
Chapter 17
Energy transition in Italy
Andrea PRONTERA492
Italian transition and the National Energy Strategy
Italian energy transition began in the 1990s hand in hand with 
the parallel development of EU energy, environmental, and climate 
policy. During the 2000s several new policy instruments have been 
deployed in order to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
Since 2009, according to the 20-20-20 EU targets, Italy is also com-
mitted to achieve 15.5 Mtoe of energy savings in annual final energy 
consumption between 2011 and 2020, a 17% share of renewable energy 
in final gross consumption, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG) by 18% compared with 2005. However, only in 2013 did the 
Italian government issue a new, comprehensive and forward-look-
ing policy document approving a National Energy Strategy (the last 
national energy plan dated back to 1988). 
The National Energy Strategy (NES) confirmed the Italian commit-
ment to the progressive decarbonization of the economy and proposed 
different actions for achieving and exceeding all the EU targets for 
2020.493 In particular, with regard to the reduction of GHG emissions, 
a 21% lower level than in 2005 is provided, thus exceeding the previ-
ous EU objective of 18%. With regard to the development of renewable 
energy, according to the NES it is expected that Italy will reach, by 
2020, 19-20% of gross final consumption, exceeding the 17% target set 
492 Andrea Prontera, PhD, Assistant Professor, International Relations and European 
Union Institutions and Policies, Department of Political Science, Communication 
and International Relations, University of Macerata, Italy, e-mail: andrea.pron-
tera@unimc.it 
493 Italy’s National Energy Strategy: For a more competitive and sustainable energy, 
NES, Ministry of Economic Development, Rome 2013.
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in the 2010 National Action Plan. Finally, with regard to energy effi-
ciency – an area where the 20-20-20 targets are not binding – Italy 
intends to outdo the European targets of 20% compared to inertial 
consumption, with expected savings of up to 24% (equivalent to a reduc-
tion of about 20 Mtoe of primary energy compared to 2011).
Energy efficiency, in particular, is considered crucial by the NES to 
achieve decarbonization of the Italian economy. New targets for energy 
efficiency are put forward not only in the NES but also in the 2014 
Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP 2014). This document 
has updated the precedent plan issued in 2011 and better clarified the 
measure-by-measure and sector-by-sector contribution to achieve the 
global targets for 2020 set in the NES (table 11). It is worth noting, 
however, that mainly as a result of the economic crisis between 2005 
and 2012, Italy has already exceeded by 58% the target for 2016 set 
in the Energy Efficiency Action Plan of 2011.494 
Table 11. Energy efficiency targets and measures for 2020  
(final and primary energy, Mtoe/year)
Sectors
Planned measures for 2011-2020 Final energy consumption Primary
Regulato-
ry stand-
ard
Measures 
and invest-
ments for 
mobility
Ther-
mal 
account
Tax de-
ductions
White 
certifi-
cate
Expected 
savings by 
2020
Expect-
ed sav-
ings by 
2020
Residential 1.60 0.54 1.38 0.15 3.67 5.14
Services 0.20 0.93 0.10 1.23 1.72
Public au-
thorities
0.10 0.43 0.04 0.57 0.80
Private 0.10 0.50 0.06 0.66 0.92
Industry 5.10 5.10 7.14
Transport 3.43 1.97 0.10 5.50 6.05
TOTAL 5.23 1.97 1.47 1.38 5.45 15.50 20.05
Source: Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2014, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_neeap_en_italy.pdf 
(accessed: 7.10.2016). 
494 Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2011,  European energy 
market reform. Country profile: Italy, Deloitte, available at https://www2.deloitte.
com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-mar-
ket-reform-italy.pdf (accessed: 3.10 2016). 
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With regard to renewable energy, according to the NES, about 
21.4 Mtoe of fi nal energy consumption should come from renewables 
in 2020, compared to 17 Mtoe in 2012, 11 Mtoe in 2008 and 8 Mtoe 
in 2004: this means that an additional 5.3 Mtoe will still be needed 
by 2020.495 However, looking at recent trends this target seems to 
be reachable: in 2014 Italy had already surpassed the 17% EU target 
(Chart 39).
Chart 40. Percentage of renewables in Italian fi nal energy 
consumption
Source: Italian Energy Effi ciency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2014, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/fi les/documents/2014_neeap_en_italy.pdf 
(accessed: 7.10.2016).
This important result has been possible especially thanks to the 
signifi cant progress made in the electricity sector, where Italian gov-
ernments have enacted several policy instruments and granted very 
generous fi nancial support (above the EU average for Renewable energy 
sources for electricity support schemes, or RES-E support schemes). 
Finally, with regard to the CO2 emissions targets – according to 
the 2020 EU requirements – Italy is committed to an 18% reduction 
in global GHG emissions compared to 2005 (a 21% reduction in the 
sectors covered by the Emission Trading System, ETS, and a 13% 
reductions in non-ETS sectors). However, also in this case, Italy has 
achieved and surpassed its targets before the 2020 schedule. By 2012 
Italy had achieved 130% of its target for non-ETS sectors and 109% of 
its target for global GHG emissions.496 This important achievement 
is the result both of the measures to promote energy effi ciency and 
495 European energy market reform..., op.cit.
496 Ibidem.
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renewables and the effects of the economic crisis. As we saw, against 
this background, the 2013 NES set more ambitious targets with a 21% 
decrease in global GHG emissions (for ETS and non-ETS sectors) by 
2020 compared to 2005.
As a result of the above-mentioned measures (and of other mea-
sures included in the NES) an important transformation of the Italian 
energy mix by 2020 (table 12.) is expected, with a prominent role, espe-
cially in the electricity sector, for renewables and natural gas, which is 
expected to be a crucial source in the Italian energy transition (also by 
virtue of its relative lower environmental impact in respect to oil and 
coal) (table 13.). This trend, on the other hand, confirms the special 
role that natural gas has traditionally played in Italy since the 1980s, 
when this source became the ’Italian way’ to partially replace oil.497 
Italy, in this regard, is a peculiar case in Europe because in compari-
son to the other major European consumers it has no nuclear energy 
(two referendum held in 1986 and 2011 twice halted the development 
of a nuclear programme in the country) and a very low contribution 
of coal in its energy mix. 
Table 12. Italian total gross primary energy consumption (Tot, in 
Mtoe) and source mix (%): 2010 and 2020
2010 2020
Electricity imports 2% 1%
Coal 9% 8-9%
Renewables 11% 23%
Oil 37% 30-32%
Gas 41% 35-37%
Tot (Mtoe) 165 155-160
Source: Italy’s National Energy Strategy: For a more competitive and sustainable 
energy, Ministry of Economic Development, NES, March 2013, Rome. 
In what follows, the main policy instruments and achievements 
in the area of energy efficiency and renewables are illustrated. In 
particular, with regard to renewables the focus will be mainly on the 
497 L. De Paoli, Italian Energy Policy: From Planning to an (Imperfect) Market, in 
F. McGowan, (ed.), European Energy Policies in a Changing Environment, Heidel-
berg: Physica-Verlag, 1996, pp. 88-129.
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measures adopted in the electricity sector, where dramatic changes have 
recently occurred. Finally, in the last section, the chapter illustrates 
the main implications of the energy transition for Italian competitive-
ness, growth, and energy security. 
Table 13. Source mix of gross electricity consumption:  
a shift to a gas-renewable mix
2010 2020
Oil 3% 2%
Imports 13% 7-10%
Coal 16% 15-16%
Renewables 22% 35-38%
Gas 44% 35-40%
Other 1% 1%
Source: Italy’s National Energy Strategy: For a more competitive and sustainable 
energy, Ministry of Economic Development, NES, March 2013, Rome.
Promoting energy efficiency: main instruments 
and achievements
In line with EU policy, Italy has enacted several policy instruments 
to meet its energy efficiency targets. The main horizontal measures 
implemented in recent years are498:
  Transposition of Directive 2002/91/EC and implementation of 
Legislative Decree No 192/05 with regard to the requirement of 
minimum energy performance standards for buildings.
  Granting of tax deductions (‘fiscal deduction 55%’) for improve-
ments in the energy efficiency of existing buildings.
  Energy efficiency certificates (‘White Certificate’ scheme).
  Measures to encourage an environmentally sustainable renewal 
of the fleet of cars and commercial vehicles up to 3.5 tons and 
implementation of the EC Regulation No 443/2009.
Table 14 below highlights the contribution expected by each instru-
ment in different sectors and the first important results already 
498 Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2011, Italian Energy Effi-
ciency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2014, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
sites/ener/files/documents/2014_neeap_en_italy.pdf (accessed: 7.10.2016).
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achieved. In particular, by 2011, Italy had already reached more than 
20% of the final 2020 targets in the residential and industrial sec-
tors, while minor results have been achieved in transport and services 
(Table 14.).
Table 14. Annual energy savings achieved in the period 2011-12 
and expected by 2020 under the NES (final energy, Mtoe/y)
Sectors
Leg. 
Decree 
192/05
White Cer-
tificates
Fiscal 
deductions 
(55%)
Incentives 
(pursu-
ant to 
443/2009)
Saving 
achieved 
2011-12
Expected 
savings 
by 2020
Targets 
met 
(%)
Residential 0.62 0.14 0.21 - 0.96 3.67 26.2%
Services 0.02 0.03 0.01 - 0.05 1.23 4.1%
Industry 0.05 1.04 0.01 - 1.09 5.10 21.4%
Transport - - - 0.22 0.22 5.50 4.0%
TOTAL 0.68 1.20 0.23 0.22 2.33 15.50 15.0%
Source: Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2014, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_neeap_en_italy.pdf 
(accessed: 7.10.2016).
Another important energy efficiency policy instrument, not included 
in table 14, is the so-called ’Conto termico’ (Thermal Account), intro-
duced in 2012. This measure represented the first nationwide direct 
incentive scheme for the generation of renewable thermal energy, but 
also the first scheme encouraging public authorities to implement 
energy efficiency actions in buildings and technical installations.499 
The scheme is addressed both to public authorities and to private par-
ties i.e. individuals, condominiums, businesses, and farms. All these 
beneficiaries can implement the energy saving actions via an Energy 
Service Company (ESCO), by means of a third-party financing con-
tract, an energy service contract, or an energy performance contract. 
As for the ‘White Certificates’, this scheme is also managed by the 
GSE (Energy Service Operator), a public company established by the 
Italian state. Examples of energy efficiency actions supported by this 
policy instrument include: thermal insulation of walls; replacement 
of windows; installation of screening and shading systems; replace-
ment of heating systems with condensing boilers; etc. 
499 Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan...2014, op.cit.
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Measures have also been enacted for supporting energy audits 
and energy management systems, including the metering and bill-
ing systems for which Italy is at the forefront in Europe. Additional 
set of measures include many information and communication cam-
paigns, professional training and support for the ESCO, measures for 
the simplification and harmonization of the legislative framework, 
and other financial instruments to support energy efficiency in build-
ings’ construction and maintenance.500 Finally, it is worth noting that 
other actions have been taken by regional and local governments in 
the context of the EU structural funds for the periods 2007-2013 and 
2014-2020. Italian local governments are also widely involved in the 
‘Covenant of Mayors’ programme launched in 2008 by the European 
Commission after the adoption of the Climate and Energy Package. 
In particular, Italy is first in the covenant as to its number of sig-
natories, coordinators, and supporters: 2,081 signatories for a total 
of 2,185 municipalities involved, including the largest Italian cities 
(Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo, Bologna, Florence, Bari, Ven-
ice, and many more).501 In line with this program, local governments 
have formulated and enacted Sustainable Energy Action Plans which 
are considered key instruments for improving energy efficiency at 
local level. 
Promoting renewable energy: main instruments, 
issues, and achievements
In the last two decades Italian governments have implemented 
various policy instruments (RES-E support schemes) to promote 
renewables in the electricity sector (table 15.). A briefly review of the 
history, achievements, and problems of these schemes is offered below 
(based on Prontera 2014).   
The first important decision of the Italian government in the area 
of renewables traces back to 1992, when the support scheme known 
as CIP 6/92 was established. This scheme was based on a feed-in tar-
500 P. Sospiro, Le Politiche europee e nazionali energetiche e di efficienza energet-
ica, in P. Sospiro (ed.), Case PRO.P.RI.E proposta di un piano di ristrutturazione 
energetica del patrimonio immobiliare, pp. 27-43. Rome: Aracne 2015.
501 Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan...2014, op.cit.
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Table 15. The main policy instruments (RES-E support schemes) 
of Italian renewable electricity policy
Instrument 
denomination
Start/
End
Type of In-
strument 
Main elements of design/amend-
ments (*)
CIP 6/92 1992-
1999
Feed-in tar-
iffs
No distinction among res-e technolo-
gies; open to «assimilated» sources; 
8 years of duration of the incentives
Certificati 
Verdi
1999-
2012
Tradable 
Green 
Certificates
Quota system for net generation; 
no distinctions among res-e tech-
nologies; tgC’s duration 12 years. 
tgC’s minimum size 100mwh.
(*) = Amended in 2008: increase 
of quota obligation for suppliers; 
extension of tgC’s duration from 12 
to 15 years; differentiation of tgC for 
res-e technologies. tgC’s minimum 
size 1mwh.
Conto Energia 2005-
2012
Feed-in
premium
For Pv only, duration of incentives: 
20 years
(*) = Amended in: 2007 (’Secondo 
Conto Energia’), 2010 (’Terzo Con-
to Energia’), 2011 (’Quarto Conto 
Energia’).
’Quarto Conto Energia’: incentives 
gradually decreasing over time plus 
annual cap.
Tariffa 
Onnicompren-
siva
2008-
2012
Feed-in
tariffs
For power plants under 1 mw (or 
under 200 kw for wind), duration 
of incentives 15 years, differentia-
tion for res-e technologies.
Nuovo Sistema 2012- Feed-in
tariffs/pre-
mium
Tendering
system
Pv (’Quinto Conto Energia’): fIt on 
generation feeding the grid coupled 
with a premium on generation used 
onsite, spending cap set at 6.7 bil-
lion euro.
res-e except Pv: fIt for power plants 
up to 1 mw and Feed-in Premium for 
res power plants above this thresh-
old; Tendering system above 5 mw 
(10 mw for hydroelectricity and 20 
mw for geothermal power); total 
spending cap set at 5.8 billion euro 
per year.
Source: A. Prontera, Process Sequencing and Policy Change. The Evolution of Ital-
ian Renewable Electricity Policy Over Two Decades, in ’Rivista Italiana di Politiche 
Pubbliche’, 2014, 9(2), pp. 287-320.
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iff (FIT) for all renewable energy technologies and was also open to 
so-called ‘assimilated’ sources (e.g. co-generation plants, heat recovery, 
waste fumes, and other types of recoverable energy from processes 
and equipment, equipment which uses waste materials/energy and/or 
processes, and those which use sources of fossil fuels produced exclu-
sively by minor isolated deposit). However, the implementation of the 
CIP 6/92 was very problematic both in terms of costs and due to the 
fact that the system was more favorable to ‘assimilated’ than renew-
ables. As a result, the instrument was first suspended, in 1997, and 
then abandoned with the policy reform of 1999 (known as the Bersani 
Decree), which introduced a new scheme based on a quota system and 
Tradable Green Certificate, TGC (‘Certificati Verdi’) to be managed by 
the GSE. The implementation of the quota system, however, was very 
problematic. But this measure, along with generous financial support, 
resulted in a rapid increase of renewables’ electricity production, that 
almost tripled in four years: from about 11 TWh in 2008 to about 
28 TWh in 2011. Despite this result, the government was concerned 
about the limited rate of development of solar energy and of smaller 
installations, which found difficulties under the TGC regime. In 2005, 
a 20-year feed-in tariff designed for photovoltaic solar panels (PV), 
the ‘Primo Conto Energia’, was introduced. Thanks to the generosity 
of the tariff the instrument was a success: it allowed for a maximum 
of 100 MW of solar power to be admitted to incentives, but this target 
was reached in nine days, and in the following two months a further 
request arrived for 300 MW more; thus the cap was increased to 500 
MW per year.502 In 2007 a ‘Secondo Conto Energia’ was introduced. 
The scheme was very similar to ‘Primo Conto Energia’, however its 
impact was impressive. PV electricity production grew dramatically: 
from 2.1 GWh in 2006 to 700 GWh in 2009 (Chart 41). However, also 
the total cost of the incentives – which are covered, with the exception 
of the TGC, through a component (A3) of the electricity bills – began 
to become considerable, reaching 110 million euros in 2008 and 303 
million in 2009.503  
502 C. Stagnaro, How Solar Subsidies Can Distort the Power Market: The Case of 
Italy, in: ‘European Energy Review’, 5 July 2012.
503 Incentivazione degli impianti fotovoltaici. Relazione delle attività, GSE, Rome 
2013.
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Chart 41. Italian PV electricity production (in GWh)  
under ‘Conto Energia’ (2006-2011)
Source: Incentivazione degli impianti fotovoltaici. Relazione delle attività, GSE, 
Rome 2013. 
Nevertheless, the success of the scheme was highly appreciated 
by the renewables producers’ organizations, and established an 
important precedent for the advocates of green technologies and deci-
sion-makers. With Budget Law 2008 (Law n. 244 of 24 December 
2007) a feed-in scheme (‘Tariffa Onnicomprensiva’) was introduced 
for non PV small generations up to 1 MW (with the exception of 
wind plants, whose limit is 200 KW), that until then had the choice 
between selling their green certificates on the market or receiving 
a feed-in tariff. In 2010 a ‘Terzo Conto Energia’, with only a limited 
revision of the incentives, was introduced. The partial revision of the 
incentives did not slow down the investment boom in PV (in 2010 
PV electricity production reached 1,850 GWh), and the government 
decided to adopt a new decision to slow down the cost of the sys-
tem. In 2011, a ‘Quarto Conto Energia’ was established, designed 
with lower financial incentives gradually decreasing over time and 
an annual cap. However, using a special law passed in 2010 (the so 
called ‘Decreto Salva Alcoa’) many PV producers were able to access 
the generous scheme provided by the ‘Secondo Conto Energia’ until 
June 2011.504 The incentives became more than 3.9 billion euros in 
one year, forcing the government to adopt a ‘Quinto Conto Energia’, 
with the explicit aim of putting the system under control. The ‘Quinto 
504 C. Stagnaro, How Solar Subsidies…, op.cit.
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Conto Energia’ also introduced a new cap: when total spending for 
the support scheme reaches an approximate cost of 6.7 billion euros, 
it will no longer be possible to access the incentives.
A more important policy change occurred for the TGC system, 
which in 2012 was abandoned in favor of a new system (‘Nuovo Sis-
tema’) which combines feed-in tariffs/premium measures, a tendering 
system and a spending cap (table 15). As a result, in 2014-15, the total 
costs of the RES-E schemes were more effectively put under control 
(chart 42). However, renewable electricity production has continued 
to grow surpassing the 60 TWh in the same period (chart 43).
Chart 42. Total costs (in billions euros) of RES-E supporting schemes: 
Certificati Verdi, Conto Energia, Tariffa Onnicomprensiva, and Cip 
6/92 (only renewables)
Source: Relazione annuale sullo stato dei servizi e l’attività svolta, Autorità per 
l’energia elettrica, il gas e il sistema idrico, AEEG, Rome 2016, available at: http://
www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/relaz_ann/16/RAVolumeI_2016.pdf (accessed: 
26.09.2016). 
Along with electricity generation, important contributions for meet-
ing the renewable energy target are also expected by other sectors: the 
residential and tertiary sectors, heating and cooling and transport. In 
the first case, the use of biomass and other renewables is to be pro-
moted mainly through a ‘Thermal Account’. For heating and cooling 
the main promotional measures are energy efficiency credits and tax 
deductions that cover different technologies, including solar thermal 
installation, biomass boilers, heat pumps, and geothermal cogenera-
tion systems. For transport as well, different measures are provided 
to promote the use of biofuel through binding minimum quotas (espe-
cially in public transport fleets). The energy efficiency credits scheme 
might also be extended to support the use of electric vehicles. 
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Chart 43. Total of renewables electricity production (in TWh) under 
RES-E supporting schemes: Certificati Verdi, Conto Energia, Tariffa 
Onnicomprensiva, and Cip 6/92
Source: Relazione annuale sullo stato dei servizi e l’attività svolta, Autorità per 
l’energia elettrica, il gas e il sistema idrico, AEEG, Rome 2016, available at:  http://
www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/relaz_ann/16/RAVolumeI_2016.pdf (accessed: 
26.09.2016). 
Finally, it is worth noting that along with these important policy 
instruments managed by the central government and the GSE other 
instruments to promote renewables are in the hands of regional gov-
ernments. In 2012, the central government established methods to 
divide the national targets set for renewables between the Italian 
regions, including possible sanctions for non-compliance (with the 
so-called Decree ‘Burden sharing’, Decree 15 March 2012 of the Min-
istry of Economic Development). Accordingly, all the Italian regional 
governments have implemented Regional Energy and Environmen-
tal Plans in order to facilitate the diffusion of renewables and support 
national decarbonization objectives. The Regional plans provide addi-
tional financial and regulatory measures and are usually coordinated 
with the cycles of EU structural funds. 
Competitiveness, green economy and energy security
With its energy transition strategy, the Italian government not 
only aims at the decarbonization of the national economy but also 
at achieving other important goals: strengthening national competi-
tiveness by reducing energy prices; supporting growth, employment, 
and technological innovation (a ’green economy’); and improving 
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the country’s energy security. With regard to the first goal, the gov-
ernment aims to align Italian energy prices with those of other EU 
countries, and possibly with other competitors outside Europe (like 
the United States). Both the instruments in the areas of energy effi-
ciency and renewables are considered important to this end. As we 
can see, incentives for renewables have been traditionally very high 
in Italy and this situation has favored a dramatic increase in renew-
ables production in recent years. However, with the last reform the 
government has managed to get the system under control while con-
tinuing to support these new technologies. According to the NES, 
with the measures envisaged by the government it will be possible, by 
2020, to reduce the overall costs of energy bills by 13,5 billion euros 
(in respect to 2012) and improve the competitiveness of Italian firms. 
Another important contribution to lowering the overall energy bill for 
the country is expected by decreasing the import of energy. Energy 
dependency is expected to decrease from about 85% to about 67% by 
2020. As a result, it is expected that Italy will save about 14 billion 
euros each year after 2020. The savings expected on energy imports 
will represent about 1% of national GDP and will have important pos-
itive effects on the Italian commercial balance. 
On the other hand, natural gas will play an important role also in 
the future Italian energy mix (35-37% by 2020 according to the NES). 
The Italian government has continued to focus on diversification of 
its gas supply, especially after the 2006 and 2009 Russian-Ukraine 
gas crisis and the recent deterioration of EU-Russia relations in the 
wake of the war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. 
Italy is the second EU consumer of Russian gas (after Germany) and 
Russian gas accounts for about 35% of Italian gas imports. Moreover, 
Russian gas is supplied to Italy mainly through the Ukrainian route. 
Up to 2014, Italy and the Italian gas company ENI supported the 
South Stream project to diversify Russian export route from Ukraine, 
but this project was halted by the European Commission. Italy is also 
involved in the development of the Southern Gas Corridor. Thanks to 
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Azerbaijani gas is expected to arrive in 
Italy (and other EU markets) in the following years (about 8 bcm/y). 
To improve its diversification of gas supply, the Italian government 
has also supported the construction of new LNG terminals. The first, 
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with a capacity of 8 bcm/y, was opened in 2009 in the North of Italy 
(near Ravenna) and the second (a FSRU with a capacity of about 4 
bcm/y) in 2013 near Livorno in Tuscany. Through these projects the 
government aims at supporting energy transition and energy secu-
rity but also at gaining additional economic benefits by transforming 
the country into an ’energy hub’ for the wider European gas market. 
Finally, as anticipated, investments in energy transition are 
intended also to create growth and jobs. According to the NES, by 
2020 a cumulative investment of 60-70 billion euros in the area of 
renewables (40% of which comes from the private sector) and about 
50-60 billion euros in the area of energy efficiency (60% of which 
is from the private sector) is expected. These investments, paral-
leled by the regaining of competitiveness in sectors with high energy 
consumption, are eventually expected to create wider benefits on eco-
nomic development. Although the overall impact of these measures is 
difficult to quantify, some indications from the existing data are sig-
nificant in this regard. In the area of energy efficiency, the estimated 
total volume of investments which benefited from tax deductions in 
2012 alone was about 14 billion euros. These investments accounted 
for an estimated 207,000 direct jobs and 311,000 total jobs (this fig-
ure is particular significant considering that in the same period the 
building sector, where many energy efficiency actions are concen-
trated, lost about 200,000 jobs due to the economic crisis).505 Another 
important figure regards the progressive shift of the Italian expendi-
ture for research and development in the energy sector: in 2007 most 
of the expenditures were still concentrated on traditional fossil fuels, 
while in 2014 energy efficiency and renewables surpassed fossil fuels 
and became the first (31%) and second (19%) areas of expenditures.506
More broadly, the impact of a ’green economy’ on overall Italian 
growth is more and more evident, and sustainability is now a key for 
innovation in all sectors of the national economy. In 2015, the green 
economy in Italy was worth about 102 billion euro and guaranteed 3 
505 Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, NEEAP, July 2014, available at: https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_neeap_en_italy.pdf (accessed: 
8.10.2016).
506 La situazione energetica nazionale nel 2015, MISE, Italian Ministry for Eco-
nomic Development, Rome 2016.
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million job opportunities.507 Recent data shows that there are 372,000 
Italian enterprises (about 25% of all businesses) that since the 2008 
economic crisis have invested in green technology in order to reduce 
their environmental impact, conserve energy, and limit CO2 emis-
sions. This trend involves all sectors – from the most traditional to 
the high-tech, from agribusiness to construction, from manufactur-
ing to chemistry – and is very high (32%) in manufacturing, where it 
has proved to be a strategic factor for ’Made in Italy’508. An additional 
294,200 new jobs connected to the green economy (’green skills’) are 
expected also in 2016, accounting for about half of the total demand for 
labor. To support this trend, at the end of 2015, the Italian government 
also enacted new comprehensive legislation on the ‘green economy’ 
(Law No. 221 of December 28, 2015, ‘Provisions on the Environment 
to Promote a Green Economy and Restrict the Excessive Use of Nat-
ural Resources’). This law covers a very broad range of policy sectors, 
including environmental impact assessment, waste management, 
environmental liability, green public procurement, water, energy and 
soil protection, the so-called circular economy, and measures to pro-
mote sustainable mobility (e.g., the improvement of public transport, 
car-pooling, bike-sharing and the creation of cycle lanes).
507 G. Latour, Italy’s green economy is bigger than people think, in Il Sole 24 
Ore, 5 November 2015, available at: http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/
business-and-economy/2015-11-04/anti-crisis-green-economy-italy-the-sec-
tor-accounts-for-372-thousand-enterprises-for-turnover-of-102-billion-143736.
php?uuid=ACQZONTB (accessed: 5.10 2016), Relazione sullo stato della green 
economy in Italia 2015, Sustainable Development Foundation-Green Italy, Rome 
2015, available at: http://www.statigenerali.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
relazione_lo_stato_della_green_economy_in_Italia.pdf (accessed: 18.09.2016).
508 Italy’s green economy...op.cit., Relazione sullo stato...op.cit.
Chapter 18
Energy transition in Slovakia  
and the Czech Republic509
Matúš MIŠÍK510
Energy sectors of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are very closely 
connected as they were for the most part developed as a single system 
during the period when they formed Czechoslovakia. Although the 
country broke up in 1993, many energy related legacies are visible also 
nowadays (for example, excellent electricity grid interconnection). The 
energy sectors of both republics underwent a significant change after the 
fall of Communism during which high energy demand sectors (especially 
heavy industry) dominated their economies. Change in their economic 
systems meant a significant decrease in heavy industry characterised 
by high energy consumption and very low energy efficiency, and gave 
way to less energy demanding sectors of industry and an increase in the 
share of services. These changes (together with other measures) meant 
also a very significant decrease of greenhouse gases emission – in the 
case of Slovakia the change from 1990 levels was 41 % in 2013511; it was 
27.9 % in the Czech case for the period 1990 to 2011.512
Energy transition started very rapidly at the beginning of the 1990s 
with the dramatic change of economy, however, it slowed down sig-
509 The work on this paper was supported by VEGA grant no. 1/0136/16.
510 Matúš Mišĭk, PhD, Department of Political Science, Comenius University in Bra-
tislava Gondova 2, POBox 32, Bratislava 814 99; e-mail: matus.misik@uniba.sk
511 Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic 
(MoE), 2014, http://www.economy.gov.sk/energy-policy-of-the-slovak-republic_
october-2014-qci/145533s (accessed: 2.05.2017).
512 GHG trends and projections in the Czech Republic, European Environment 
Agency, 2013, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/greenhouse-
gas-emission-trends-5/assessment-1 (accessed: 3.05.2017).
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nificantly later on. Energy transition has been significantly connected 
to the development of renewable sources of energy (RES) that have 
been sensitive especially towards the feed-in tariffs introduced in 
both countries at the end of 2000s. At the same time, however, both 
countries utilise thermal power plants for electricity generation that 
support the status quo within the energy sector. Nuclear power is con-
sidered by both countries to be an emission-free source of electricity 
contributing to the development of a carbon-free economy. 
Moreover, nuclear energy and thermal power plants are considered 
by the Czech Republic and Slovakia to be cornerstones of their energy 
security, which is one of the main issues of interest for these countries.513 
Thanks to domestic sources of coal the Czech Republic is “fully self-suf-
ficient in electricity production”.514 On the other hand, RES – crucial for 
the energy transition and development of a carbon-free economy – have 
been subject to unstable development caused by challenges connected 
to the implementation of feed-in tariffs and technical issues connected 
to grid stability. Therefore, for example the Slovak strategic document 
on RES claims that these energy sources can improve energy security 
only to “some extent and to partially diversify the energy supply”.515 The 
Czech strategic document516 questions especially the economic feasibil-
ity of the RES – their competitiveness vis-à-vis other sources of energy 
and the subsequent competitiveness of the whole EU in a global market 
with many players using cheaper sources of energy.
Energy balance structure
The energy mixes of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are charac-
terised by a few common traits (utilisation of nuclear energy, level of 
RES) while they differ in others (especially a higher share of solid fuels 
513 M. Mišík, On the way towards the Energy Union: Position of Austria, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia towards External Energy Security Integration, Energy, 
2016, vol. 111, pp. 68-81.
514 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky, Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu, 2014, 
http://www.mpo.cz/assets/dokumenty/52841/60959/636207/priloha006.pdf 
(accessed: 20.05.2017).
515 National Renewable Action Plan, Ministry of Economy and Construction of the 
Slovak Republic (MoEC), 2010.
516 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky, op.cit.
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but also a lower share of natural gas in the Czech case). The energy 
mix of the Czech Republic is characterised by the dominant posi-
tion of solid fuels and the use of nuclear power (Figure 36). Thermal 
power plants cover 60 % of electricity demand and therefore in spite 
of environmental concerns this energy source is “irreplaceable … from 
a security as well as an economic point of view”517. Nuclear energy 
covers more than 30% of electricity consumption and thus also has 
a prominent role within the Czech energy mix. Renewables contributed 
to the energy mix with 8% in 2013, while the binding national target 
set within the 2020 Climate and Energy Package is 13% by the end of 
2020. Contrary to Slovakia, hydropower in the Czech Republic has 
only a very small share of total electricity consumption – only about 
3%, which is also the whole potential of hydropower in the country. 
However, a common factor is their rather small utilisation of biomass, 
which in both countries has significant potential.
The Slovak energy mix is characterised by almost equal distri-
bution among different energy sources, which is considered to be an 
advantage from the energy security point of view. Renewable sources 
of energy are, however, used less (8.2%) and nuclear energy is used 
more (23.8%) compared to the EU average.518 Renewables thus cov-
ered very similar portions of gross domestic consumption of primary 
energy sources in both countries in 2013 (chart 44). 
The main contributors to the share of RES in Slovakia are big 
hydroelectric power plants, especially the Gabčíkovo hydropower plant 
(which produces up to 19% of domestic electricity consumption). Over-
all, more than 90% of all RES came from hydropower before 2010.519 
However, with the introduction of feed-in tariffs and other support-
ing measures (preferential grid access) at the end of the 2000s, other 
types of RES also started to play a prominent role in the Slovak energy 
mix. Act No 309/2009 on the promotion of RES approved in 2009 
brought a long-term guarantee of feed-in tariffs for 15 years as well 
as preferential access for these types of sources to the grid. Thanks to 
this support the installed capacity of photovoltaic power plants had 
517 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky, op.cit., p.13.
518 Country Factsheet Slovakia. State of the Energy Union, European Commission, 2015, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015SC0237&-
from=EN (accessed: 21.05.2017)
519 National Renewable Action Plan, op.cit.
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reached 537 MW by the end of 2013. The support scheme introduced 
by the Act 309/2009 was cancelled in 2011 as “legislative support 
for installations above 10 kW is no longer needed given the current 
installed capacity of solar power plants and the price development of 
technologies at grid parity”.520
Chart 44. Energy mixes of Slovakia and the Czech Republic (2013)
Source: Country Factsheet Slovakia. State of the Energy Union, European 
Commission, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL-
EX:52015SC0237&from=EN, Country Factsheet Czech Republic. State of the Energy 
Union, European Commission, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?qid=1449825446922&uri=CELEX: 52015SC0220. (accessed: 20.05.2017).
The Slovak target within the Climate and Energy package 2020 
is 14 % of renewable sources of energy in the energy mix until 2020. 
This goal was set in the National Renewable Action Plan that forecasts 
a 15.3 % share of RES in the energy mix by 2020.521 The biggest poten-
tial is in biomass that can produce up to 120 PJ of energy in Slovakia. 
In order to reach the 14% target only 80 PJ are needed – which means 
that Slovakia has enormous biomass potential that can signifi cantly 
contribute to the increase of RES in its energy mix in the future. This 
potential is currently not utilised to a high degree; however, thanks 
to its potential it has seen a signifi cant increase in the recent past, 
and further increase of its utilisation is expected by the Ministry of 
Economy.522 Biomass can compete in terms of price with fossil fuels 
and therefore has been prioritised by the strategic documents of the 
520 Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit.
521 National Renewable Action Plan, op.cit.
522 Ibidem.
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Slovak government. Moreover, it can, together with energy savings 
and other types of RES (for example geothermal energy), be used to 
decrease the amount of natural gas used for heating purposes (and 
thus also decrease its import and thus increase Slovak energy security). 
Neither Slovakia nor the Czech Republic have binding targets in 
the area of renewables utilisation in the case of the Energy 2030 pro-
posal. However, Slovak strategic documents expect that the country 
will reach 20% of RES by that date. 
From the energy transition point of view, both countries can be char-
acterised by high level of utilisation of solid fuels for electricity generation 
and also the use of nuclear power for this purpose. Both countries are 
supporters of nuclear energy and are currently building or planning 
to build new nuclear reactors. Slovak nuclear power plants Mochovce 
3 and 4 are supposed to be commenced in 2017/2018 while the Czech 
Temelín 3 and 4 was stopped for now in 2014 in its preparation phase 
due to problems during the procurement procedure. The Czech Republic 
uses much more coal for production of electricity (almost 60%523) com-
pared to Slovakia (thermal power plants produced 22 % of generated 
electricity in 2013524). However, the share of solid fuels in the energy 
mix of the Czech Republic has decreased rather substantially since 
1995 (by 18%) while the share of RES and nuclear energy has increased 
(from 3 to almost 8 % and from 8 to 18% respectively).525 A high share 
of domestic coal in energy production is considered, especially by the 
Czech authorities, to be a guarantee of energy security and the strate-
gic documents consider coal to be an irreplaceable source of electricity 
in spite of acknowledging its environmentally challenging nature.526
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency is a rather challenging issue for both countries. 
Although the trend is very positive with energy efficiency steadily 
improving, the Czech Republic as well as Slovakia are currently lag-
523 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky, op.cit. 
524 Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit.
525Country Factsheet Czech Republic. State of the Energy Union, Euro-
pean Commission, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?qid=1449825446922&uri=CELEX: 52015SC0220 (accessed: 4.04.2017)
526 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky, op.cit.
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ging behind the EU average in this area. Slovak energy efficiency issues 
are currently governed by the Third Energy Efficiency Action Plan pre-
pared in line with Act No 476/2008 on efficiency in energy use.527 The 
document sets goal of energy saving amounting to 11% of the average 
final consumption for the period from 2001-2005 until the year 2020. 
General energy efficiency target for the country is thus 16.4 Mtoe (tons 
of oil equivalent) of primary energy. Although consumption decreased 
during 2005-2013, later this trend was reversed and Slovakia is facing 
a challenge to increase its energy efficiency during a period of contin-
uous economic growth.528 Energy intensity is, however, still a problem 
as it remains in absolute terms almost twice the EU average.529
The Czech energy efficiency target for 2020 is 39.6 Mtoe of pri-
mary energy. The Commission assumes that the Czech Republic will 
meet this goal if the current trend of energy efficiency improvement 
is kept. Similarly to Slovakia, energy intensity has stayed almost dou-
ble the EU average, in spite of a fast decrease in the last period. The 
biggest decrease was recorded in the industry sector where energy 
intensity decreased by 35% in the period between 2005 and 2013.530
Energy transition and the resulting increase in energy savings and 
higher rate of RES utilisation will positively contribute to the increase 
of energy efficiency. The on-going effort to decrease energy consump-
tion in all sectors of the economy combined with the increase of RES 
production in both countries paves the way for a gradual decrease of 
fossil fuels utilisation for electricity generation. However, the recent 
low price of electricity complicates these efforts, as old coal-fired 
power plants can provide currently more economically feasible solu-
tions. For example, the gas-fired power plant in Slovak Malženice was 
shut down just after a couple of months of production in 2013 due to 
low utilisation rate. The potential of the power plant as an electricity 
527 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2014-2016 with an Outlook up to 2020, Ministry 
of Economy of the Slovak Republic (MoE), 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/
ener/ files/documents/NEEAP_EN_ENER-2014-01001-00-00-EN-TRA-00.pdf 
(accessed: 7.04.2017).
528 Country Factsheet Slovakia. State of the Energy Union, European Commission, 2015, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015SC0237&-
from=EN (accessed: 7.04.2017).
529 Ibidem.
530 Country Factsheet Slovakia..., op.cit.
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source using a “bridging” source (i.e. gas – creating a bridge between 
fossil fuels and renewables thank to its low emissions) and a back-up 
source for RES was thus not utilised. 
Planes of competitive advantages  
/ new branches of economy
Neither Slovakia, nor the Czech Republic are leaders in develop-
ing new technologies connected to energy transition in general or 
RES in particular. Their main agenda when it comes to transition to 
a zero-emission economy is support of nuclear energy, which is con-
sidered to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
as the production of electricity in nuclear power plants is basically 
emission-free. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are therefore also try-
ing to support further utilisation and development of nuclear energy 
within the EU. In cooperation with the European Commission, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia established the European Nuclear Energy 
Forum in 2007.531 Its main current aim is to support discussion of 
nuclear-energy-related issues especially in the post-Fukushima nuclear 
accident world. The Forum meets annually in Bratislava or Prague; 
participants include EU member states, EU institutions, regulators, 
energy companies, and other stakeholders. 
Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia are keen supporters of nuclear 
energy being two of the very few countries within the EU that are 
preparing or actually building new nuclear reactors (although expan-
sion of the Czech nuclear power plant Temelín was cancelled in its 
preparation phase when the tender was cancelled, Mochovce 3 and 
4 have been being built since 2008). Nuclear energy is considered to 
be a “low-carbon” technology that will help reduce fossil fuel con-
sumption and thus also greenhouse gas emissions. Slovakia does not 
directly includes nuclear among RES and is not part of its strategic 
documents about this type of energy source; however, Slovak energy 
policy claims that “the preservation of nuclear energy in the energy 
mix has also played an important role…[in:] continuous reductions 
531 Nuclear energy forum launched in Bratislava, Euractive, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/nuclear-energy-forum-launched 
-in-bratislava/ (accessed: 11.04.2017)
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in the carbon intensity of GDP”.532 Later it is even more direct when 
the document claims that “Nuclear energy is the driving force of low 
carbon growth in Slovakia”.533
Energy security
Energy security is an issue that is very important for both coun-
tries. The Czech Republic is much more active in this area and many 
of its energy sectors underwent changes in order to improve energy 
security. Slovakia had been a rather passive observer until the 2009 
gas crisis which meant a crucial change in the country’s perspective 
on energy security and diversification. However, from the energy 
transition point of view, energy security is an issue that supports the 
status quo (especially in the Czech case) as “traditional” energy sources 
are considered to be the most secure ones. Moreover, RES have been 
connected in the region especially with high prices caused by feed-in 
tariffs and problems with grid stability.
The state energy conception of the Czech Republic states that the 
significant share of thermal power plants burning domestic brown and 
hard coal is a crucial contribution to energy security of the country.534 
Contrary to the Czech Republic coal does not play such an important 
role in Slovak energy security as the main part of coal consumed in this 
country is imported (in 2012 Slovakia imported 4861 kilotons of coal out 
of 7153 kiloton of total coal consumption what represented almost 68%).
Also nuclear energy is considered to be a very “secure” source of 
energy by the Czech strategic documents as it enables, contrary to 
other energy sources, creation of a strategic reserve for a longer period 
given the high concentration of the fuel.535 Therefore Czechs, but also 
Slovaks, sometimes go so far as to consider nuclear to be a “domes-
tic” source of energy.536
Renewables (especially biomass) are considered by the Slovak 
532 Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit., p. 40.
533 Ibidem, p. 41.
534 Státní energetická koncepce České republiky..., op.cit.
535 Ibidem.
536 M. Mišík, The Influence of Perception on the Preferences of the New Member 
States of the European Union: The Case of Energy Policy, Comparative European 
Politics, 2015, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 198-221.
267Energy transition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic
authorities to have an important position in decreasing dependency 
on natural gas supplies from abroad.537 This is based on the idea that 
renewables are domestic energy sources. Moreover, according to the 
Ministry of Economy, these sources of energy will help to reduce 
greenhouse gasses and pollution. However, as noted above, the Slo-
vak position is cautious in this area and strategic documents mention 
also the challenges connected with the utilisation of RES. The National 
Renewable Action Plan states that RES carries several risks including 
fluctuations that have “an adverse effect on the safety and reliability 
of grid operations”538 and significant price hikes caused by feed-in 
tariffs. Therefore, other documents, for example, the Energy Policy of 
the Slovak Republic, states that the country support “particular those 
[RES] with predictable generation” that are able to deliver energy at 
a price that is “close to market prices”539.
Renewables and their consequences for the electricity grid thus 
present a challenge for the analyzed countries. Although there are the 
above mentioned issues at the domestic level, there are also challenges 
connected to the stability of the grid at the regional level. Especially, 
German RES cause problems for the Czech and Slovak electricity grids. 
Energiewende significantly supported development of RES capacities 
in northern Germany, where there are much better conditions for wind 
as well as photovoltaic power plants than in other parts of the country. 
However, after the Fukushima nuclear accident, Germany revisited 
its decision to shut down its nuclear program and decided to close all 
nuclear power plants by the end of 2022 and fully concentrate on RES. 
Moreover Germany immediately shut down several of its oldest reac-
tors located mostly in the southern part of the country. This has created 
a regional unbalance between electricity supply and demand – while 
the northern part of the country produced a significant surplus of elec-
tricity from RES, there was a shortage in the southern part of Germany. 
Electricity produced in the north started to be consumed in the south. 
However, the internal German grid was insufficient to support 
such a huge volume of electricity and therefore it started to flow to 
southern Germany through neighboring countries – especially Poland 
537 National Renewable Action Plan, op.cit.
538 National Renewable Action Plan, op.cit. p 5.
539 Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit., p. 60.
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and the Czech Republic (so called loop flows). Moreover, the bidding 
zone between Austria and Germany enabled the export of electricity 
from German RES to Austria without the necessary infrastructural 
support thus adding to the problem (transit flows). These unsched-
uled flows emerged shortly after the German decision to shut down 
nuclear power plants and already by August 2011 were causing severe 
problems for electricity grids in Central Europe including Czech and 
Slovak ones.540 For example, overall transit through Slovakia increased 
by 79 % in 2011 compared to 2010.541 These flows were unscheduled 
due to the partly unpredictable nature of RES, thus putting extra 
pressure on the grids and its operators, threatening the grids’ stabil-
ity and enabling possible blackouts.
Many levels of cooperation have been used to deal with this issue. 
First, it was addressed at the ENTSO-E (Network of electricity trans-
mission system operators) level; however, neither this nor at the bilateral 
or regional (Visegrad four) levels brought the desired outcomes. The 
problem became less urgent after 2012 as Germany started to limit 
the amount of unscheduled flows, and better coordination between 
grid operators enabled the prevention of blackouts. However, Poland 
decided to solve this problem by building a phase shifting transformer 
that received financial support from the European Union through the 
Project of Common Interest scheme.542 The Czech Republic approaches 
this issue through improved cooperation at the regional level – col-
laboration with Germany and Austria on this issue was one of the 
priorities of its 2015-2016 presidency of Visegrad group.543
540 Position of ČEPS, MAVIR, PSE Operator and SEPS regarding the issue of Bidding 
Zones Definition, 2012, http://www.mavir.hu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=-
513b0eee-8eb1-405b-85f1-3df85c47237d&groupId=10262 (accessed: 13.04.2017)
541 Ibidem.
542 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/89 of 18 November 2015 amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
as regards the Union list of projects of common interest. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2016_019_R_0001&from=EN (accessed: 
13.04.2017).
543 V4 Trust – Program for the Czech presidency of the Visegrad Group, Viseg-
radgroup, July 2015–June 2016, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/
presidency-programs/20152016-czech (accessed: 14.04.2017).
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Conclusion
Energy transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be char-
acterised by several traits. Nuclear energy is an important part of the 
transition for both countries as it is considered to be a low-emission 
source of energy and at the same time an important part of energy 
security as it is considered to be a “domestic” source of energy. In the 
Czech case also coal-fired power plants using domestic coal stocks 
contribute significantly to energy security which is considered by both 
countries to be one of the most important energy-related issues. On 
the other hand, renewable sources of energy are being approached 
cautiously after very fast development at the end of the 2000s and 
the beginning of the 2010s that brought concerns about the ability 
of these energy sources to be implemented in the existing electricity 
grid as well as issues connected to the feed-in tariffs and their influ-
ence on the price of electricity for end consumers (households as well 
as businesses). Neither of the two countries are leaders in developing 
new technologies or policies connected to energy transition. Their 
position when it comes to energy transformation is rather passive 
with a dominant interest in energy security issues.
Conclusion
Energy transition is an inevitable process, currently going on in 
many countries. At the national level, it requires a coordinated policy 
involving cooperation between different institutions, and especially 
the world of science and industry. With the diversity of energy bal-
ance structure of different countries in mind, we can also see different 
approaches to the issue of energy transition. Energy transition based 
on low-emission energy sources is connected with real social and 
economic benefits such as alleviating the effects of climate change, 
its influence on human health, and enhancing energy independence 
or energy system flexibility. Transition-focused thinking means the 
ability to see many different forms of energy production beyond the 
commonly used fossil fuels. 
Transforming the economy into a low emission economy (energy 
transition) is one of the biggest economic-environmental challenges 
of the 21st century. The longer the emitting countries wait to start the 
transition, the higher will be its costs and the more difficult its imple-
mentation, because present investment in the traditional technologies 
producing energy from conventional fuels will form the energy mix 
for many years544. Properly designed energy and climate policy has 
a stimulating influence on all areas of socio-economic life and fosters 
the building of a modern and highly developed economy, and mod-
ernization of the energy sector seems the only solution allowing the 
maintaining of energy security and competitiveness of energy pro-
duction in the age of climate change545. Associating environmental 
policy with energy policy results from the fact that energy is the sector 
with the greatest impact on the quality of air and is the source of the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere responsible for 
global warming. The sector of energy production is one of the greatest 
544 T. Młynarski, Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne i ochrona klimatu w drugiej deka-
dzie XXI wieku. Energia - Środowisko – Klimat [Energy security and climate 
protection in the second decade of the 21st century. Energy – Environment – Cli-
mate], Kraków 2017, p. 189.   
545 Ibidem.   
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CO2 emitters and must play a fundamental role in the decarbonization 
of the world’s economy. Energy transition forces the modernization 
of the energy infrastructure and reduction of energy intensity of the 
economy through investment in innovative green energy technolo-
gies. Growing awareness in the international community of the need 
to counteract GHG emissions has increased the importance of the 
ecological aspect of energy security, which includes the reduction of 
negative effects on the natural environment at each stage of energy 
management (extraction, processing, transport, storage, and con-
sumption). The threat resulting from climate change, in turn, requires 
revaluation of the traditional concept of energy security, including the 
still present preference for cheap energy sources that actually prevent 
the effective reduction of CO2 emissions.  
The process of energy transition is seeding up globally as a result 
of the growing role of electricity in new branches of the economy, 
including transport. It will contribute to the replacement of previous 
fossil fuels (oil) with electricity perceived as “fuel” for vehicles. The 
global fleet of electric vehicles nearly doubled in the years 2014-2015, 
reaching the level of 1.3 million. In the first quarter of 2017 alone, the 
number of registered electric vehicles in three countries which are 
the leaders in this regard, i.e., China, the USA, and Japan, exceeded 
1.3 million.  The IEA estimates that the number will grow up to 30 
million cars by 2025 and exceed 150 million in 2040. Such develop-
ment of electric cars will reduce the demand for oil by approximately 
1.3 mb/d in 2040546. T. Seba assumes a much more dynamic develop-
ment of electromobility. He anticipates within 8 years that all land 
transport will be powered with electricity, which will lead to a slump 
in oil prices and the collapse of the petroleum industry.547 Surely, the 
dynamics of electromobility development will depend on the speed 
of overcoming different barriers to it, such as the development of an 
energy infrastructure for charging electric vehicles, production of effi-
cient batteries, the growth of public acceptance, and first of all, lower 
prices for electric cars. This will help countries that spend consider-
able financial resources on the import of oil and fuels to rather spend 
546 World Energy Outlook 2016, IEA.
547 J. Arbib, T. Seba, Rethink X. Disruption, Implications and Choices. Rethinking 
Transportation 2020-2030.
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it on electricity, which is mostly generated on domestic markets, and 
so the flow of funds may become a lever for economic development 
in each country. The crucial question is how different countries will 
decide to invest in it and whether they will achieve in this way certain 
sources of economic advantage.
It is clear that despite technological development, fossil resources 
are still dominant in the structure of primary energy (nearly 80%). 
However, in the coming decades, the situation will likely change, 
given the dynamics of development within the last 15 years of energy 
technologies based on RES, which do reduce emissions. The process 
will additionally stimulate a dynamic growth in demand for elec-
tricity, whose production has increased 4-fold in the last 40 years. 
The development of ICT systems, digitalization, and robotization are 
bound to make the demand for electricity grow in the future. The 
development of renewable energy also leads to changing the model of 
relations between the producer and consumer of electricity, as the pre-
vious consumer may now also produce energy, becoming a prosumer. 
Restrictive environmental standards also favor nuclear energy, which 
is regarded as one of the low-emission forms of final energy produc-
tion. But it seems that nuclear energy will play only an intermediary 
role in the process of energy transition, because by 2040 nearly 200 
out of 450 nuclear reactors may be discontinued. Within the nearest 
several decades, nuclear energy will mostly develop in Asia. Natural 
gas may also prove to be an intermediary fuel in the transition process. 
As a result of developing LNG technology, the natural gas market is 
becoming more and more integrated and globalized. Transition pro-
cesses also involve new forms of contracting energy resources and 
electricity as a result of the development of energy exchanges and 
electronic platforms for energy trade. The formation of physical and 
virtual gas hubs provides conditions for a new architecture of energy 
contracts, which are alternative to long-term contracts.
It must be emphasized that one way of reducing GHG is to improve 
energy efficiency by optimum use of energy resources. Energy tran-
sition processes mean that optimum energy management in smart 
grids will soon become a challenge. It seems that the improvement 
of energy efficiency is the most economically optimal way of reduc-
ing GHG emissions. The growing demand for electricity causes the 
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need to ensure stable and secure supplies to end customers. It also 
contributes to maintaining the proper quality of electricity, and this 
increases the demand for electricity storage facilities, which may help 
improve the flexibility of the electricity system and balance energy 
supply and demand. Nowadays, different methods of storing electric-
ity are available, and ongoing work in new technologies mean there 
will soon be more. 
Analyzing the model of energy transition in selected countries, we 
can see that the process not only leads to the modernization of the 
energy balance structure, but also to changes in thinking about the 
energy sector. Even a decade or two ago, nobody would have expected 
the US, which used to import over 100 bcm/year, to become an exporter 
of natural gas. The process of technological change that has taken 
place in the last few decades in the US refers to the area of extrac-
tion and production of energy resources, which will soon make the 
country change from being an importer of natural gas to being its net 
exporter. The so-called shale revolution, which began with natural gas 
and then also applied to oil, has affected the global market of energy 
resources and become one of the factors of transition. Considerable 
amounts of oil and natural gas entering the American market have led 
to lowering energy prices, and together with the intellectual potential 
has become a factor that attracts investments to the American mar-
ket. In the case of the US, the process of transition has caused the 
creation of a huge number of jobs in areas of the economy connected 
with the energy sector.548 
In the EU, one of the first countries to begin the transition involving 
extensive implementation of renewable energy is Denmark. Similar 
activities are being taken in the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
is pursuing the regular growth of renewable energy in its energy bal-
ance structure. These activities are also a response to the oil crisis of 
the 1970s, when Western European countries felt the effects of exces-
sively high dependence on imported oil. It is important, however, that 
Germany, having a substantial share in renewable energy technologies, 
548 M. Paszkowski, Analiza implikacji zniesionego przez Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki 
zakazu eksportu ropy naftowe [Analysis of implications of the ban on oil exporting 
abolished by the USA]. POLITYKA ENERGETYCZNA – ENERGY POLICY JOUR-
NAL, 2017, vol. 20, part 1, p. 37. 
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has made it one of their export goods, which have become a source of 
their competitive advantage. Denmark has noticed a similar oppor-
tunity and is the leader in wind energy technologies. At certain times 
of the day, surpluses of electricity may be sent (exported) to other 
countries. Therefore, well developed energy structure and electricity 
interconnections are a significant element affecting the position of Ger-
many (the second greatest exporter of electricity in the EU, just next 
to France) and Denmark on the integrating energy market in the EU. 
Among EU countries, Italy has also found the potential for develop-
ing its competitive energy sources as part of a “green economy”. This 
way, Italy has created many new jobs. Recent significant investments 
by Italian companies in the development of renewable energy tech-
nology is giving the economy some benefits. France has been building 
its position in another way. Initially, it based the modernization of its 
energy sector on nuclear energy, which not only enabled it to lessen 
its dependence on fossil fuels import, but also made the country one 
of the main suppliers of products and services for the nuclear indus-
try. The Act on energy transition adopted in 2015 showed priorities 
such as the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
combined with the reduction of nuclear energy. 
Whereas France is planning to reduce nuclear energy, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia perceive this form of electricity production as 
the solution ensuring a low-emission energy sector. Apart from the 
existing nuclear power plants, they are also planning to construct new 
installations, which will facilitate the process of energy transition, 
also supported with the development of renewable energy. Nuclear 
energy is also an important element of the energy balance structure 
in Great Britain, which is planning to build another installation as 
well. Recently, that country has developed its energy infrastructure 
and liberalized its energy market, in some elements becoming the 
point of reference for many emerging energy exchanges. One of the 
British priorities is currently to improve energy efficiency, both in 
households and in industry. 
Within the last several decades, Poland has had significant suc-
cesses. Previously, it based its energy balance on hard coal and lignite 
deposits, which are used to produce the majority of its electricity. Evi-
dently, on the one hand, Poland’s future energy transition is going to 
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involve the improvement of coal blocks, which may contribute to the 
reduction of greenhouse gases emission. On the other hand, the country 
is looking for its sources of competitive advantage, trying to determine 
its way of energy transition by considering the specificity of the previous 
energy balance structure. Austria and Switzerland skilfully use their 
central location in Europe. In the case of the former, its location ena-
bles it to serve the transit function for the import of energy resources 
to other European countries. On one hand, it provides an opportu-
nity for developing the Austrian economy, but on the other hand, it 
makes the country dependent on others. Regarding the national pri-
orities of the energy sector, further improvement of energy efficiency 
is important, and the sources of competitive advantage are based on 
technological development resulting from the extensive research sec-
tor, and technological ideas then become the export product. Similar 
assumptions were adopted in Switzerland, which mainly pursues tech-
nological development. The factor that makes Switzerland different 
from many other European countries is pumped storage power plants, 
which ensure the possibility to store electricity. Switzerland can also 
see the potential in developing the technologies of energy storage and 
the use of hydrogen in the energy sector and transport.
To sum up, we can see that energy transition in different countries 
is not the same. This mainly results from the variety of the previous 
energy balance structure. However, in each country, energy transition 
is an opportunity for re-industrialization of industry and building new 
branches of the economy, as well as creating competitive advantage. 
It is in the interest of each country to strengthen its energy security 
and to create new jobs as part of the economy. Social expectations and 
renewable technologies correspond more and more to the countries’ 
industrial strategies. In many countries, energy transition occurs 
by evolution, not revolution. Daniel Yergin emphasizes that techno-
logical speed is not the only factor to affect the pace of transition.549 
Apart from this factor, there are others. Therefore, it is even more 
difficult to reduce the phenomenon of energy transition to one com-
mon denominator. 
Editors
549 D. Yergin, Quest, Penguin Books, New York, p. 722. 
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